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ABSTRACT
AN ENGLISH NEWSPAPER FOR BRITISH AND CHINESE: THE SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST STUDY (1903-1941)
by
ZOU Yizheng
Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis studies the relationship between the South China Morning Post and
its audiences. To be viable and profitable in the Hong Kong media market, the SCMP
had to meet the various needs of its Chinese and British readership. For example,
British readers were serious sports fans and the SCMP endeavoured to be the best
newspaper to target its wealthy British audience who was obsessed with the game of
lawn bowls. Because playing fields were mainly granted to the British ex-pats over
Chinese citizens, the sports pages of the SCMP mainly attracted British audiences.
Chinese readers were generally merchants who were concerned about their
businesses in China and Hong Kong. Hong Kong as an international trade and
shipping centre provided both the SCMP and Chinese merchants an opportunity to
grow through Chinese and British Imperial business networks. As a result, the SCMP
represented the interests of Chinese merchants in its various reporting about China in
the first half of the twentieth century.
Although the Hong Kong government executed a strict censorship against the
Chinese press, the SCMP was free from censorship most of the time; consequently, it
could publish sensitive and important events that Chinese subscribers desired to read
and comment upon. In particular, Chinese audiences could express their concerns
and attempt to mould the opinions of other readers because of reports, editorials and
correspondence published in the SCMP. While the Chinese had limited influence in
the British colonial government, the SCMP played an important role in improving
Chinese audience freedom of expression and its social position in the course of
consensus building in Hong Kong. In this manner, the SCMP had an economic,
political and social function in the making of Hong Kong in the first half of twentieth
century.
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Introduction

This PhD thesis studies the contribution of an influential English language
newspaper for Chinese and British readers, the South China Morning Post (SCMP),
to the development of Chinese bourgeoisie audience freedom of expression and for
the prosperity of British colonial business interests in Hong Kong in the first half of
the twentieth century. This research shed lights on four themes of the fundamental
realities of Hong Kong: the relationship between Hong Kong Chinese and Chinese
elites, the relationship between Hong Kong Chinese and the Hong Kong government,
the relationship between Hong Kong Chinese and China, and the relationship
between media and Hong Kong.
One theme of my research is about the relationship between the Hong Kong
Chinese community and the Chinese elites. Elizabeth Sinn studied the rise and fall of
Chinese merchant leaders in the non-government organization Tung Wah Hospital
regarding the way they handled integration and conflicts with the British Hong Kong
government. 1 In other words, Chinese businesspeople’s power and social position
improved through establishing medical services for the Chinese community, which
the British colonial government had deliberately neglected. John Carroll emphasized
the collaboration between Chinese bourgeoisie and the Hong Kong government
between the 1840s and 1930s. 2 Carroll studied the complex and even conflicting
behaviours of Chinese merchant leaders, such as forming associations and clubs in
Hong Kong, to exhibit the special position of the Chinese community. Carroll
believed these behaviours could improve the position and influence of Chinese
business leaders in the Chinese community and in British Hong Kong society. Some
Chinese business leaders gained positions in the Hong Kong government through
1

these influences.
However, the elite status of Chinese leaders studied by Sinn and Carroll has
been challenged in the twentieth century. My research shows that the South China
Morning Post was a new platform to enhance the elite status of these Chinese leaders.
The social, economic and political role of Tung Wah Hospital in representing the
Chinese community significantly weakened in the first half of twentieth century,
which decreased the influence of Chinese leaders in the Chinese community. 3 In
addition, the effect of Chinese leaders as an intermediary between the Hong Kong
government and the common Chinese people weakened when there appeared to be
frequent internal differences and conflicts.4 To maintain their own privileged status,
scholars claimed that Chinese elites provided consultation services and exhibited
their individual achievements and abilities to the Hong Kong government. That is to
say, while Tung Wah Hospital had lesser social, political and even diplomatic
functions in early twentieth century Hong Kong, Chinese elites managed to use
substitutes to protect their social status, at least in the Chinese community. In
addition, they could also use their special positions to enjoy more power in the
autonomous Chinese community and seek further business interests.5
Accompanying the emergence of the South China Morning Post in the first half
of the twentieth century, the role of Chinese leaders as intermediaries between the
Chinese community and the Hong Kong government could be framed through the
reporting and their speeches, which served to mould Chinese merchant opinions.
With an elite status in Hong Kong society and the image of representatives in the
SCMP, Chinese merchant leaders could influence other Chinese merchant audiences
to make collective decisions and maintain the order of the society. In other words,
the SCMP could help the Chinese leaders manage the Chinese community and build
2

consensus when disputes happened.
My research also investigated the relationship between Hong Kong Chinese
merchants and the Hong Kong government. Scholars believed that the British Hong
Kong government managed the Chinese through an indirect way. Elizabeth Sinn
studied the Tung Wah Hospital as a semi-official institute to handle Chinese affairs
such as petitions to the Hong Kong government. John Carroll also studied the leaders
who gained special positions in Hong Kong who were selected as members of the
Legislative Council and the Executive Council to represent and manage the Chinese
community on behalf of the Hong Kong government. These occurrences reveal the
segregationist nature between the Hong Kong government and the Chinese
community.
However, some scholars show that the British Hong Kong government also
interfered with Chinese affairs directly and the development of Chinese community
benefitted from the colonization of British imperialists as a result. For example, Luk
Chi-hung believed the Hong Kong government directly managed Chinese food
providers when necessary.6 Huo Qichang praised the contribution of British colonial
education to the Chinese community.7
Whether the British Hong Kong government executed direct or indirect
measures in its administration, the Chinese community was mainly a subordinate
mass in front of the Hong Kong government. As a result, the power of the Chinese
community to directly influence Hong Kong society was limited. Instead, there were
also racial segregation and discrimination policies against the Chinese community.
When the Chinese had been ignored or treated unequally, scholars noticed that the
media could meet the demands of Chinese bourgeoisie through helping solving the
problems of Hong Kong Chinese and providing a fair and virtual place to express
3

their various needs. Elizabeth Sinn studied Chinese newspapers and pointed out that
the Chinese press in Hong Kong “enabled Chinese to express their views as subject
people of the colonial government”. 8 However, even if Chinese audience could
express their views in a Chinese newspaper, it was difficult for them to influence the
British and the British Hong Kong government directly.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Hong Kong colonial government
issued a series of forceful ordinances to censor the Chinese press. Scholars like Lee
Chin-chuan and Carol Lai both believed that Hong Kong’s press freedom for
Chinese newspapers was seriously suppressed in the first half of the twentieth
century. 9 Consequently, even if the Chinese press wanted to represent and help
Chinese audiences, it might be sanctioned. The English press received the least
censorship and interference from the Hong Kong colonial government, which
endowed the SCMP with the status of representing the interests of its Chinese
merchant audience, improving or shaping the position of leaders in the Chinese
community and propagandizing Chinese nationalist sentiments. The SCMP shortened
the distance between the Chinese merchant audience and the Hong Kong government,
which also read the SCMP. From time to time, the Hong Kong government directly
used the SCMP to communicate with the Chinese merchant audience and vice versa.
This not only improved the efficiency of the Hong Kong government, but also
enhanced the rights of the Chinese merchant audience. In brief, the Chinese merchant
audience gained the freedom of reading information that represented their interests
and the ability to post their needs and emotions in a forum for both Chinese and
British audiences to make themselves heard by power elites such as the governors
and senior officials.
My research on the South China Morning Post explains that the SCMP was a
4

newspaper read by British and Chinese bourgeoisie readers, including elite readers,
and took the demands of readers seriously in order to make a profit for its
shareholders. Thus, the Chinese bourgeoisie audience could benefit the media power
of the SCMP. In addition, they used the SCMP as a channel to express their needs
and exhibit their stances, which they could not easily do in the British colonial
government. Furthermore, the SCMP could improve their power or position, which
would make them as equal as the British audience to express opinions freely in its
paper. Such a rare and important channel could help the Chinese bourgeoisie
influence the British colonial society, in which the British leaders did not listen to or
easily accept the voice of the Chinese. This study of the SCMP improves our
understanding about the relationship between the Chinese merchant audience and the
Hong Kong government. That the SCMP was a platform for British and Chinese
audiences to communicate with each other revises our former understanding that the
Chinese community was forced to express its needs to the Hong Kong government
indirectly through elite Chinese leaders. Instead, they could approach the Hong Kong
government informally via the SCMP.
The other theme is the relationship between the Hong Kong Chinese merchants
and China. Some historians illustrated the important and positive influence of Hong
Kong Chinese to China in the relationship between Hong Kong and China. For
example, Huang Zhenquan studied the contribution of Hong Kong Chinese to the
Qing Westernization Movement (Yangwu Yundong, 洋務運動).10 In addition, Huo
Qichang studied the relationship between Hong Kong Chinese and the Revolution of
1911 in China.11 Cindy Yik-yi Chu tried to disclose a closer relationship between
Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie and the China Communist Party (CCP), and pointed
out that the CCP had already noticed the important role of Hong Kong Chinese
5

capitalists as a significant part of the United Front since 1937. 12 In addition,
mainland Chinese historians’ research on Hong Kong history usually focuses on the
close relationship between Hong Kong and China.13 Their research in the last two
decades of the twentieth century usually criticizes the British imperial invasion of
China and praises the Hong Kong Chinese fight for the return of Hong Kong to
China.14
However, some scholars discovered that in some cases the attitudes of Hong
Kong Chinese toward China showed another side. Cai Rongfang believed that in
some Chinese nationalistic movements in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Chinese
merchants showed collaborative and conditional nationalism. Collaborative
nationalism means that the Hong Kong Chinese merchants wanted to use the
advantage of their special position as Hong Kong residents to change China for their
reform purposes.

15

Conditional nationalism means that Hong Kong Chinese

merchants supported the Chinese nationalistic movement in order to make profits and
retreated when the movements damaged their business interests.16
Part of my research did show that the stances of the SCMP kept pace with those
of Chinese merchants. In some critical situations such as the Great Strike in 1925,
both the SCMP and Chinese merchants kept away from the nationalistic movement,
which was radical and detrimental to their interests. However, in the reporting on
earlier nationalistic movements, the SCMP or Chinese merchant audience showed a
passionate attitude toward the nationalistic movements, which did improve their
profits in business. It seems far-stretched for Cai to compare the degree of
nationalism and business interests. 17 The two terms, “nationalism” and “business
interests”, are not always diametrically opposed. Sometimes, they are united. When
the two terms conflicted, it did not always mean merchants became traitors of China;
6

they may simply have not supported a radical movement of a particular government
in China. Thus, for example, even if Chinese merchants held a conservative attitude
toward the Great Strike in 1925, it never meant they cut off their relationship with
China. This attitude became particularly obvious in the 1930s anti-Japanese reporting.
Chinese merchant audiences pressured the SCMP to report more on the SinoJapanese war as result of Chinese nationalist motions. Even if their nationalism or
patriotism combined with the motives of their business interests, it never meant they
were corrupt or negative because their trade and shipping activities with China was
good for the Chinese economy and themselves. Overall, in my research, the Chinese
audiences showed rational nationalistic sentiment. They were not radical patriots, nor
negative collaborators of the colonial government.
There was a clear connection between the SCMP profits and Chinese nationalistic
reporting, which took advantage of Chinese interests about nationalistic movements.
My research discloses that the SCMP had a combined reporting strategy; that is, how
the SCMP handled reporting according to the demands of its British and Chinese
readers who were of higher stratum of Hong Kong society; viz., the British and
Chinese bourgeoisie. In this way, the SCMP represented and advanced the position
of these Chinese audiences, especially through providing more audience freedom
than the Chinese press could offer on reporting about China. The commercial nature
of the SCMP and its Chinese merchant audience did not deny their stances on
Chinese nationalistic events. Furthermore, the SCMP and its Chinese merchant
audience were susceptible to each other. In front of some important nationalistic
events, the SCMP educated the audiences, built consensus and propagandized the
Chinese merchant audience with patriotism.
Finally, my research on SCMP history will help scholars understand the role of
7

media in Hong Kong society. We had very limited knowledge about the relationship
between the English media and Hong Kong society in the first half of the twentieth
century. Carol Lai studied the freedom of the press in Hong Kong in the post-war
years.18 I believe that the tradition of freedom of the press for the Hong Kong public
partly originated from the SCMP. In my research, the Chinese merchant audience
enjoyed the freedom of reading and expressing their opinions in an English
newspaper, which showed the class nature of the press freedom for its audiences. I
selected the largest Hong Kong English newspaper company, the South China
Morning Post (SCMP) Limited that had both British and Chinese subscribers to
study the role and influence of the English language press in Hong Kong history. The
SCMP Ltd had two newspapers between 1916 and 1941. One was the SCMP; the
other was the Hong Kong Telegraph. Both newspapers covered news and items of
interest for British and Chinese bourgeoisie readers. The SCMP was the most
influential English morning paper and daily in 1930s Hong Kong.19 In addition, I
discovered that, during the period that I have researched, the SCMP was mostly used
in Hong Kong government reports to the British government. 20

The Combined Reporting Strategy of the South China Morning Post
In this PhD thesis, I argue that the SCMP formed a combined reporting strategy,
which improved Chinese bourgeoisie audience’s freedom of expression in the press,
and their social position, and contributed to the development of Hong Kong trade
while it consolidated British dominance in Hong Kong. In other words, its business
interests were its first priority.
The board of directors of the SCMP did not consider the freedom of the editorial
room of the SCMP as the most important thing.21 The SCMP was not an official or
8

semi-official newspaper of the Hong Kong government, nor was it affiliated with any
political party. It simply tried to interest its readers and increase its circulation and in
doing so, it attracted many more advertisers than its competitors in Hong Kong.
Furthermore, the SCMP was different from the Chinese press, which enjoyed less
external press freedom than English newspapers. This research explains why the
SCMP had such a business strategy, how the strategy worked and its influence in
Hong Kong society. From 1903 to 1941, the SCMP employed such a strategy
because of the following four factors.
Firstly, there was the factor of China. The SCMP’s board of directors, co-founders,
editors, and Chinese staff were friendly to Chinese readers, and they wanted to attract
a Chinese-speaking audience to read their newspaper. While the English newspaper
market in Hong Kong was locked in furious competition, more than 97 percent of the
Hong Kong population was Chinese, and they made up of the majority of the
SCMP’s potential market.22 Although only a very low percent of Chinese residents
were members of the Chinese bourgeoisie, nevertheless, there were still around
40,000 members of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong in 1931.23 In order to
satisfy the Chinese readers’ demand, the SCMP could more easily obtain news
sources from China and at a lower cost than it could from Reuters News Service in
the United Kingdom.
Secondly, the SCMP had to supply local and visiting British readers within British
colonial Hong Kong and other parts of the British Empire with the news from Hong
Kong and British sources.24 Without British readers, British firms would not have
advertised in a Hong Kong newspaper. With only Chinese readers, the SCMP could
not have operated well because its circulation would have been low, and the revenue
from advertisements would have been pitiful. Thus, British readers were
9

indispensable to the SCMP.
Thirdly, the development of industry, finance, and the entertainment business
required a newspaper that could reach the greatest number of readers with consumer
power. English speakers with decent incomes who were readers of the SCMP were
the targeted customers of advertisers in English newspapers. Further explanation
must be highlighted here regarding the formation of the combined reporting strategy.
As early as the founding of the SCMP, it could not compete well with the other
English newspapers so it targeted a “big circle of Chinese clients”, a limited number
of English and other foreign residents.25 Other competitors, including the Hong Kong
Daily Press, had occupied the Hong Kong English press market and owned the
valuable upper class British readers. 26 In other words, attracting those Chinese
subscribers was the easiest method to sell its newspaper, not to mention the SCMP
Ltd had been supported and owned by the National Bank of China, invested in by a
group of Chinese merchant leaders such as the director of Tung Wah Hospital, Fung
Wa Chuen, and was focused on the Chinese market. Even if the SCMP grasped a
certain percentage of the Chinese reading audience, in order to be viable, it still had
to own enough British readers to attract British advertisers, just as the Hong Kong
Telegraph did.27
Fourthly, the different censorship ordinances of the Hong Kong government
toward the Chinese and English press gave the SCMP the opportunity to reach a
group of English-speaking Chinese bourgeoisie readers. This meant that Chinese
bourgeoisie readers who gained English language skills could read news that could
not be printed in the Chinese press, and comment freely without being censored by
the government. The SCMP became a public sphere for Chinese readers to express
and even mould opinions.
10

Here, I will briefly explain the “different external press freedom policy”. The
government’s racial segregation and discrimination policies in Hong Kong, as well
as the ‘Zhongfa Xiyong’ (中法西用; the British used Chinese laws when handling
Chinese inhabitants’ legal cases), were important factors that legally divided Hong
Kong into two separate worlds. Thus, under the law, the Chinese and British press
enjoyed different external press freedoms, which I will discuss further in subsequent
chapters.
The SCMP’s combined reporting strategy worked well between 1903 and 1941.
Since its founding, the SCMP ‘consistently maintained a strong lead’ in reporting on
China. 28 The management believed the “policy of [the SCMP] will in the future”
continue to “result in the greatest good to the greatest number”, including the change
of increasing Chinese readers “gradually taking place” and thus the SCMP should
“attract” Chinese readers with reporting of “Chinese origin”.29 However, until the
1920s, the editor of the SCMP, Thomas Petrie, still felt it difficult to obtain enough
China news to satisfy Chinese readers, because “Hong Kong is tied to Reuter[s]”
which, as “a British agency, features British news and views”.30 Moreover, Petrie
believed that Reuters told readers “little or nothing about our immediate neighbours”,
which was the “chief disadvantage of the present system or lack of system”. Thus,
the SCMP management wished to have “a broader, bigger, brighter and better cable
news service” to cater to “the numbers of native readers of the foreign press in China
(Hong Kong was at least geographically affiliated with China, according to Thomas
Petrie)”.31
The combined reporting strategy did not change in the 1930s. SCMP editor Ching
wrote, “Our news is departmentalized. A ‘post reader’ can always find what he wants,
in other papers the reader has to take his news where he finds it.” Furthermore, the
11

editorial editor admitted “the interest in a newspaper is diversified” on the “main
page, or in the sporting columns”.32 To better gratify the diversified interests in the
SCMP, the SCMP had a “high percentage of news to advertisements”. Except for the
“shipping advertisements”, “unimportant items of court news”, and “cinema
advertising”, the cable news and editorials were mainly about China or the British
Empire, which could serve Chinese and British audiences separately.33 I will discuss
in the following chapters the influences of the SCMP, as well as explain how the
newspaper executed such a strategy.
In summation, this research focuses on the background, course and result of the
SCMP’s combined reporting strategy. Firstly, the SCMP editors and owner gradually
formed a strategy of making profits from both Chinese and British audiences.
Secondly, the SCMP provided audiences with broad and representative topic
reporting for Chinese and British readers. Thirdly, the strategy of reporting on China
improved the audience freedom and social position of Chinese bourgeoisie readers,
which also helped the SCMP and even Hong Kong business development. The
British also preserved their sporting culture and maintained their dominance in Hong
Kong.

A Consistently Commercial Newspaper
From the founding of the SCMP in 1903 to its temporary closing as of the 1941
Japanese invasion, the newspaper was substantially owned by the financial and
industrial bourgeoisie, who wanted to use it as a tool for their business interests.
Before Dr Noble became the controller of the SCMP in 1906, the National Bank of
China was its controller. In 1903, the board of the SCMP Ltd planned to make the
newspaper ‘much better and more interesting’ than its rivals.34 In 1903, the SCMP
12

Ltd had more than 100 investors; more than 90 percent of whom were British or
other foreigners.35 The National Bank of China appointed A. G. W. Playfair as the
board chairman of the SCMP Ltd upon the newspaper’s founding, thus controlling
the SCMP.36 The SCMP Ltd owed a large amount of money to the bank because of
company debentures, and it would have become part of the bank’s private property if
Dr Noble had not acquired the majority stake in 1906, totalling 4,292 shares.37
The bank invested in the SCMP because it wanted to use the SCMP to attract
Chinese and British merchants and clients to open accounts at the bank.38 Thus, it is
clear that the SCMP became a newspaper that represented Chinese merchant interests.
Similarly, other Hong Kong commercial newspapers in the nineteenth century were
intermittently friendly when reporting on China governments.39 Chinese people did
not typically read English newspapers in Shanghai. 40 However, Hong Kong’s
English newspapers were cosmopolitan newspapers because the British substantially
controlled Hong Kong, and these newspapers once had the freedom to criticise local
issues as long as there was substantive evidence to support the opinion. Although this
freedom was protected de jure by British laws on freedom of the press, it was
suppressed de facto by Hong Kong government ordinances in the turbulent first half
of the twentieth century.41
Frank H. H. King believed that the late nineteenth century Hong Kong English
press exemplified personal journalism, which means that editors used the newspapers
as their tools to comment on social events. Before this time, some editors were
British or American merchants, and their primary goals in founding or buying
newspapers were commercial.42 Newspaper editors liked or hated different colonial
officials. Consistent criticism could cause the arrest of an editor for using the press
for libel.43 The editors of the SCMP were not arrested like those of the other three
13

newspapers—the Hong Kong Telegraph, the Hong Kong Daily Press and the China
Mail, which demonstrates that the SCMP had a very mild style. In the early years
(1903-1907) of the SCMP, the editorials had been written by Alfred Cunningham,
Douglas Story, Thomas Petrie, and probably Tse Tsan Tai. All of these people had
good relationships with the Hong Kong government, and they were not radical
journalists. Tse Tsan Tai’s position at the SCMP was as the co-founder and the
comprador, to bring business to the company.44 The SCMP, from the beginning, was
actually a company that worked hard to make a profit.
Li Shaonan divided the Hong Kong newspaper history into three periods: the elite
press period (1841-1873); the partisan press period (1874-1924); and the socioeconomic press period (1925- ). 45 Li clarified that there were different genres of
newspapers during the same periods. 46 Li’s argument makes some sense, but the
suggested periodization could be re-periodized according to my understanding about
the nature of the Chinese press in given eras. There are at least four reasons for the
controversy of the “partisan press” period.
Firstly, Hong Kong had no long-standing political parties between 1874 and 1924.
Li used Wang Tao’s Xunhuan Ribao, Chen Shaobai’s Zhongguo Ribao, and a series
of Weixinpai (維新派, mild reformers) and Gemingpai (革命派, violent reformers,
or revolutionaries) newspapers. In addition, the only famous party was also a secret
society, the Revive China Society, which owned Zhongguo Ribao. However, Li
Gucheng pointed out that Zhongguo Ribao might be an exaggerating story of a
revolutionary party paper, because he could not find sufficient copies of Zhongguo
Ribao and suspected the influence of Zhongguo Ribao.47
Secondly, 1874-1924 was the most rapid period of development for the Chinese
bourgeoisie in Hong Kong.48 Chinese merchants acquired or founded newspapers,
14

including Chinese and English newspapers, for their business interests, not for
political goals.49
Thirdly, Li Shaonan made a weak argument using English newspapers as his
supporting materials, saying only that the SCMP and the Hong Kong Telegraph had
strong political orientations before the 1911 Chinese revolution.50 However, Li did
not provide any sources to support his assertion in his article.
Other scholars, such as John Wong and Lam Man-sum, offered different
interpretations through context analysis. Wong studied English newspapers, such as
the China Mail and the Hong Kong Daily Press, which supported Chinese reform but
actually only wanted to protect British interests in China. 51 Lam studied the four
English newspapers—the China Mail, the Hong Kong Daily Press, the Hong Kong
Telegraph, and the South China Morning Post—between 1895 and 1912 and found
that these four newspapers were commercial newspapers, although the China Mail
published the most radical editorials. In their 1911 revolution reporting, these
newspapers did not support the revolution and only supported legitimate reform by
the Manchurian government in China. In particular, in their editorials, they were
primarily concerned with the stability and prosperity of Colonial Hong Kong.52
Thus, the role of the four newspapers in Chinese reform and revolution was
‘usually indirect and rather unconscious’.53 I agree with John Wong’s and Lam Mansum’s insights that those newspapers were not partisan; rather, they were commercial
newspapers for British interests; furthermore, I believe the SCMP represented
Chinese merchants’ business interests.
Fourthly, the Chinese and English press, during this period, did not focus on
political audiences. Rather, mainly businesspeople, middle class readers or lower
class intellectuals purchased those other newspapers while the SCMP focused on the
15

British and Chinese merchants with its Chinese reform news reporting, a popular
topic about which important news was being disseminated at that time. Li Shaonan
did not differentiate partisan newspapers publishing political editorials from
commercial newspapers providing a variety of unbalanced and changing comments
on political events. In other words, Li Shaonan did not notice the close relationship
of market value and political news, and he misunderstood that Chinese-edited
newspapers with political news resulted in a genre of radical, or partisan, press in
Hong Kong.
As for Li’s “socio-economic press” period, from 1925 to the present, one of the
defects of his argument is he neglected to acknowledge that between 1925 and 1941
there was a period of “co-existence of commercial newspapers and partisan
newspapers”. In the 1930s, varieties of newspapers supported by different parties and
governments appeared in Hong Kong because of the Sino-Japanese war. The
Japanese Hong Kong military government claimed that before the Manchurian
Incident occurred on 18 September 1931, Hong Kong was a base for British imperial
propaganda; after that, it was the Chongqing Nationalist Party’s propaganda base. In
other words, Hong Kong was an international propaganda market.54 The SCMP took
advantage of this opportunity to benefit from Chinese political parties’ orders.
During this period, the SCMP had connections with the Chinese Nationalist Party
(under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek), the China Defence Union (under the
leadership of Madame Sun Yatsen), and the Communist Party of China’s Hong Kong
branch (under the leadership of Liao Chengzhi) for the purpose of reporting on the
Chinese War Against the Japanese, which significantly improved the SCMP’s
circulation, with its net profit reaching its zenith in the 1930s.55 While Hong Kong
had a stable commercial environment, large-circulation newspapers meant more
16

advertisements, especially for English newspapers with powerful, high-consuming
audiences. It did not matter whether the readers were British or Chinese. With the
combined reporting strategy, the Chinese audience read Anti-Japanese War reports
and were hostile to Japanese-advertised services or products, though there were still
many British consumers who made it profitable for Japanese advertisers to keep
working with the SCMP. Thus, the SCMP made money either way.
I previously argued in the Journal of Biographical Literature (Zhuanji Wenxue)
that the SCMP co-founder Tse Tsan Tai was a revolutionary propaganda pioneer in
modern Chinese history, and I clearly indicated in the same article that the SCMP
was a commercial newspaper and that it did report on Chinese reform, although not
from its beginning.56 Further to my previous observation, I have to add and highlight
that the SCMP’s reporting on China met the demand of its business strategy.
In addition, Tse also did not want to turn the SCMP into a radical newspaper for
revolutionaries. Tse’s position as a revolutionary was a secret, so it was impossible
for him to disclose his identity publicly, which would have been a huge risk. What
Tse intended was to found a newspaper similar to other Hong Kong English
newspapers so that he could make a profit to feed his family. 57 Editorials and
comments on China in the SCMP were not radical because of the newspaper had
‘frequent claims and counter-claims, charges and counter-charges’, which was how
other English newspapers operated in Hong Kong.58
Frank H. H. King pondered in his book on Chinese coastal newspapers ‘the extent
to which it actually carried this [Tse’s plan to support Chinese reform in the SCMP]
through must be the subject of further research’.59 My reply to this proposal is that
Tse had a limited and unintended influence on the SCMP; however, Tse, like other
British journalists, had a sympathetic attitude toward China and the Chinese people
17

and wanted a peaceful and prosperous China. He did not use the newspaper to
encourage violent uprisings nor published radical editorials encouraging the
overthrow of any government. I should emphasise that three barristers served as
company directors including a chairman, in the SCMP boardroom.60 Their presence
minimised any illegal activities, including libel, which was the only restriction on the
freedom of the SCMP editors before 1907.
James Curran argued that the short lifecycles of radical newspapers were the result
of investors or advertisers not supporting such newspapers; the higher the circulation
a radical newspaper had, the earlier it would close.61 Jean Chalaby argued that the
transformation of the British press from political publishing to commercial
journalism in the nineteenth century indicated that the commercialisation of the press
might go against political publishing ideals.62 Further to their arguments, I present a
de-Westernising version of the SCMP. The controllers of the SCMP focused on
business development. They attempted to attract Chinese and British readers to
increase circulation. The SCMP was well-accepted by local advertisers, including the
Hong Kong government, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Asahi Beer, Shewan,
Watsons, Lane Crawford, and other prominent local companies.
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Although the

Chinese were oppressed in Hong Kong society, the SCMP did not challenge the
unfair political system in Hong Kong but was a conservative commercial newspaper
that accommodated itself to the colony and maximized its profits by obtaining
advertising orders. The radical newspapers Curran mentioned were published for
working-class readers in the United Kingdom; the readers of the SCMP were higherclass Chinese and British people who expected an open and fair Chinese market.
The SCMP had content on China politics and wars, and sometimes it disclosed
Qing government corruption. As the SCMP was an English-language newspaper, the
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Qing government would not have interfered with its circulation in China. After Dr
Noble took over the SCMP in 1906, he only implemented financial and technical
reforms. He did not dismiss editors like Thomas Petrie and did not change, but rather
improved, the style of reporting about China for Chinese readers. Thomas Petrie
worked at the SCMP as the editor until 1924, having joined the SCMP in 1905.64
Petrie kept a good relationship with the Chinese in Hong Kong.
The SCMP was controlled by financial and industrial capital from the National
Bank of China, Dr Noble, the Shewan family, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Bank, and the newspaper served the Hong Kong Chinese and British community as a
conservative commercial newspaper. The high commercialisation of the SCMP made
it into a “money tool” for the advertisers, but not a political publishing medium. It
struggled to be profitable in the Hong Kong colony by integrating Chinese and
British readers and cooperating with social organizations.
Michael Schudson argued that the anti-commercial bias in the study of the history
of journalism was wrong and that it was incorrect to equate “profit and
commercialisation” with corruption and to portray the editorial room and
management as being in conflict. 65 My research shows that the SCMP used the
aforesaid strategy to make a profit, but it also had positive social influences,
including improving the right of Chinese bourgeoisie to be informed by the SCMP,
and created a virtual platform for them to discuss varieties of current affairs.

Cooperation with British and Chinese Social Organisations
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky claim that the American press was a tool for
its controllers and sponsors’ interests and represented them to convey propaganda to
the public.66 Although the SCMP was not a propaganda tool in my research period,
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the SCMP also cooperated with organisations such as owners, management,
advertisers (Shewan, HSBC, Asahi Beer), and the Hong Kong government, to filter
unpopular news reports and editorials through self-censorship, censorship, and direct
intervention by social organizations. The SCMP represented British and Chinese
readers and formed a combined reporting strategy, and in so doing, the SCMP
achieved its greatest business profits, resulting in extending the freedom of Chinese
audiences to read news and express opinions that stimulated the development of
Hong Kong economy.
From its founding in 1903, the SCMP had been controlled by a bank and then by
Dr Noble, an important investor with expansive business interests in East Asia,
especially in Hong Kong. The SCMP’s directors were from the National Bank of
China, the Shewan family (a high-resource company in Hong Kong and one of the
largest advertisers in the SCMP), and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, among
others. The SCMP cooperated well with the government when Hong Kong faced
crises. The cinema industry also cooperated very well with the SCMP because of
important common interests; in particular, cinema advertisers liked the sporting page
that attracted a British audience. Similarly, the British audience was a targeted
consumer of the first-run theatres that screened English language films.67
Given the newsroom was strapped financially, the SCMP had to rely on every
possible method to remain viable. It not only needed the British to subscribe to and
read the newspaper but also English-speaking Chinese readers; it not only needed
advertising income, but it also begged for government stipends for Reuters telegrams
to save money. It attempted to be socialised and commercialised with business in
Hong Kong, and it refrained from criticising them easily. For example, the SCMP
avoided criticizing two big companies, the Shewan and HSBC, as their bosses owned
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board seats in the SCMP. The only exception was if a company did something
detrimental to the Hong Kong economy, which was a basic prerequisite for the
SCMP’s business, then the SCMP would attack this company, even if it advertised
with the SCMP. For example, it once started a conflict with the Hong Kong, Canton
and Macau Steamboat Company, which worked with the Canton government during
the 1925 Canton-Hong Kong Great Strike.68
In short, the SCMP took advantage of advertisers and governments and found a
balance in reporting and representing the British and Chinese communities in Hong
Kong.

Combined Reporting Strategy
In other British colonies in Asia, English newspapers were usually only published
for British readers; for example, the English newspaper, Strait Times, did not begin
to attract both Chinese and other non-British readers until 1938. 69 The SCMP’s
combined reporting strategy was useful to advance Chinese social position as well as
serve Chinese democracy and business.
Frank H. H. King noticed the phenomenon of the ‘increasing role of the Chinese’
in the history of Hong Kong journalism, which took two forms, one has been widely
researched; i.e., the ‘development of the Chinese language press itself’, and the other,
‘Chinese capital in English-language newspapers’, requires ‘considerable research’.70
In addition, ‘the effects of these investments [on the SCMP and the SCMP’s
afternoon paper, the Hong Kong Telegraph] have yet to be established’.71 Further to
King’s expectations, I noticed that the “China effects” came not only from
‘investments’ but also from its readers who at the same time included the advertisers,
government officials, politicians, editors and the newspaper’s Chinese staff. I
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elaborate on this in Chapter 1. As a result of the “China effects” from the aforesaid
factors, the SCMP became a virtual place for Chinese merchants to read, comment,
mould opinions and enhance the position of some Chinese leaders.
Herbert Schiller, in his Mass Communications and American Empire, points out
that collaboration between press and commercial groups influenced reporting and
suppressed press freedom in American press history.72 However, in my research, the
SCMP cooperated with social organizations to make profits and create more audience
freedom for Chinese bourgeoisie readers than the Chinese press. Consequently, the
SCMP became more attractive to Chinese bourgeoisie readers because their news
might not be reported in the Chinese press. For example, Chinese editor Henry Ching
had no say in the SCMP business but still had partial editorial freedom to support the
Chinese in the reporting as long as the board deemed it good for the company
profits.73
Hu Daojing argued that English newspapers in modern Shanghai facilitated
communication among foreigners, but the Chinese did not read these newspapers.74
Frank H. H. King provided a generalised response that English newspaper audiences
were mainly foreigners. He believed that ‘interests in China were limited by the
practical requirements of the foreigner in China, who was either trader or missionary,
and these requirements were likely to direct attention almost exclusively to a limited
aspect of the China scene’.75 King believed that the SCMP might constitute ‘a further
exception’, which provided much more content on China than other English
newspapers.
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The SCMP published shipping and cinema stories, classified

advertisements and financial news, which attracted both the Chinese and British
communities. Meanwhile, the SCMP also provided consistent and sometimes
abundant reporting on China in its pages.
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The Chinese, who comprised roughly 97 percent of the population of Hong Kong
in the first half of the twentieth century, were a big market for the SCMP. Although
the SCMP was read by British and other European consumers, as well as Americans,
the SCMP never gave up its strategy of developing a Chinese audience market and
meeting the needs of Chinese readers.77 The SCMP did this for its commercial goals;
i.e., higher circulation and advertising income, especially advertisements from
Chinese companies. As a result, the SCMP provided specific news reporting to
attract both Chinese and British audiences. Without either Chinese or British
audiences, the SCMP would have been in danger of bankruptcy.

Chinese Bourgeoisie Audience
While British readers were a widely scattered audience in varieties of professions,
Chinese readers were a very concentrated audience working mainly in commercial
and financial firms. Although these readers included some professional readers in
education, government, legal and medical services, nevertheless, according to Zhang
Li’s research on modern Hong Kong population and profession, the commercial and
financial firm audiences remained the majority of readers of the SCMP. 78 These
readers were wealthy and understood the English language; they were loosely
considered bourgeoisie, the majority of who were Chinese merchants.
Hong Kong historical scholars like Carl Smith, Elizabeth Sinn, and John Carroll
focus on the Chinese elites who collaborated with the British Hong Kong
government in the making of Hong Kong. The SCMP Chinese readers included the
Chinese

elitist

audience

these

scholars

discussed.

There

were

different

understandings about “elite” in the Hong Kong study that might have left illusive and
confusing concepts. For example, sometimes Carroll defined Chinese elite as the
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“leaders of Chinese bourgeoisie” or “leaders of Chinese community”, while Chinese
bourgeoisie have been defined as “urban elite connected with modern business”.79
Such definitions confuse scholars about the relationship between elites and
bourgeoisie. Scholars generally refer to the prestigious leading Chinese merchants as
the “elite”. The meaning of Chinese elite could not simply be equalled to Chinese
bourgeoisie in this study. It is understandable in Western academia that elite could
mean “middle or upper class of Americans”, namely the “managers of one sort or
another”, who can be “political managers, business managers (like corporate
executives or that sort of thing), doctoral managers (like university professors), or
other journalists who are involved in organizing the way people think and look at
things”.80 However, in my research, “Chinese elite” is only defined as the leaders of
Chinese bourgeoisie or merchants. In particular, the SCMP Chinese audiences were
“Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie readers”, which included Chinese elite readers. My
definition of “bourgeoisie” is almost the same with Carroll’s, viz., “entrepreneurs,
compradors, bankers, industrialists, and professionals such as lawyers and
physicians”.81 Thereafter, even if “elite” is used in the research, I define it as the
“leaders of Chinese bourgeoisie”.
Carl Smith believed the small group of Chinese elite was comprised of contractors,
merchants, compradors, government servants and Chinese missionary employees,
who could provide leadership in the Chinese community.82 Smith generated the list
of Chinese elites through researching “names given on memorials, petitions and
subscription lists”, and pointed out besides “the repetition of a name on subsequent
lists, the amount of the contributions, and the position of the name on the document
serve[d] to suggest the relative of an individual”, “proprietorship of land also
suggest[ed] potential elite status”.83 Smith’s selection standard of “Chinese elite” is
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the exposure rate and fortune quantity. In addition, he named Chinese unofficial
members in the Legislative Council “the elite of the elite”.84 While Smith clearly
understood elite meant the renowned Chinese bourgeoisie, John Carroll, most of the
time, equated Chinese elite to the leaders of Chinese bourgeoisie. As a result, the
lexical meanings varied in their research because the meanings of “leader of Chinese
bourgeoisie”, “renowned Chinese bourgeoisie” and “bourgeoisie” are obviously
different. In particular, sometimes Carroll used terms like “Chinese merchants as the
Chinese gentry of a British colony”, or “affluent Chinese”, or “a Hong Kong Chinese
bourgeois world”. 85 After reading his research, other scholars such as Law Wing
Sang believe that Carroll talked about a “Hong Kong’s Chinese elite into a fullfledged bourgeoisie”. The definitions of “Chinese merchant”, “Chinese bourgeoisie”,
“Chinese gentry” and “affluent Chinese” are different, which would be troublesome
for readers to understand the term “Chinese elite” completely and consistently.
Scholars had already pointed out that “elite” was “too complex for easy
generalization” because even within “this relatively small group there existed
different political orientations and different levels of allegiance, as reflected in the
variety of career paths of their choice”. 86 In addition, the relationship between
Chinese elites and Chinese bourgeoisie sometimes were vague; the Chinese elite
could be leaders, representatives or partners of Chinese bourgeoisie. Chinese elites
should first want to collaborate with the British colonists and then they should have
enough financial, social and reputable resources to gain and maintain elite status or
prominent roles in British colonial Hong Kong. While Chinese elites’ names
appeared in the SCMP, like Ho Fu, Ho Tung, Tse Tsan Tai, Chow Shou Son, Ho Kai,
less prominent Chinese bourgeoisie members also made up the SCMP’s Chinese
readership. In Carl Smith and John Carol’s research, the effect of Chinese elite was
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that they were an intermediary between the Chinese community and the Hong Kong
government. In my research, the intermediary readership includes the elites and the
SCMP, a newspaper that represented Chinese bourgeois interests and could publish
their needs in the newspaper without disclosing their real personal information; such
a practice also improved the position of leaders in the Chinese community, helping
them maintain or gain the position and the reputation of elite status. In particular, my
research not only shows that the SCMP was useful in shaping the elite status of the
leaders of Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong, it shows more importantly the Hong
Kong Chinese bourgeoisie were politically “progressive bourgeoisie” and always
weak in its civil society.87 Chinese bourgeoisie also had their voices heard in the
SCMP by virtue of the external and internal press freedom of the English language
press.

Reporting for the Chinese Audience
While there were restrictions on the SCMP preventing it from publishing reports
and editorials against the British Empire and Hong Kong, it was allowed to report
negative or positive news about China. The SCMP paid lower costs to obtain news
from Canton, Amoy, Shanghai and Beijing. It had correspondents in large Chinese
cities but had few in the United Kingdom. Considering the demand for Chinese news
by Chinese readers and the comparative cost advantage over British news, the SCMP
copiously published China-related news.
I would like to point out those commercial newspapers, including the Englishlanguage SCMP, promoted Chinese reform and Chinese national sentiments, but it
should be understood that they did this mainly to make profits by news and editorials,
as well as provide information on China for British merchants to take into account
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for their Chinese businesses. Paul A. Cohen, in his book, Between Tradition and
Modernity: Wang T’ao and Reform in Late Chʻing China, told a similar story. Wang
Tao, the famous Chinese reformer and founding father of Chinese newspapers, made
a significant amount of money through his successful management of the Xunhuan
Ribao, with its valuable business information, Chinese news, Canton news, Beijing
news, and shipping information. Unlike other Chinese commercial newspapers,
Wang published editorials against Qing government officials in Xunhuan Ribao to
make profits. The legal protection in Hong Kong guaranteed such a strategy for
Chinese newspapers before 1907.88
Hu Daojing wrote that English newspapers were used to protect the Western
powers’ political and commercial interests in China.89 Lai Guangjian pointed out that
Chinese coastal newspapers represented British national interests. With reporting that
lacked substantive evidence, the English newspapers in Chinese coastal cities, other
than those in Hong Kong, supported the British invasion of China. These newspapers
tried to control public opinion and harm Chinese interests.90 Ge Gongzhen wrote that
missionaries used the newspapers to spread Protestantism in China and in so doing,
the missionaries wanted to subjugate Chinese culture to serve foreign countries’
national interests.91 Zheng Guanying, the Qing official reformer and scholar, proved
this argument in his Shengshi Weiyan: when there were Sino-foreign conflicts, the
Western newspapers tried their best to slander the Chinese government.92 However,
Chinese editors published more impartial editorials, and even the late Qing
government noticed the importance of English newspapers in Chinese diplomacy.93
Yong Z. Volz, Chin-Chuan Lee, and Jiarong Zhou remodel these arguments in
their research on American and Japanese newspapers in China: they claimed that
those newspapers, whether privately owned or government-sponsored, represented
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their national interests in China. 94 My research shows that the SCMP worked
differently. The SCMP had in-depth connections with both Chinese and British
investors, editors, advertisers, management, readers, and political institutions; thus, it
represented both British and Chinese interests during my research period. The SCMP
expected a stable and prosperous Hong Kong society, which fit British interests in
Hong Kong. In particular, while it supported Chinese reform for a better business
environment for both Chinese and British merchants, it expected significant income
as a result. Additionally, it represented Hong Kong and mainland Chinese merchants’
interests through its editorials, which did not incur the anger of advertisers from the
Chinese and British communities because the SCMP had readers of greater economic
power in those communities.
Elizabeth Sinn echoed Zhang’s argument and substantiated this conclusion via
research on the Chinese newspaper Qiribao (Zhongwai Xinwen Qiribao, 中外新聞
七日報), which was edited by Chen Ailing, who was later the editor of other Chinese
newspapers, including Huazi Ribao (Chinese Mail), which operated under another
form of the combined reporting strategy, that of Chinese and English language
reporting in one newspaper. 95 This development occurred because the English
newspapers intended to attract Chinese readers.
In actuality, the earliest Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong, such as Zhongwai
Xinbao, Huazi Ribao, and Xunhuan Ribao, were founded by mild reformers, such as
Wang Tao, Chen Aiting, Wu Tingfang, etc., who worked for the Hong Kong
government, the Qing government, or the government of the Republic of China, in
that order. They used the newspapers to improve the position of China around the
world and freely expressed their views in Hong Kong. Although the development of
Chinese newspapers was seriously influenced, or manipulated, by foreign capital,
28

Elizabeth Sinn claimed that these newspaper editors tried to be independent in
reporting the news and especially in attracting Chinese readers, by identifying their
newspapers as publications for Chinese readers in Hong Kong.96
The first Chinese and British-founded English daily, the SCMP, had an important
role in, and made vital contributions to, modern Hong Kong history. It helped to
improve the position of Chinese bourgeoisie readers through reporting; in addition,
the SCMP promoted audience freedom for the Chinese community in Hong Kong.
Probably because of the difficulty in accessing the SCMP archives and the old
newspapers themselves, the contribution of the SCMP’s reporting in support of
Chinese reform and resisting the Japanese invasion of China has not been well
studied. The SCMP reported on China for commercial objectives, but it also
portrayed the contribution of Hong Kong Chinese readers to the causes of modern
Chinese reform and nationalist movements. I discuss this in detail in Chapters 2 and
5.

British Audience
According to scholars, especially John Carroll, Hong Kong was an example of
collaborative colonialism, which meant that the British could not control every part
of Hong Kong by force, so they executed a policy of cooperating with local Chinese
elites in the governance of Hong Kong.97 In the field of the Hong Kong press, the
SCMP, as a British colonial English newspaper, had to have both Chinese and British
subscribers to be viable in my research period.
Hong Kong, as a British colony, could not shrug off the influence of the British
Empire. Consequently, as an English newspaper, the SCMP had to satisfy the needs
of British readers and report the “home news”, even if only using Reuters sources,
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and it occasionally published stories on British imperial events. Most of the time,
there were only a few hundred to a few thousand British residents in Hong Kong,
plus sporadic British readers in Canton and China’s coastal cities.
The SCMP preserved British cultural heritage via reporting on British sports, such
as lawn bowls, cricket, golf, and football. Thus, besides news sources from Reuters,
the SCMP had additional reporting sources among the British. It was the same with
other British event reporting, such as the King’s birthday, Empire Days, and the
British Empire Exhibition in London in 1924-1925. In 1908, the new head of the
SCMP, Dr Noble, emphasised this focus and noted that the SCMP had its feet in two
worlds: the British Empire and China.98 Moreover, the SCMP had to obey the Hong
Kong government’s Seditious Publication Ordinance of 1914 and restrict its negative
reporting on the British Hong Kong government. In particular, it could not “bring
into hatred or contempt His Majesty, or the Government established by law in the
United Kingdom or in this Colony or in any British possession or in British India or
the administration of justice in any of such places or to excite disaffection towards
His Majesty or any of the said Governments”.99 In 1927, the SCMP also had to begin
obeying the Printer and Publication Ordinance. The Printer and Publication
Ordinance could require the SCMP to “pay any fine which may be imposed upon the
proprietor, printer, publisher or editor of the newspaper in question, either under this
Ordinance or in respect of any matter appearing in the said newspaper”. In addition,
the SCMP would have to “pay any damages that may be awarded in any action for
libel in respect of any matter appearing in the said newspaper and the costs of any
such action”.100 To avoid possible fines arising from reporting on the British Empire,
the SCMP used British news agency content and created sports and exhibition news
content, but it could not be like other British newspapers, such as The Times and
30

Manchester Guardian, which focused passionately on social affairs and frequently
commented on the British government.
The SCMP’s history witnessed the decline of the British Empire and the rise of
Chinese and American capitalism in East Asia. More than 100 British merchants sold
their company shares to American investor Dr Noble, making the SCMP a company
controlled by an American.101 Although before that, the SCMP was owned not only
by British investors but also by Chinese investors, including a Chinese merchant
bank, the National Bank of China. The SCMP was also an advertising medium for
the companies of the wealthiest non-British owners.

Nationalism, British Identity, and the Business of the SCMP
The SCMP provided reporting about the rise of Chinese nationalism during the
first half of twentieth century; for example, content on Chinese reform and business
conflicts with Western powers.102 In addition, the SCMP provided more content of
what Chinese readers expected on the Chinese war with the Japanese.103 These cases
showed the interaction of newspapers with Chinese nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm
emphasised that human factors, such as propaganda, were used to stimulate national
sentiment in the course of the construction of nationalism.104 In addition, Hobsbawm
believed that the nation would be constructed in keeping with the principles of
nationalism. 105 Benedict Anderson, meanwhile, believed that the nation would
appear or could be imagined under the simultaneous conditions of capitalism,
printing technology and human language diversity.106 In other words, the printing of
capitalism in the form of newspapers provided material conditions for the
imagination of the Chinese nation in Hong Kong. My research in this thesis discloses
that the identity could also be helpful for the progress of media business.
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My definition of Chinese nationalism employs those of Carlton Hayes and Hans
Kohn. Hayes says, “Loyalty and attachment to the interior of the group (namely the
nation and homeland) are the basis of nationalism”.

107

Hans Kohn defines

nationalism as “A deep feeling of attachment to a homeland and absolute loyalty to it,
and a sense of sharing its destiny are the basis of nationalism, which is genuine when
no other factor checks the loyalty to the homeland”.108 I define Chinese nationalism
in this thesis as “a strong but unnecessarily eternal passion to the motherland”. The
passion could be cultural-based, business-based and politics-based. For my purposes
and intents, Chinese nationalism is conditional and could be weakened by the ebb of
business interests from the motherland. Being Chinese in terms of race did not mean
every Chinese was automatically a patriot or a nationalist. A “Chinese patriot” is
simply defined as a Chinese person who supported his country development and
endeavoured to protect it in front of external intimidation. A patriot did not
necessarily support governments in China; viz., being pro-China. The meanings of
the two terms “patriotism” and “nationalism” are almost the same in this thesis.
The rapid development of publishing capitalism in Hong Kong co-stimulated the
burgeoning of Chinese nationalism. The SCMP grew with the tide of nationalism and
the formation of modern republicanism, particularly because it could report Chinese
news more freely. The SCMP has been a neglected factor in modern Chinese history.
Its role in modern Chinese reform and revolutionary history was definitely limited,
but it represented the press part of the contribution of Hong Kong to modern Chinese
history.
Concurrently, the SCMP reported on British events, such as imperial exhibitions
and sports, and, therefore, it met British imperial readers’ needs and made Hong
Kong a part of the British Empire through its relevant reporting. Daniel Dayan and
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Elihu Katz claimed that media events can ‘integrate societies into a collective
heartbeat and evoke a renewal of loyalty and its legitimate authority’.109 Similarly,
the reporting of lawn bowls in the SCMP exhibited the British identity of Hong Kong
British residents.
The “identity” or “national identity” here means one feels he or she belongs to a
nation, irrespective of anything else. Therefore, Chinese identity means a man who
deems he is a part of China. British identity means a man who deems himself a part
of Britain. “British imperial identity” means a man who deems himself a part of the
British Empire.
British imperial identity, like other identities, was vague, dynamic and imagined.
Bernard Porter claimed that British Imperial identity during the nineteenth century
was mainly owned by the British middle and upper classes, which had commitments
to the United Kingdom.110 The SCMP was a newspaper for the Chinese bourgeoisie
and British, and Chinese merchant leaders had been portrayed as those who shared
the British imperial identity with the British editor. Kelby Halone studied the
interplay between sport, communication and identity and he claimed the contribution
of identity and sports to communication. 111 Similarly, it is not surprising that the
prosperity of the SCMP had a close relationship with British identity.
In summation, there were interactions between news reporting and cultural
identities. While the news reporting portrayed identities, those identities, on the other
hand, attracted audiences and improved the SCMP sales figures.

Freedom of the Press in British Colonial Hong Kong
A widely accepted definition of ‘press freedom’ is the freedom of expression,
broadcasting and publication without government interference and approval before
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the publication within the laws guidance or restriction. 112 Similarly, Hong Kong
scholars accept the definition of press freedom in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; namely, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”113 The press freedom applies to the press and its audiences. If the editors
and media owners are the same group of people, it is not necessary to discuss
editorial freedom. Editorial freedom is usually defined as the company-employed
editor in chief having absolute authority to determine which news or news sources to
report without interference of the media owners. In other words, the press freedom at
least includes three parts, which are the freedom of the media without censorship by
the government (external press freedom), the editorial freedom (internal press
freedom) and the freedom for audiences to seek, receive and impart information in
the media (audience freedom).
In this thesis, I employ the three parts of press freedom to analyse the relationship
between the SCMP and Hong Kong society. The “freedom of the SCMP” means the
SCMP newspaper itself could publish news without daily censorship or government
interference; “internal” press freedom, or “editorial freedom of the SCMP”, means
the SCMP editors had the freedom to publish without the interference of the
management; “audience freedom” is the freedom of audiences to learn information
and freely express their opinions in the SCMP. The three parts generally united on
the principle of the stability of Hong Kong. Board members and the general manager
had the power to interfere with editorial office work and the editors had no say in the
final decisions. Nevertheless, interference from the board members and general
managers did not happen frequently. In particular, the editors in chief most of the
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time had very good relationships with board members and the general manager. In
other words, the SCMP editors still had an ideal level of editorial freedom, though
not an absolute one. As result of the good situation for the first two parts of press
freedom, the freedom of audiences in the SCMP was protected and guaranteed.
The combined reporting strategy took advantage of the Hong Kong censorship
muzzling China-related reporting in Chinese press. Thus, the SCMP used the Chinarelated reporting to make profits. I identify the external press freedom in Hong Kong
through three perspectives. Firstly, during different periods, the SCMP enjoyed
different degrees of external press freedom under changing government ordinances.
Secondly, for English newspapers, including the SCMP and other Chinese
newspapers, external press freedom was differently enforced. For example, Chinese
newspapers suffered daily censorship after the 1922 Seamen’s Strike, which actually
provided the SCMP an unfair advantage in the media market.114 The SCMP could
provide information to attract Chinese bourgeoisie readers that the other Chinese
newspapers should have been able to provide but could not. Thirdly, the SCMP board
members, and government officials, including governors, sometimes pressured the
SCMP editors and journalists to change or withdraw reporting against some
advertisers or relevant social organizations. In this way, the SCMP maintained
relevant advertisements.
Carol Lai, Chin-Chuan Lee, and Joseph Man Chan believed there was significant
intervention in the external freedom of press by the British Hong Kong colonial
government. 115 Although the Chinese press suffered from severe censorship and
regulations, nevertheless, Lai, Lee and Chan neglected the external press freedom of
an English newspaper like the SCMP, or overstated the media regulation in British
Colonial Hong Kong. Hong Kong English newspapers either supported or criticised
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different colonial officials and their competitors from time to time. Although editors
were sometimes sued for libel, it did not influence the operation of the newspapers,
and the editors could manage their newspapers from prison, which again showed that
external press freedom was respected in Hong Kong.116 The SCMP also had a libel
contingency fund to cope with libel lawsuits, even though the SCMP did not need to
submit its content for censorship before publication.117
The official report about the British press disclosed that suppression of the external
press freedom in the British Empire was not rare: “Varying degrees of official
control, censorship and intimidation prevailed [in] India, Burma and Malay”.118 In
To-day in Egypt: its Administration, People and Politics, the SCMP co-founder and
editor, Alfred Cunningham, said the Hong Kong English press was not like the
English press in Egypt, as it was under censorship, while Arabic-language
newspapers enjoyed external press freedom. 119 Egyptian English newspapers were
censored because they were influential and could be read easily by audiences in
Britain.120 Similarly, Chandrika Kaul’s research on the Indian press showed that the
Indian media was deeply influenced by the British liberal press tradition, although
there were suppressions from time to time.121 Lam Man-sum claimed that the Hong
Kong English newspapers had little impact on British public opinion.
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Consequently, what the SCMP had reported would not cause serious concern in
Britain.
To summarize, the SCMP enjoyed more external press freedom than the Chinese
press in British colonial Hong Kong. The SCMP management sometimes suppressed
editorial freedom, while at other times it met Chinese readers’ demands under the
auspices of the SCMP board. These variations in the press freedom were exploited to
maximise the newspaper’s profits. In addition, this profit-oriented practice was
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helpful to improve the Chinese bourgeoisie audience’s right to be freely informed by
the press and to participate in public consensus.

The Framework of the PhD Thesis
I have employed five chapters to study the SCMP and its influence on Hong Kong
society. In the first chapter, I discuss the relationship between the SCMP and its
British and Chinese readers, advertisers, management, and editors and Hong Kong’s
political parties, as well as the Hong Kong censorship policy. In so doing, I hope
readers will understand that the SCMP had to meet the demands of both Chinese and
British readers to implement a combined reporting strategy and survive in the Hong
Kong press arena. In addition, the SCMP had to navigate relationships with groups of
people and institutions to increase its income and decrease its growth obstacles.
In the second chapter, I include case studies about the SCMP’s reporting on
Chinese reform, the May Fourth Movement and so on. In so doing, I would like
readers to understand that the SCMP managed to attract Chinese readers with
abundant articles about China, making it different from other English press outlets in
Chinese coastal cities like Shanghai, as well as in the British Empire. The SCMP had
to obey Hong Kong’s press laws and social orders regulating reporting on China and
the British Empire, but it still needed to do something for its Chinese readers. Thus,
it exhibited a complex and flexible attitude in handling its reporting.
In the third chapter, I focus on the SCMP’s coverage of lawn bowls, one of the
most important sports in British Colonial Hong Kong. While reporting on China
brought the SCMP good circulation and advertising value, some British readers
might not have found it interesting or attractive, although instructive. In addition, the
SCMP would not have a significant British audience if it only had reporting on China
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because British audience considered the SCMP did not represent the British residents’
interests in Hong Kong.123 While the SCMP managed to attract Chinese readers, it
still needed to retain British readers, so the SCMP provided what British readers
liked; for example, sports reporting. It enhanced its lawn bowls reporting, and in so
doing, the SCMP not only consolidated its British readership, but it also attracted
advertisers, many of which were British firms.
In the fourth chapter, I detail that the SCMP provided interesting and attractive
information for British and Chinese readers who expected to see what the British
Empire Exhibition would bring to Hong Kong. The SCMP expressed British imperial
sentiments in its reporting, but it also advocated the long-term interests of Hong
Kong in an imperial business network, which improved the SCMP’s circulation and
advertising income.
In the fifth chapter, I discuss the SCMP in the 1930s, a complex international
political and business situation. The SCMP had to provide Anti-Japanese War
reporting to meet the demands of its Chinese readers, but the British board of
directors and readers did not support this tactic. The board did not want to lose
Japanese advertisers and hurt the company’s interests. In addition, British readers
also worried that the Chinese might riot in Hong Kong because of anti-Japanese
sentiment. The British colonial government and British legislative council members
were also concerned that such news would bring Hong Kong society to an unstable
situation. As an English newspaper experiencing the least censorship from the Hong
Kong government, though there was self-censorship from the SCMP board, the
SCMP still had the freedom to report Sino-Japanese war news for its Chinese readers.
The SCMP board also finally realised that the best option was to cooperate with
different political parties to make profits from selling war news to the Chinese and to
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an increasing number of British readers. Most importantly, the Chinese advertisers
and British advertisers had important interests in China, and being pro-Japanese or
neutral in the Sino-Japanese conflict did not fit the interests of advertisers like HSBC,
Bank of China, and Shewan. In other words, reporting on the Anti-Japanese War
effort maximised the SCMP’s income via circulation and advertisements. Japanese
advertisers still needed to advertise in an Anti-Japanese newspaper, because there
were British clients and some unpatriotic Chinese clients who worked with those
Japanese firms.
The SCMP focused on maximising its shareholders’ interests in a colonial
environment and formed a combined reporting strategy to create a profitable venture.
In particular, it spoke for the Chinese audience. It also promoted the prosperity of
Hong Kong, such as in the development of trade and sport. In doing so, it gained
valuable audiences in the British and Chinese communities and attracted advertisers
who benefitted from the fast-growing Hong Kong economy.
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1.

THE FORMATION OF THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST COMBINED REPORTING STRATEGY

In this chapter, I illustrate the British and Chinese readers and organizations
connected with the South China Morning Post (SCMP), and the varieties of Chinese
factors that existed in the SCMP, which finally led to a combined reporting strategy.
These factors include readership, management, editors and advertisers. Five years
after the founding of the SCMP, the editor of the China Mail, W. H. Donald, wrote,
‘British trade in China has always had a staunch supporter in the Post. In matters
Chinese the Post has consistently maintained a strong lead.’

1

The strategy for

reporting Chinese and British events for Chinese and British readers was one of the
most significant characteristics of the SCMP’s reporting. The SCMP also received
subsidies from the Hong Kong government for many years and had long-term
advertisement contracts with the Chinese Nationalist Government’s companies. Thus,
the SCMP was a profit-oriented newspaper, without the responsibility or the
possibility of serving the masses, most of whom could not read English. Only by
serving the bourgeoisie audience in this way, could the SCMP obtain the highest
circulation, cover British and Chinese readers, and win the attention of varieties of
advertisers in Hong Kong. To make profits, the SCMP sometimes suppressed
editorial freedom to cooperate with advertisers and the government.
It also engendered a legal environment with greater external press freedom for
English newspapers in Hong Kong to publish information and editorials that the
Chinese press could not. With low circulation but a bourgeoisie audience, in an
environment of harsh media suppression, the SCMP chose to be a conservative,
quality paper accepted by both Chinese and British readers, and local advertisers.
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Readership
The SCMP only had a circulation of roughly 300 copies as of its founding in
1903.2 In 1916, it had a circulation of 500 to 600 copies. 3 By the 1920s, it had made
great progress, with a daily circulation of 2,900, which was partly due to good
business management and the Great Canton-Hong Kong strike. 4 In 1932, its
circulation had reached approximately 5,500 copies.5 Unfortunately, there was a 10
percent drop soon after the circulation peak due to the world economic crisis.6 In
1938, the company Board minutes recorded that the circulation generally had shown
a steady increase, but the minutes do not disclose the circulation figure. 7 After
discussion with former SCMP editor Robin Hutcheon and checking the population
data in 1941, I have estimated a circulation figure that should be no fewer than
10,000 subscriptions before Japan took over Hong Kong.8
At the very beginning, the readers of the SCMP were mainly British and other
European seamen serving on ships near the harbour, Chinese merchants, and British
women and men from all strata of Hong Kong society.9 The SCMP started to attract
Chinese readers because of a series of factors that I will explain in subsequent
chapters. In addition, shipping news was traditionally the SCMP’s most important
section, secondary to the sports section. 10 The shipping section was mainly for
British and Chinese merchant readers. The more Hong Kong developed as an
international shipping and trade centre, the more shipping news and advertisements
appeared in the SCMP. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how the SCMP supported the
improvement of Hong Kong trade, especially within the promising British imperial
commercial network, through its British Empire Exhibition reporting.
The chapter on sports reporting will improve scholars’ understanding of British
colonial life and colonial press operation. The sports section was mainly for the
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British readers. As the SCMP editor Douglas Story said, ‘every male Briton of Hong
Kong engaged, from his Excellency the Governor to the most recently joined
subaltern in the barracks, from the elderly Attorney-General to the youngest clerk in
a shipping office’ followed sports obsessively.11 They ‘pa[id] too much attention to
sport’ in early twentieth century Hong Kong.12 Therefore, it is understandable why
the SCMP had a strong sports section and even put lawn bowls in the front section in
its newspaper while other English newspapers did not do this. The large sports
section meant higher circulation and more advertisement income, and so
demonstrated the motives of the SCMP in using sports reporting to make profits. .
There were economic crises, financial market collapses and wars, which could
potentially decrease the advertising income for the SCMP. In order to remedy
advertising loss under those circumstances, the paper had to increase circulation and
derive income from other channels. I will discuss these special situations in Chapter
5.
Between 1903 and 1941, the price of the SCMP was 10 HK cents per copy, and it
cost approximately HK$3 per month. Foreign and Chinese workers who did not
understand the English language only made HK$5 to HK$15 per month, and most of
their money was spent on food and other necessities. The readers who understood
English had a certain higher than average level of financial capability, and they
wanted to know about politics, economics, trade, business, Hong Kong, mainland
China, and entertainment.
Of course, these people were also clients or potential clients of the local Hong
Kong movie theatres, department stores like Lane Crawford, the Bank of East Asia,
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Bank of China (Hong Kong),
the Bank of Canton, and other advertisers in the SCMP. The SCMP was a newspaper
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for the middle and upper classes in Hong Kong, who had significantly influenced the
development of Hong Kong.
Thus, from this perspective, the SCMP was one of the most influential newspapers
in Hong Kong, considering its circulation and Chinese bourgeoisie readership. Some
Chinese newspapers might have had a greater circulation; for example, Gongshang
Ribao and Huazi Ribao had approximately two or three times the circulation of the
SCMP; nevertheless, their readers were lower class or middle class Chinese, who
were not the most influential people in Hong Kong society. In addition, most Chinese
newspaper readers were not wealthy enough to buy the products advertised
frequently in the SCMP.
The SCMP never conducted a survey to determine how many Chinese and British
readers they actually had before 1941, and the readership should be understood as
dynamic. Robin Hutcheon told me that 70 percent of the post-war subscribers were
British firms 13 and that there were also subscribers in Canton and other Chinese
cities. 14 The SCMP also had subscribers in the United Kingdom and the United
States, but the international circulation was limited;15 however, a Chinese scholar in
the 1940s estimated that more than half of the readers of the English newspapers
were Chinese.16 The SCMP intended, during the pre-war period, to absorb as many
English-speaking Chinese readers as possible, and it attempted to learn to respect of
the sentiments of Chinese nationalists. 17 Hutcheon believed that some Chinese
readers ‘skimmed the headlines, the cartoons, the photographs, etc., but were not
serious committed readers’.18
In other words, the Chinese readership was different, with a different definition,
and it consisted of subscribers who read editorials, business information and
entertainment news. In particular, these special readers were advertisers and
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politicians. While the SCMP had an overwhelming majority of the English press
market in Hong Kong, we can easily believe that most of the English newspaper
readers at least read the SCMP, considering the British population, the SCMP’s
readership, and the readership’s structure. There were several thousand British
subscribers from British firms, and British readers made up a significant number, I
believe, accounting for the majority of British morning paper readers in Hong Kong
in the 1930s and 1940s, considering the unpopularity of the other morning paper, the
Hong Kong Daily Press.19 From Royal Navy soldiers to the governor, a wide stratum
of British read the SCMP. Even low-level British readers’ food budget sometimes
equalled ten Chinese workers’ monthly incomes, or HK$140.20
The Chinese readers are divided into at least three groups. The first group is
Chinese intellectuals. Whether these people lived in Hong Kong for half a century or
only eight years during the Sino-Japanese War, they received a traditional Chinese
education; even if they went on to postgraduate or even secondary school education
in Hong Kong or the Western world, they usually maintained a strong sense of
Chinese identity. For example, the librarian of the Hong Kong University Fung Ping
Shan Library, Chen Junbao, OBE, read English newspapers, including the SCMP.21
In addition, he was a member of the Chinese Defence League, an anti-Japanese
organisation under the direction of Madame Song Qingling.22 The SCMP also had an
uncertain number of mainland Chinese intellectual readers, who received their
education overseas or earned doctorates in the United States and the United Kingdom
and later worked at universities or for the Nationalist government.23
The second group, the majority of the SCMP audience, consisted of Chinese
businesspeople who immigrated to Hong Kong for economic or political reasons in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Some of them were called ‘better-class
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Chinese’ (高等華人), and some of them were called ‘higher-class Chinese refugees’
(高等難民). Better-class Chinese made up the largest audience in comfortable firstrun theatres.24 Businesspeople were also important clients of the banks in Hong Kong,
which helped merchants in their trade businesses. These merchants were patriots and
bought National Salvation Bonds to ensure a victory against the Japanese Invasion in
the 1930s, but they also hoped the Nationalist government’s senior officials would
return some of the funds that they ‘accumulated … to the Nation’s War chest which
urgently requires a lot of funds in order to secure our ultimate victory.’25
The third group of SCMP readers were native Hong Kong residents who accepted
Western education, worked for British companies, or for the government, and had
much less connection to the mainland. Hong Kong-born residents made up more than
one-quarter of the Hong Kong population beginning in 1921. Some of these people
were educated at the University of Hong Kong and worked for the government or for
foreign companies. The university student union subscribed to the SCMP, so students
and professors could read it there.26
These students were closest to the British colonisers and were loyal British
subjects. The president of Minsheng College, Yang Duansheng, did not like some of
the people in this group because he had little in common with them, and Chen
Junbao fully agreed with Yang. 27 Actually, these natives included college students,
lower level staff and compradors at companies, and government officials who paid
greater attention to the SCMP news, job advertisements, and film advertisements.
They spent their spare time in theatres watching Western movies and were inclined
to be closer to foreigners. Readers in this group later became the professionals in
Hong Kong society, and while they made up the lower level of the SCMP readers,
they were still useful and valuable to advertisers because of the larger size of this
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group, which constituted a majority of the clients of the SCMP advertisers.
The SCMP tried to attract Chinese readers as of its founding, and this policy did
not change until 1941. Although the SCMP did not agree with everything that
happened in China or that was done by the Chinese, nevertheless, the SCMP
understood that it had to respect its Chinese readers’ emotions, and thus it reported
China news to satisfy the variety of demands of Chinese readers. 28 The SCMP
provided news reporting and supported in its editorials what mainstream readers
supported or sympathised with, which did attract Chinese audiences. I selected
important events in modern Chinese history, such as early Chinese reforms, the May
Fourth Movement, and the Chinese resistance against the Japanese invasion, to
demonstrate that the SCMP had such an effect.

Management and Chinese Staff
The SCMP management treated Chinese and British staff in an equally courteous
manner. The newspaper’s Chinese staff members were entrusted with important
posts, including editors in chief, editors, chief Chinese staff, accountants and
compradors. In addition, the Chinese staff cooperated well with management during
crises. According to He Xingfeng’s research on the Huaqiao Ribao, which was
founded by Chinese staff members Shum Waiyau and Chan Kai of the SCMP, they
wanted to edit a newspaper for loving their motherland China 29 ; in contrast, the
British managed the SCMP. This collaboration between the British and Chinese,
from operation to news reporting, endowed the SCMP with Chinese and British
characteristics, thus contributing to the combined reporting strategy.
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Co-founders from China and Britain
The SCMP was a joint-stock newspaper business from its foundation. It did not
successfully sell all initial 6,000 shares to investors, and the financial situation was
not ideal for some time.30 Frank H. H. King believed that using the capital of Chinese
investors such as Tse Tsan Tai and others to found the SCMP improved the Chinese
role of the colonial English newspaper.31 In addition, in 1905, Alfred Cunningham
had to ask for a permit to erect a movable kiosk to sell ‘all or any of the other local
papers’ and books at Blake Pier to make a profit. 32 The kiosk permit had been
cancelled in 1929 by the Director of Public Works, who required the manager of the
SCMP to keep ‘the area in a clean and tidy condition’.33
In 1903, Tse Tsan Tai was not in a good financial situation; he had lost money in
business and was not wealthy at that time, so the SCMP was his greatest hope for
making money.

34

Tse, although a former revolutionary leader, wanted to make

money via media investment. Tse and Cunningham targeted both Chinese and British
readers by reviving and sympathising with China, but they did not turn the SCMP
into a radical revolutionary paper like Zhongguo Ribao.35
Cunningham was also the organiser of the St. George’s Club in Hong Kong, where
British people could socialise and play games together; later, SCMP editor George
Lloyd became the chairman of the club committee.36 Meanwhile, Tse Tsan Tai was
the founder of the Chinese Club, where Chinese merchants could meet and discuss
the development of the Chinese community in Hong Kong.37 The two co-founders
brought Britishness and Chineseness to the one newspaper. The editor of the SCMP’s
contemporary China Mail pointed out that ‘one consistent aim of the Post has been
to promote a clearer understanding, both politically and commercially, between the
Chinese and the “barbarians” of the West.’ 38 The SCMP supported Chinese and
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British merchants’ interests in the newspaper and created an image of co-prosperity
for British and Chinese Hong Kong through its reporting, for example, through the
enthusiastic reporting on the British Empire Exhibition in 1924, which is explained
in a subsequent chapter.
Unfortunately, the low circulation of the SCMP as a start-up company could not
support the luxurious lifestyle of general manager Alfred Cunningham. As a result,
one angry shareholder, Joseph Whittlesey Noble, a dentist from the United States,
acquired two-thirds of the SCMP’s shares and dismissed Cunningham and Tse, who
together only owned roughly 10 percent of the shares in the SCMP, from the SCMP
Ltd.39 However, this did not mean a transfer in control. In fact, the controller of the
SCMP since 1903 was the National Bank of China; the bank controlled the SCMP
through company debentures, not shares, and had two seats on the SCMP board
before Noble took over the company, and the bank remained on the board until it
closed in 1911.

Joseph Whittlesey Noble
Dr Noble was a Far East entrepreneur who invested in the SCMP for profit and
used it to promote his other ventures in Hong Kong. His newspaper contemporary J.
B. Powell pointed out that Noble was a great man who bought SCMP shares at the
earliest possible time, occupied the greatest number of board positions, and held the
position of board chairman in Hong Kong.40 Nevertheless, they did not explain why
Dr Noble invested in the SCMP or how Dr Noble planned the objectives of the
SCMP. Dr Noble became wealthy because of a generous award from the Qing
Emperor. According to cultural expectations, Noble should have been grateful to the
Chinese government. Noble directed the SCMP toward news reporting on China
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because he was happy to see that an increasing number of Chinese readers liked to
read the SCMP’s news reporting on China.41 In addition, he treated Chinese people
with compassion; for example, he offered some free dental services to the Chinese
community through Ho Kai’s Alice Memorial Hospital.42 Noble also gave important
positions to Chinese people, such as the editorship to Shum Waiyau and Henry
Ching. Noble made profits from investing in the SCMP, as well as many of his own
companies, or those in which he invested, that advertised in the SCMP.
Executive and legislative council member Sir Paul Chater was Dr Noble’s
newspaper investment partner in Hong Kong. Chater and Noble invested in the
SCMP and in other businesses in Hong Kong and controlled scores of board seats at
these companies.43 Noble’s accumulated business holdings in Hong Kong included
Hong Kong Dairy Farm, the Ice and Cold Storage Co., Ltd., the Hong Kong Hotel,
Ltd., Hong Kong Tramways Co., Ltd., the Hong Kong Electric Co., Ltd., the Green
Island Cement Co., Ltd., and the South China Morning Post, Ltd. He was chairman
of the Dairy Farm Company and the Hong Kong Hotel, Ltd.; he was on the
consulting committee of China Light and Power Company, and he was a director of
Hong Kong Tramways Co., Ltd. 44 While Noble used the SCMP to promote his
businesses in Hong Kong, he understood that his newspaper reporting should be
friendly to the Chinese and British communities, otherwise his companies and
products would be boycotted.
It is no wonder that Noble directed the SCMP to publish reporting on China to
make profits. To a certain extent, Noble was one of many American merchants who
became wealthy by living their dreams in the Far East. General M. C. Stayer told
Jonas E. Warrell that it was the Qing government that made Noble rich in the
Forbidden City. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, General Stayer was the Sanitary

49

Officer at the American Embassy in China. The Emperor had problems with his teeth
and wanted to find an American dentist who used more modern techniques than
Chinese dentists did. The Emperor selected Dr Noble for the position of royal dentist.
Noble was in San Francisco, but he accepted this duty, satisfied the Royal family, and
was heavily rewarded. 45 We do not know the exact amount of money that Noble
received, but we can estimate. The first Western dentistry clinic in Beijing belonged
to Chen Shun Long, who opened his business in 1888; before that, an American
dentist in Hong Kong educated him.46 Because there was only one American dentist
in Hong Kong whose name was Dr Noble, it is almost certain that Chen Shun Long
was a student of Dr Noble’s clinic, and Noble might have owned shares in the
Beijing clinic. Chen Shun Long was a royal dentist and treated Dowager Cixi’s teeth.
His recompense was 500 taels.47 Noble was invited to the palace and would have
been rewarded more than Chen Shun Long; it is likely that his compensation could
have been a few thousand taels. In any case, this would reasonably explain Noble’s
means to invest in the SCMP.
In 1911, Noble found that he had made an egregious mistake. Angus Hamilton, a
well-known journalist in London, became the editor in chief of the SCMP in 1910.
This man played an important role in the SCMP’s history. He wanted to bring the
liberal tradition of British journalism to Hong Kong and criticised the one member of
the Hong Kong elites, Robert Gordon Shewan, whose companies had actually been
the most important advertisers in the SCMP for a very long time. Hamilton was good
at writing lively and ironic editorials, and his articles took aim at Shewan. Hamilton
rejected the SCMP’s board interference. Board director J. S. Harston, who previously
employed Hamilton in London, said Hamilton’s editorials were ‘very nearly
libellous,’ but Hamilton claimed, ‘Mr Harston had no knowledge either of the six-
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column article or of the page article containing the careful, non-libellous and
important analysis of the cause of the depreciation of the Green Island Cement
shares.’ Hamilton claimed he ‘has written what he was informed’ 48 , which still
resulted in the censorship of his editorials before publication.49
The worst issue arose when Hamilton physically assaulted the Chinese chief of
staff in the printing department, causing a strike at the SCMP, which later became a
press strike across Hong Kong. The SCMP needed the Chinese staff to print the
newspapers but no longer needed the troublesome British-style editor. It was wise for
the SCMP to stand on the side of Chinese staff, because the Chinese staff saved the
company from collapse several times on critical, historical occasions.
Another wise decision of the SCMP was the acquisition of the Hong Kong
Telegraph, an afternoon English newspaper previously owned by Chinese merchants.
The SCMP completely acquired the Hong Kong Telegraph in 1916.
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This

acquisition provided a guarantee for the SCMP, which meant that if the SCMP was in
trouble, the Hong Kong Telegraph could help the SCMP overcome the trouble and
decrease losses; for example, in case of a strike, even if the printers of the SCMP all
left, the Hong Kong Telegraph could help with the printing. The synergy of the two
newspapers made media management more flexible and helped to improve the
competition between the two newspapers. The editors could work for both
newspapers at the same time to cut costs.
In 1925, when the Great Strike and a stock market collapse occurred in Hong
Kong, Dr Noble left Hong Kong happily for his first marriage. He sold most of his
assets in Hong Kong, except for the newspapers and the Dairy Farm. Dr Noble
married a divorcee, Ethel Darby, retired in his fifties and stayed in New York to
placate his wife and children, and he no longer paid much attention to the business of
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the SCMP. Darby disclosed that the reason Dr Noble left Hong Kong for the United
States was only to marry her. 51 Dr Noble completely believed that his selection of a
Chinese editor would benefit the SCMP for a long time. In fact, the designated editor
worked at the SCMP for thirty-four years and defended the combined reporting
strategy. He also brought in his nephews as editors and accountants for the SCMP.52
Another two designated managers were John Scott Harston and Benjamin Wylie,
who were British. Harston was on the committee of the Hong Kong Law Society. He
was also a director and chairman of the National Bank of China, Ltd., A. S. Watson
& Co., Ltd., and Humphreys Estate and Finance Company, Ltd., and he was a
member of the Hong Kong Club.53 Harston ensured that the SCMP operated within
British common law, and he sympathised with the Chinese. Wylie’s general
management promoted the SCMP in Hong Kong, and he obtained advertisements
from local companies. Harston saved a score of Chinese revolutionaries in 1903 at
the request of the co-founder, Tse Tsan Tai.54 Wylie was the head of the Chinese
printers and treated Chinese people in a friendly manner. Both Wylie and Harston
liked British sports. Wylie liked lawn bowls, and Harston liked cricket. I explore the
relationship among the SCMP, lawn bowls, and Britishness in a subsequent chapter.

Editor Henry Ching
The SCMP from time to time respected freedom of the press because the
designated Chinese editor, Henry Ching (Shen Hanyang, 沈翰揚) Sr., was brave
enough to insist on what he believed was right and to negotiate with the Hong Kong
government, as well as with military forces.55 However, the SCMP helped the Hong
Kong government maintain the social stability of Hong Kong by filtering some news
that was detrimental to the British administration. 56 Former editor in chief Robin
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Hutcheon claimed that, except for those special cases such as ‘Empire Days’, the
SCMP was not ‘the spokesperson of the British Empire and would not support the
British business interests without question’.57
As for the news reporting that the British or Hong Kong government disliked, as
long as the SCMP editor thought it was necessary to report on events, and the
directors thought it would be good for the company’s interests (for example, higher
readership and more subscriptions), they did not fear possible intervention from the
Hong Kong government. The editors of the SCMP and the Hong Kong Telegraph
were reminded by the board chairman and other directors several times that what
readers read in the SCMP had already been selected by the editors and would be
useful for the company interests, as well as meet the readers’ demand. Nevertheless, I
should emphasise that the SCMP enjoyed a broader policy of freedom of the press,
and its editorials were not censored by the government.
In particular, regarding Anti-Japanese War reports, while some Chinese-language
newspapers were censored by the Hong Kong government, as the biggest English
newspaper in Hong Kong, the SCMP reported Anti-Japanese War news and printed
supportive and powerful editorials.58 It encouraged the international community to
assist the anti-Japanese cause and expressed the desire for the Chinese to succeed in
their resistance against the Japanese invasion. As a result, the SCMP won the support
of Chinese readers, and Ta Kung Pao regarded the SCMP as the newspaper that
sympathised the most with China. 59 I should clarify that Henry Ching’s primary
national identity was Australian, followed by overseas Chinese.60 This explained his
passive reaction to anti-Chinese comments on the Sino-Japanese conflict in the early
1930s. However, the letters of his Chinese audience and his English-speaking
Chinese friends’ private talks influenced his editorial support of the Chinese
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resistance.61

Chinese Staff
After the 1911 Hong Kong press strike, the SCMP management decided to
establish a good relationship with the Chinese and tried to treat them equally. John
Scott Harston was a solicitor and chairman of the SCMP. Benjamin Wylie, a printer,
was the acting general manager of the SCMP, and he held twenty-six SCMP shares.62
Henry Ching, whose mother was Australian and father was Chinese, experienced
much discrimination in Australia.63 However, Ben Wylie treated him very well and
found that Ching was good at devising editorials. Therefore, Ching was promoted
and served as the editor in chief for more than thirty years, which was recognised as
a miracle among the Chinese residents in Hong Kong society.
It was very realistic for the SCMP to use talented Chinese people to work for the
newspaper. The employment policy of the SCMP was so flexible that if a worker did
not know English well, he could perform manual labour for the SCMP, although
editors and journalists earned higher salaries by writing articles. Shum Wai Yau
received a low salary at the very beginning of his career at the SCMP. However, once
his ability became well known at the SCMP, he received a promotion with a higher
salary and allowed access to positions of higher management. Finally, he founded the
Wah Kiu Yat Po (Overseas Chinese Daily) with the complete support of the SCMP.
Other Chinese staff at the SCMP, such as Chan Kai, C. E. Wong, and Henry Ching,
earned a few hundred or even thousands, of Hong Kong dollars per month; some of
them had higher salaries than the foreign staff.64 Chan Kai worked at both the SCMP
and at the Overseas Chinese Daily; at the same time that he was a shareholder and
manager of the Overseas Chinese Daily, he was also the chief of Chinese staff for the
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SCMP.65
The SCMP rewarded the Chinese staff who were loyal to the company in the 1911
strike. The management decided to change the situation and treat the Chinese better,
including allowing the Chinese staff members’ children to work for the company.66
The SCMP used family ties to strengthen the company’s stability, and it employed
senior Chinese workers to manage the younger Chinese; in this way, the SCMP used
kinder human resources to treat its Chinese employees. When conflicts inside the
SCMP became issues with a family, they were solved within the family; not only was
loyalty formed within the company, but every member of the staff gained a sense of
responsibility toward the SCMP. This indicated that the SCMP paid as much
attention as possible to their decisions in order to understand Chinese employees’
emotions. After well-educated Chinese became editors for the company, they could
make hundreds of dollars every month, just like the British.67
The SCMP also provided benevolent services for Chinese employees, although the
sums of money were not as large as those for the foreign staff. They explained that
the difference was caused by the different lifestyles of the Chinese staff and the
foreign staff; for example, the British staff would retire and return to the United
Kingdom, where the cost of living was higher.68 In 1939, the SCMP established a
special fund known as ‘the Chinese superannuation fund’ as a way of providing for
staff or the family of staff who could no longer work. The SCMP employed a large
number of native staff and was grateful to those who worked faithfully for the SCMP
for many years. The fund was used to help Chinese staff members who grew old and
needed to retire, or ‘to the dependents of those who died, have been made by direct
payments out of the company’s monetary resources’69; this showed that the Chinese
staff enjoyed differential treatment compared to other Chinese employees in Hong
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Kong.
The SCMP’s family ties management style controlled the labour movement inside
the SCMP; thus, hiring present staff’s relatives was regarded as a safe and effective
method for avoiding strikes. Loyal and elderly workers for the SCMP could bring
their sons and relatives to work for the SCMP. Although their salaries were low at
the beginning, as long as the SCMP management recognised their abilities, they had
many opportunities for promotion. In the 1930s, the Chinese staff earned the lowest
salary at HK$20 per month. The Chinese editor, Henry Ching, earned the highest
salary, which was HK$1,400 per month.70 When Hong Kong’s economy was weak,
such as during periods of inflation and exchange rate fluctuation, the SCMP did not
increase the salaries of the Chinese printers at the same rate as foreign workers. The
salary increase was 10 percent for the editors, but it was 30 percent for the Chinese
lower level staff, which ensured that low-income workers could buy enough food to
eat when food prices rose steeply.71 The policy made the SCMP a united team.
The key reason that the SCMP flourished was due to the successful collaboration
between the Chinese and British staff and the fact that the human resource
management had established a connection with the combined reporting strategy. In a
newspaper office that reached a rich balance between Chinese and British people, it
created a balance in its reporting on Chinese and British events.

Advertisers
The largest advertisers in the SCMP included a series of firms that had substantial
business in China and British colonial Hong Kong. These firms expected a peaceful
and prosperous China and Hong Kong for their businesses to flourish. British
advertisers represented the British merchants’ business interests in China, but they
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expected to benefit from the development of modern Chinese economy. These firms
included Shewan Tomes Company, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC), which had two board seats at the SCMP. These advertisers
would not allow anti-Chinese government reporting to appear in their newspaper
while they participated in historic business cooperation such as granting national
construction loans, financial reform, and their anti-Japanese monetary policy, with
the various Chinese governments.

Shewan Tomes & Co.
In the early period of the SCMP, one of the leading advertisers was Shewan Tomes
& Co., Ltd, which was also one of the largest companies in the East. 72 This
company’s advertisements appeared on the first page of the SCMP almost every day
for nearly twenty years.73 In the 1920s, the SCMP moved front-page advertisements
to the inside pages, and it maintained, on either side of four columns of news, twocolumn display advertisements, which were great revenue earners. The
advertisements of Shewan Tomes & Co., Ltd. remained in the SCMP until the
Japanese took over the newspaper office in 1941. The circulation of the SCMP
increased steadily in the post-Noble period, and the advertising income increased
enormously most of the time. The SCMP had a good relationship with the newsprint
paper provider Shewan Tomes & Co., Ltd., and received a stable supply. The SCMP
had sufficient newsprint in the 1930s, even when the price of newsprint rose greatly
and supplies sold out. Robert Gordon Shewan was the director of the SCMP
beginning in the 1920s, and he held 100 shares in the SCMP.74 When the war caused
newsprint to increase in price and sell out in 1939, the SCMP continued to obtain
newsprint from Shewan Tomes & Co., Ltd.75
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Newsprint data of the SCMP from 1931 to 193976
Date of Order

Quantity (Reams)

1931/12

12,000

1932/3

6,000

1933/3

15,000

1934/2

15,000

1935/3

15,000

1936/9

15,000

1937/3

5,000

1937/9

10,000

1938/6

10,000

1939/1

15,000

R. G. Shewan’s son and Shewan’s representatives were also directors of the SCMP
board and at the HSBC until 1941.77 In addition to the advertisements of Shewan
Tomes & Co., Ltd., the Shewan company controlled more relevant companies in
China and Hong Kong, including the Canton Electric & Fire Extinguishing
Company78, the China and Manila Steamship Company, Ltd., the American Asiatic
Steamship Company, the Green Island Cement Company, Ltd., the Hongkong Rope
Manufacturing Company, Ltd., the China Provident Loan and Mortgage Company,
Ltd., the China Light and Power Company, Ltd., and the Canton Land Company,
Ltd.79 Those companies had clients across wide regions and different social strata,
covering both the Chinese and British communities and even mainland Chinese
clients.
On the front page of 20 April 1925, there was the China Light and Power
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Company, Ltd. advertisement, in which it said the company served ‘Business,
Industry, and the [China] Domestic Economy’. Obviously, the company had
important interests in Hong Kong and mainland China and the Shewan family did not
want the SCMP to publish negative information about its business. After the incident
involving Hamilton in 1910, the Shewan family acquired 100 shares in the SCMP
Ltd., became the board director, and participated in the company operations; this was
not only a financial investment but also an action on the part of the Hong Kong
industrial and financial capitalists to promote their businesses with the SCMP.
Obviously, from then on, the Shewan family business fared very well under the
support of the SCMP’s advertising promotions. The negative news reporting and
editorials against the Shewan family’s companies disappeared forever. The SCMP
board usually had only three or four directors, and the director designated by the
Shewan family was very influential in business.
Shewan Tomes & Co. had offices in Hong Kong and mainland China, which
carried on ‘an extensive import and export trade, dealing in practically the whole
output of the West, from piece goods to metals, and from flour to cement in
everything, in fact, that is required by the people of the Chinese Empire’.80 Shewan
Tomes & Co. needed a peaceful and prosperous China and Hong Kong market for its
business to succeed; naturally, the company expected that the SCMP to implement an
appropriate reporting and advertising model to target its Chinese and British clients.

Banking Advertisers
The development of the SCMP was closely connected to financial capital. As early
as the founding of the SCMP, the chief manager of the National Bank of China
(hereafter NBC), G. W. Playfair, was the board director of the young SCMP.81 Two
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directors of the NBC, John Scott Harston and G. C. Moxon, became directors of the
SCMP.82 Before Dr Noble controlled the SCMP, the NBC was the creditor of the
newspaper company, which owned a debenture of the SCMP worth HK$50,000. 83
According to the record of the Colonial Secretary’s Office, on 6 May 1904, the NBC
had HK$407,000, including 605 banknotes in circulation, third behind the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereafter HSBC) and the Chartered Bank
of India, Australia, and China. 84 The NBC was founded by the most influential
merchants in China, owned by investors in China and Hong Kong, and supported by
Qing government senior officials, including Viceroy Li Hongzhang.85 The objective
of the NBC was ‘fairly indicated by its name and as general bankers and finance
agents, with its head-quarters in this colony’. 86 Undoubtedly, ‘the vast volume of
Chinese financial business will in the future be negotiated through this Bank, and in
view of projected railways and the opening of mines all over the country, in addition
to extensive water-work and reclamation schemes for Canton and other large
cities.’87
It seems the NBC was an early model of the Bank of China (Hong Kong);
nevertheless, its institution was different. It was not a real ‘national bank’ for China;
rather, the NBC was a Chinese capital bank managed by British and Chinese
executives, though owned by Hong Kong Chinese leaders such as Wu Tingfang and
Fung Wa Chun.88 Its ‘leading control would be vested in the hands of both natives
and foreigners’ and served the entire Hong Kong community. 89 Unexpectedly, the
NBC did not develop very well, and the Hong Kong government did not make it into
a legal note-issuing bank, so NBC managing director Ellis Kadoorie announced its
liquidation in 1911.90 Actually, since the founding of the NBC, the HSBC was widely
believed to have engaged in tactics to damage this competitor in Hong Kong and
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China, which was not a Chinese government bank, including exerting pressure on
issuing banknotes and punishing the NBC’s partners.91 Therefore, it is clear why the
NBC needed the SCMP to promote its business through a method of absolute control;
for example, running NBC advertisements in a much better position on the
newspaper page than the HSBC advertisements. 92 I should emphasise that the
SCMP’s combined reporting strategy was very helpful to the NBC’s business
objectives, as the NBC and SCMP had similar clients: Chinese and British merchant
readers. At least, the HSBC would not use the SCMP to publish propaganda
detrimental to the NBC.
The HSBC had participated in Chinese government loans and economic
development since the late nineteenth century. 93 In 1895, to succeed in the
competition to manage money for the China government, the HSBC managed to
persuade the NBC to withdraw from a promising agreement with the Qing
government. 94 Finally, the NBC could not survive in the banking competition in
Hong Kong and lost control over the SCMP, so the NBC’s advertisements
disappeared from the SCMP’s pages. In particular, ‘throughout the 1930s, in keeping
with its long-standing connections with government finance in China, the bank
[HSBC] took a leading part in efforts to stabilise the Chinese national currency.’95
Frank H. H. King studied how the HSBC cooperated with and supported Chinese
governments closely and vehemently. He pointed out that after 1937, the HSBC
changed its policy from ‘active support for China’ to ‘must be opposed to Japan’.96
Cooperating with the SCMP met the best interests of HSBC. The evidence for this
assertion is that in 1933, HSBC’s director, who was also a director of the SCMP,
agreed that anti-Japanese reporting ‘[did] harm to the company’s newspaper interests’
and that actions should be undertaken ‘to refrain from inserting any further’ anti-
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Japanese reporting.97 However, the dual directors of the HSBC and the SCMP, R. G.
Shewan and A. L. Shield, did not interfere further with anti-Japanese reporting,
which reflected the HSBC’s attitude toward the Sino-Japanese war, which was ‘to
fight Japanese with China.’ The SCMP’s solution was to allow some long-term
Japanese advertisements to remain, while allowing anti-Japanese reporting to grow at
will.
The two banking advertisers were both influential and important to the SCMP. In
one case, the SCMP had to abandon the policy of editorial freedom to save the
advertisements and obey its directors’ orders. The SCMP Ltd.’s afternoon paper, the
Hong Kong Telegraph, had an editor named Norman Stockton who was intimidated
by the reputation of the bank. In 1939, the Hong Kong Telegraph and the SCMP
disclosed the divorce of the HSBC’s chief manager, Sir Vandeleur Grayburn, along
with his photograph in the Hong Kong Telegraph. Grayburn thought this was
revenge borne out of hatred from the SCMP. The SCMP was required to clarify this
and republish the news of Grayburn’s divorce in the SCMP without a picture or
headline, along with the understanding that the HSBC would no longer advertise in
the SCMP.98
At that time, the SCMP was divided, as both editors of the SCMP and the Hong
Kong Telegraph insisted on their editorial freedom. Henry Ching was brave in the
face of the threat of action against the company’s newspaper, and he said that under
no circumstances would he agree to suppress the report. The troublemaker Stockton,
the editor of the Hong Kong Telegraph, insisted he had done nothing wrong.99 The
manager of the Hong Kong Telegraph and the general manager of the SCMP
expressed their regret and apologised to the HSBC.100 Ben Wylie wrote to the HSBC
on behalf of the SCMP and told them that the editor of the Hong Kong Telegraph
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would be seriously reprimanded, and the divorce and photograph constituted an
unwarrantable report.101
Later, Grayburn asked for a formal letter of apology from three directors of the
SCMP board.102 One of the directors of the SCMP replied for and on behalf of the
SCMP Ltd., rejecting Grayburn’s request for a further apology because Mr Wylie
and Mr Harston were the people indicated in this letter.103 A. L. Shields, who held
board seats at both the SCMP and the HSBC, said that while he fully realised the
necessity for freedom of the press, at the same time, there was such a thing as the
dignity of the press, and he called for a board meeting.104 The SCMP and the HSBC
had common interests and finally came to a compromise. Although Wylie did not
object to freedom of the press, given the loss of enormous business interests, he
reprimanded the editor and told him to be cooperative; otherwise, he would be
dismissed.105
The HSBC was the SCMP’s longest term and most important advertiser. It
advertised in the SCMP almost every day in the 1920s and 1930s. The HSBC had
long-lasting interests in financing the Chinese economy, and it had a positive attitude
toward the various Chinese governments. Although its business experienced setbacks
in the 1911 Revolution, the HSBC still expected to cooperate with the new
republican government and provide capital.106
There were only a few bank advertisements on the first few pages of the SCMP,
such as those from the HSBC and the Bank of China. The SCMP believed that more
extensive financial reporting would bring a larger audience with financial interests
and more financial advertisements. The SCMP director James Harper Taggart
believed that the 1925 stock market crisis was a good opportunity for the SCMP to
launch a financial page so it could attract banking advertisements.107 During the 1925
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Hong Kong stock market crisis, the SCMP promoted its financial reporting page and
initiated long-lasting debates about stock investments and banking issues.108 Since its
founding, the SCMP published advertisements from Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China,
Nederlandsch

Indische

Handelsbank,

N.V.,

Hong

Kong

Savings

Bank,

Nederlandsche handel Maatschappu, N.V., Banque-Franco-Chinoise, the Bank of
Canton, Ltd., the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., Bank of
China, the Ho Hong Bank, Ltd., the Bank of East Asia, Ltd., the Bank of Kwangsi
(Hong Kong Branch), and P. & O. Banking Corporation, Ltd.109
Among these banks, the Bank of Canton was owned by overseas Chinese reformer
and patriot Li Yutang, who funded Sun Yatsen’s revolutionary activities. The Bank
of China and the Bank of Kwangsi (Hong Kong Branch) were owned by the Chinese
Nationalist Government. The Bank of East Asia was a Hong Kong Chinese
merchant-owned bank. All of these banks targeted Chinese clients, and they
advertised in the SCMP to attract better class Chinese to open accounts and do
business with them; in fact, altogether, they accounted for the majority of Chinese
bank account holders in Hong Kong. The Bank of China was in the same building as
the Bank of Canton after 1938.110 The Bank of China also closely cooperated with
the Bank of East Asia.111 These banks all had very clear anti-Japanese attitudes.112
The SCMP had to pay attention to these advertisers’ reactions when it wanted to
publish pro-Japanese reporting.
In summation, the majority of the banking advertisers in the SCMP were proChina; thus, its reporting focused on Chinese news and sometimes was even proChina because these banks targeted Chinese clients and worked with China
governments.
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Pro-China means the advertisers and the SCMP were close to and partial to China
governments, especially the Republic of China government. Support of the Republic
of China government could be political, moral and economic, but it did not mean the
position was unchangeable because the SCMP choose to report on China case by
case under the demand of its readers. Sometimes it criticized China governments, for
example, the Qing government, to please its Chinese readers. Meanwhile, the Hong
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia,
and China, and P. & O. Banking Corporation, Ltd., were owned by British merchants
or British imperial investors, so the SCMP was not hostile to British readers and
provided some attractive content for British readers to win over advertisers.

Monopoly and Defending the SCMP’s Interest
Chinese news reporting was very important for the SCMP to attract audiences; the
newspaper even collaborated with two others newspapers, the China Mail and the
Hong Kong Daily Press, to boycott another English daily to buy Reuters Chinese
news products. When Ben Wylie was on holiday during the summer, the manager of
the Hong Kong Telegraph became the acting general manager of the SCMP. When
the China Mail morning paper offered its Sunday paper, the Sunday Herald, F. P.
Franklin, the manager of the Hong Kong Telegraph, proposed offering a Sunday
edition of the SCMP to its editor, Ben Wylie. They hoped that their Sunday
newspaper would bring in more advertising income and improve the competitiveness
of the SCMP.113 Unfortunately, Franklin’s proposal proved to be a failure in 1939 as
street sales were negligible, and the paper’s income fell to less than HK$600.
Franklin pointed out the sharp increase in the cost of newsprint and other essential
supplies, which led him to believe that the Sunday edition of the SCMP should be
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cancelled immediately to stop the losses and to conserve their stocks of paper.114 This
case explained that the press market in Hong Kong was fully competitive and new
English daily newspapers with competitive advantages would seriously decrease the
incomes and profits of the SCMP.
Franklin did not make note of the appearance of a new Sunday newspaper months
before the Sunday edition of the SCMP closed. The Sunday China Times, an Englishlanguage newspaper, published initially only on Sundays. A rumour circulated that it
would publish daily in June 1939, which lit a fire under the SCMP, Hong Kong Daily
Press, the China Mail, and Hong Kong Telegraph. What was more frightening to the
old Hong Kong English dailies was that the new newspaper would be a five-cent
daily; this price was half the cost of the old English newspapers in Hong Kong. The
United Press Association manager in Hong Kong told Franklin that he would not sell
content to the China Times.115 However, Reuters News Service made the four dailies
in Hong Kong very nervous because it had decided to sell news content to the China
Times. The editor of the China Mail, Graham Barrow, informed Franklin by
telephone that he had advised the China Times that Reuters would not be able to
supply the China news product ‘Fareut’, as it was discovered that it would infringe
upon their agreement with the other papers to supply their services to a paper
charging five cents per copy. Franklin said that the China Times had asked ‘whether
the service could be supplied if they amended the price to ten cents’, and Barrow
replied in the affirmative.116
This was the second time that the four English newspapers worked peacefully and
enthusiastically with each other. The first time was to push the Hong Kong
government to issue the Ordinance of Secret Societies during the 1911 Hong Kong
press strikes.117 Their countersignatures appeared on a letter to Reuters of 12 June
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1939 that protested the decision to sell services to the China Times. The London
Reuters boss, Sir Roderick Jones, continued to support the China Times. Instead of
compromising completely with the four English newspapers in Hong Kong, he
directed Reuters to reduce the monthly service fee from £87 to £72.118
The China Mail did not agree with this solution and still complained to Reuters
and explained the importance of the Reuters products to the Hong Kong newspapers.
They argued that newspaper conditions in London could not be compared with those
in Hong Kong: ‘It is possible for London newspapers to gather news from every
corner of Europe and also from the United States by telephone, and thus secure
exclusive stories from their special correspondents in order to supplement the
standard news services such as Reuters.’ On the contrary, the high cost of bringing
news to Hong Kong newspapers made them rely mainly upon Reuters or other news
agencies. If Reuters sold its service to a competitor undercutting the standard selling
price, the China Mail would not agree to it.119 As a result, the SCMP defeated the
China Times in this attack. Subsequently, the China Times did not publish the
morning paper as planned.

Press Freedom: a Way to Make Profits and Create a Virtual Chinese Council
From time to time the SCMP enjoyed freedom of the press, even if there were
objections from the Hong Kong government and the SCMP board. A Hong Kong
judge issued a ruling in a case on ‘press freedom and censorship’ in 1931, which
stated that both external freedom of the press and censorship were legal according to
the common law of the United Kingdom. The judge ruled that the ‘Legislature in
Hong Kong would have power, if it so desire in an emergency, to establish a
censorship of the Press, and … has authority to depute such power to the Governor in
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Executive Council’. The Governor would decide when censorship began and how
long it would last. The Censorship Unit was founded and the position of Censorship
Official created at the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, where the leader of the
Censorship Office was called the ‘Chief Chinese Censor’.120
The legal authorities and the Hong Kong governor did not subject English
newspapers like the SCMP to censorship; only Chinese-language newspapers were
censored in the beginning. As a result, the SCMP had a reputation for reporting more
useful and important Chinese information for Chinese readers. The combined
reporting strategy thus left British readers with the impression that the SCMP’s
articles were ‘merely helping to shake the prestige of the Britisher’ and that the
newspapers made accusations against the King’s uniform and the police; as a result,
a few readers endeavoured to eradicate all negative articles about the British from the
columns of the SCMP in Hong Kong.121 The SCMP editors claimed that the SCMP
was never meant to be the mouthpiece of clubs, organisations, and societies, adding
that its new function was to provide news without favouritism.122 This again explains
why the SCMP had a combined reporting strategy: it published reporting for the
Chinese and British, and if it favoured one of the communities over the other, it
would make one unhappy. The early news reporting and editorials supporting
Chinese merchants’ interests and the 1930s Anti-Japanese War reporting are good
examples of this policy.
However, in the SCMP’s history, suppression of editorial freedom never stopped.
If the journalists or editors criticised local elite, they were warned of potential
dismissal, or forced to compromise under pressure from the governor. Therefore, the
SCMP, together with other Hong Kong newspapers, existed in a situation that yoked
partial freedom of the press to partial subordination to authorities. The most serious
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case of interference with the press’s freedom was the arrest of the editor and owner
of the Hong Kong Daily Press, Yorick Jones Murrow, who irritated the Hong Kong
governor with blunt editorials. 123 Many Chinese newspapers were carefully and
notoriously censored and had to close because an unexpected amount of content was
cancelled by Hong Kong government censorship officials. Some Chinese newspapers
had even been charged with publishing letters from Chinese nationalists. For
example, the newspaper Kung Wo Po published a letter from Chinese soldiers in
Canton, which called on all Chinese to kill the traitors in the 1919 May Fourth
Movement, as well as those responsible for the failure of China at the Paris Peace
Conference. As a result, the newspaper was fined HK$15.124
The SCMP was only censored formally under the Censorship Regulations of 1917
and the ‘Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1922’, in addition to an article on the
censorship of English press placards and display sheets, August 1939.125 However,
Chinese newspapers were formally censored under the Chinese Publications
(Prevention) Ordinance of 1907. In 1922, because of the Hong Kong Seamen’s
Strike, the ‘Emergency Regulations Ordinance’ was approved by the Hong Kong
governor to authorise ‘censorship, and the control and suppression of publications,
writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication’.
126

‘Emergency’ solutions were used to handle the Chinese trouble; thus, censorship

was applied only to Chinese newspapers. The former chief editor of Gongshang
Ribao (The Industrial and Commercial Daily) confirmed this policy.127
The controller of Gongshang Ribao, Man Kam Lo, who was also an unofficial
legislative council member, represented the Chinese press and suggested that the
Hong Kong government remove the censorship of the Chinese press and use British
law books and Encyclopaedia Britannica to show that ‘In the British colonies the
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press is as free as it is in England’.128 However, fourteen legislative council members
voted against this motion because they believed that Chinese newspapers could be
used by the Chinese to act against the interests of Hong Kong society. 129 Among
those objections from legislative council members, S. W. Ts’o gave a typical
explanation of why the Chinese press should be censored:
No one appreciates more than I do the principle of the freedom of the press…
Hong Kong is situated on the outskirts of China with a population of no less
than 97 percent Chinese. While there is, at the present moment, so much
unrest and uncertainty in the political atmosphere in the Far East, it is very
easy and quite natural for the Chinese papers to over-step their bounds by
giving expressions to their feelings on matters Chinese and the Government
can be the only judges as to the desirability or propriety of such expressions
being broadcast in this Colony. Such expressions, if undesirable and
unchecked, might create misunderstandings outside and stir up trouble inside
the Colony. 130

Thus, the English press, and especially the SCMP, had an opportunity to report
Chinese news or any other information that might be suppressed in the Chinese press.
This is solid evidence that the SCMP enjoyed much more external press freedom
than the Chinese press. Therefore, the SCMP’s reporting on China gained more and
more popularity among the English-speaking Chinese readers and provided a virtual
council for Chinese to discuss their concerns.
On the other hand, the SCMP was owned by large investors and industrial
bourgeoisie, including Noble and an unofficial executive council member, Sir
Catchick Paul Chater.131 They then owned two newspapers, including the afternoon
paper of the SCMP Ltd., the Hong Kong Telegraph. The journalists for both papers
worked in the same office, though the Hong Kong Telegraph had a separate manager:
F. P. Franklin. Both Franklin and Noble lived on the Peak, which showed their high
social status in the colony pursuing a racial segregation policy.132
The SCMP’s general manager, Benjamin Wylie, said that the SCMP was a
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conservative newspaper. The bottom line of the SCMP in news reporting was that it
would not hurt the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Thus, in the case of the
1925 Canton-Hong Kong strike, the SCMP did not report on the British suppressions
and massacres of Chinese workers and suppressed the truth. It not only pushed all of
the responsibility for the strike on the Cantonese, it also criticised the working class
strike, which caused serious instability in Hong Kong and affected the everyday life
of the British community, especially the British middle class and capitalists. The
SCMP’s general manager said that he was an obedient servant of the Hong Kong
governor, providing KMT (Kuo Min Tang) intelligence from Canton, and
negotiating with the Hong Kong military force and government when there were
conflicts generated by the SCMP’s reports. 133 Henry Ching, Jr., the son of Henry
Ching, and Hutcheon believed that Ching was a man who defended the stability of
Hong Kong society. 134 Ching insisted on editorial freedom unless the interests of
Hong Kong capitalist society would be harmed; thus, there was no absolute external
and internal press freedom in Hong Kong as censorship, filtering and suppression
were common and acceptable. The SCMP enjoyed press freedom, which was
sometimes suppressed when it conflicted with the interests of advertisers and the
government.
Chinese readers were the cornerstone audience of the SCMP. Without Chinese
readers, the SCMP would be in danger of continuous financial loss. While the SCMP
attracted a wealthy British audience via its shipping and sporting news, the varied
advertisers were interested in targeting the similarly wealthy Chinese bourgeoisie
audience who had high consumption power and a taste in purchasing the products
that were advertised in the SCMP. The SCMP management and editors noticed such
causality when making a combined reporting strategy to please the Chinese audience.
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More importantly, in the mind of the SCMP editor, Hong Kong Chinese merchant
audiences were highly engaged in the prosperity of Hong Kong and their interests
should be protected. 135 Thus, the SCMP both represented British and Chinese
audiences’ interests in a British colony that suppressed the external press freedom of
Chinese newspapers. As a result, the Chinese audience liked to publish their opinions
and appeals in the SCMP; in other words, the SCMP improved audience freedom of
the Chinese bourgeoisie readers and created a virtual council for them.
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2.

THE ‘MODERN NEWSPAPER’ COMPETING WITH
IMPERIAL ‘AMBASSADORS’

In the first quarter of twentieth century China, Chinese people experienced
turbulent social changes. The Late Qing Reform left the SCMP readers hope,
suspicion and frustration. The lost national interests in Shandong meant humiliation
and anger to China, a victorious nation in World War I. The 1920s strikes subjected
the Chinese merchant readers to a bewildering dilemma between patriotism and
protecting their commercial interests in Hong Kong. As immigrants from China,
especially Guangdong, who invested on a big scale in China, what happened in
China not only attracted these Chinese readers, it was also highly related to their
business interests. Therefore, they became attentive to the news reporting on China
in the SCMP. The SCMP realized this great demand and facilitated corresponding
and critical reporting for these Chinese merchant readers while the Chinese press was
restricted in its ability to provide negative reporting on the Qing government.
In this chapter, I analyse the SCMP reporting on the Late Qing Reform, the
boycott against American goods, the May Fourth Movement and strikes. The SCMP
published positive reports on the nationalist movements that happened outside Hong
Kong to please Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie readers. Nevertheless, their
sentiments of Chinese nationalism or patriotism were transient and conditional. Once
these detrimental movements became contagious to Hong Kong, and likely to
influence the Chinese merchants and the SCMP interests, the SCMP’s stances
changed. Although the reporting and Chinese correspondents showed a rational and
conditional nationalistic sentiment, but for the Chinese community’s lack of
protection from the powerful motherland government, it could not simply deny the
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merchants’ limited patriotism. Under the circumstances of these social movements
and conflicted merchants’ opinions, the SCMP published Chinese merchants’
concerns, represented Chinese merchant interests and moulded Chinese opinion. The
SCMP was not founded to be a radical newspaper but as a ‘modern newspaper’ that
stood against radical ‘personal journalism’ in Hong Kong.1 At its first board meeting,
the newspaper was designed to be ‘very much better and more interesting’ than its
rivals.2 The two co-founders, Tse and Cunningham, both held roughly 10 percent of
the SCMP’s shares; however, the real controller was the National Bank of China.
Naturally, the NBC used the SCMP as an advertising medium, besides taking it as a
new client.
While the SCMP claimed to be a ‘modern newspaper’, it also called its
competitors were ‘old-time ambassadors’, not ‘newspapers’. 3 The meaning of
‘ambassador’ was that the China Mail, the Hong Kong Daily Press and the Hong
Kong Telegraph were propaganda tools, which ‘lie[d] for the good of his country’.4
The SCMP was not designed by the editor to be a propaganda tool, but ‘a newspaper
by means of a few trenchant articles, so be that they have truth behind them, will
rouse a public to resent aggression, so to reform abuses, to mould the policy of
governments. Such is the power of the modern newspaper’.5 The nature of ‘modern
newspaper’ was ‘modern’, which meant ‘to tell the truth for the good of humanity’,
reporting not only for the British but also for the Chinese.6 The SCMP’s competitors
focused on British readers and reporting British news, which has been understood
widely by American and Chinese scholars as ‘representing British interests’,
although the SCMP roused the public to resent aggression, reform abuses, and
moulded the policy of the government.7
The ‘modern newspaper’ was actually the result of the phenomenon of the rising
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class of Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. The SCMP expected to attract the “best classes” audience since its
founding and “earn the respect and the supports”.8 The market opportunity was to
provide a newspaper that could attract English-reading Chinese. In 1901, a Chinese
syndicate acquired a British newspaper, the Hong Kong Telegraph.9 This syndicate,
headed by Robert Ho Tung, requested that Hong Kong Telegraph editor J. P. Braga
publish a newspaper that considered the ‘increasing infiltration of the Chinese into
Western-style business’.10 There were a limited number of English-speaking readers
in Hong Kong, and the SCMP had to compete with three accepted newspapers which
represented British readers’ interests; one example of which was, the Hong Kong
Daily Press which represented the British elite who lived on the Peak. 11 Thus,
providing the ‘increasing infiltration of the Chinese’ into the English newspaper
world with interesting and useful information was the SCMP’s strategy. Wisely, the
SCMP, just like the Hong Kong Telegraph, did not publish a newspaper only for the
Chinese, but also ‘not to lose sight of the fact of British control of Hong Kong’s
activities’.12
The founding of the SCMP was actually a shock to the Hong Kong Telegraph
group. As an afternoon newspaper that had been punished for libel twice and the
publisher of which had once been jailed, it attacked the SCMP as increasing
‘Hongkong’s troubles’.13 For a long time the Hong Kong Daily Press did not have a
good relationship with the SCMP, which was why, during the strikes of the 1920s,
the SCMP’s general manager angrily watched the temporary closing of the China
Mail and the Hong Kong Daily Press and declined its request for help.14 Beginning
with the founding of the SCMP, the Hong Kong Daily Press gradually lost ground to
the SCMP and finally sold most of its business to the Chinese Nationalist
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Government in 1939.15
Although the ‘Post … consistently maintained a strong lead’ in ‘matters Chinese’,
it was not, as imagined by some people, that revolutionaries had founded a radical
newspaper.

16

The SCMP as a medium connecting the British and Chinese

communities was not only an intercultural and international business ideal, but also a
very practical solution of the fresh newspaper to remain viable.
The SCMP was a joint-stock newspaper company since its foundation, so one of
its aims was to make money. It did not successfully sell all the 6,000 shares to the
investors at the very beginning and the financial situation was not ideal for a long
time.17 In addition, Alfred Cunningham had to ask for a permit to erect a movable
kiosk to sell “all or any of the other local papers” and books at Blake Pier in 1905.18
The kiosk permit had been cancelled and was required to keep “the area in a clean
and tidy condition”19; in other words, the SCMP faced critical financial problems
since its founding. Winning readers and advertisement income was crucial to the
favourable development and longevity of the SCMP.
When Tse and Cunningham had their newspaper business, even if the SCMP
reported on Chinese reform, it was widely accepted in Hong Kong. Reporting and
commenting are different from plotting reform, as they had previously used in other
newspapers. Advocating Chinese reform via an overseas Chinese newspaper actually
reflected the desires of the Chinese and British bourgeoisie, who wanted to
participate in the Chinese economy, which was an important theme in the early
twentieth century. The SCMP used this content to attract the attention of merchants
and other readers. In fact, the SCMP had more than half of its columns covered with
various advertisements from British and Chinese firms, which showed that the SCMP
was accepted by both communities’ advertisers. Additionally, it showed the SCMP
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relied heavily on advertisement sales. During the Tse and Cunningham period (19031907), the editorials sometimes conflicted with one another, which could be
considered a method of adjustment to make the newspaper acceptable among
advertisers and readers.
In 1909, Dr Noble confirmed the SCMP’s objective to ‘guard shareholders
interests wherever possible’, and he made sure that ‘every effort [was] being made to
make the newspaper readable and acceptable to the bulk of the English-reading
people’.20 One of the most important methods was to attract as many Chinese readers
as possible. To achieve this goal, Dr Noble proudly announced that the editorial
room was ‘from time to time furnished with excellent copy of Chinese origin’ and
that the ‘Chinese should be so attracted’. 21 As a result, the ‘circulation …
substantially increased’ and ‘its value as an advertising medium [was] most generally
recognized’. 22 The SCMP’s Chinese readers in the early period were mainly
merchants who had strong purchasing power.
An ordinance suppressing the Chinese press accidentally brought new Chinese
reporting market opportunities to the SCMP. On 11 October 1907, the Hong Kong
Legislative Council passed Ordinance No. 15:
To prevent the publication in the Colony of matter calculated to disturb the
peace of China. Whereas, owing to the proximity of the Colony of Hong
Kong to the mainland of China and to the tendency to create internal
dissension in that country, it is deemed expedient to prohibit within the
Colony the publication of matter calculated to excite such dissension—
1.
This Ordinance may be cited as the Chinese Publications (Prevention)
Ordinance, 1907.
2.
Every person who within the Colony prints, publishes or offers for
sale or distributes any printed or written newspaper or book or other
publication containing matter calculated to excite tumult or disorder in China
or to excite persons to crime in China shall be guilty of an offence and be
liable to imprisonment for any item not exceeding two years and to a fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars.23

This ordinance was said to restrict Chinese publications, such as the supplement
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of Min Pao and Tiantao.24 As a result, it became difficult for the Chinese press to
publish negative editorials against the Chinese government. Nevertheless, this
became an unfair advantage of the SCMP, which enjoyed more external press
freedom in reporting China issues and therefore gained more potential audiences
concerning China issues.

Reporting on Chinese Reform
To meet the Chinese readers’ reading and practical demands, the SCMP in its
early years provided long-term reporting about Chinese reform. The SCMP held a
pessimistic opinion on the internal reform of the Chinese government, believing that
“there is no Chinese nation [because it was overthrown by the Manchurian
Government]; there is merely a Chinese race”. As a result, the SCMP claimed, “As
we have again and again stated, to confer such powers upon a people grievously
divided among them is akin to supplying fire to incendiaries.” Few senior officials
wanted to support a constitutional government, even if there were laws in China:
“Laws will never divorce the Chinaman from the charms of the opium pipe”; in
China, there was “no public”, “no public opinion”, and “no nation”. 25 When the
SCMP predicted more and more reforms would commence in China, it concluded,
“[A] united China would certainly mean the end of any Manchu dominance”.26
Instead, the SCMP recommended reform in China. The SCMP published editorials
on how China could learn from Japan about being a strong power,27 as well as how to
develop Chinese industry,28 how to expel some of the Western powers in the Chinese
railway industry, and how to build its own Chinese railway.29 In this British colonial
newspaper, such vague reporting did not identify those nations it considered
“Western”; they might mean France and Russia, which were competitors of the
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British Empire. In addition, building China’s own railways would not hurt British
interests, because, even if the Qing government built railways by itself, it would still
need loans from British banks, such as the HSBC, which was an advertiser in the
SCMP.30 In any case, this kind of reporting attracted many Chinese readers and did
not hurt the advertisers’ interests. Furthermore, I have to highlight that the controller
of the SCMP, the National Bank of China, was actually founded as a joint venture
owned by the Chinese and British for the domestic Chinese railway business.
To clarify, the National Bank of China wanted to provide loans to Chinese
companies that were involved in Chinese business. Thus, these editorials on China
railways were entirely acceptable, as long as the NBC and the SCMP received
maximum benefits from the editorials. As a result, the SCMP criticized or
commented on the development of China reform while the Chinese bourgeoisie
would have benefitted from successful political and economic reform. In other words,
an efficient, impartial and fast growing China market would increase Hong Kong
Chinese traders’ fortunes.
China had numerous problems with corruption. For example, the SCMP disclosed
that when British opium importation decreased, Yuan Shikai, one of the most
powerful Qing officials, ordered ‘opium boiling machinery from England’ and was
‘considering the best scheme for controlling the sale of this daily output’. 31 This
happened because when there were imperial edicts to suppress the opium trade, ‘the
production of native opium increase[d] year by year without restriction. Indeed, the
Chinese Government [found] it a most profitable source of income’.32
To meet the demand of Chinese readers concerning China issues, the SCMP not
only reported on the reforms, but frequently offered suggestions for reforming China.
Regarding economic reform, the SCMP suggested that China should not completely
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boycott foreigners, as the foreign engineers’ experience and capital could be good for
the development of China. China had corrupt systems that were remediable with
‘firm training in the right direction’.33
Regarding cultural and educational reform, the SCMP suggested although there
was some progress in the schools that were already open, the Japanese experience
should also be heeded.34 The SCMP also discouraged foot-binding in China, an issue
in which Tse Tsan Tai was deeply involved in Hong Kong. 35 The SCMP further
called for educating the Chinese and decreasing the illiteracy and profound ignorance
of the population: ‘Before China is ready for parliamentary powers such as educated
and enlightened nations enjoy, a comprehensive propaganda has to be accepted by
the people, and assimilated. Until this comes to pass and a purer public life
characterises high official circles, all hope or real reform must remain in abeyance’.36
Regarding the military, the SCMP believed that ‘China had undergone a radical
change, and the Chinese officers of the foreign-drilled troops to-day is of the same
stamp of earnest young men of good family that the Chinese naval officer is
representative of’, which was significantly different from the old and corrupt
Manchurian soldiers.37 China was also considered by the SCMP to have realised that
the ‘the sign of highest civilisation is perfection in battleships and regiments’; thus,
all of China’s progress in building military schools and naval cruisers encouraged the
editor of the SCMP, and the editor was excited about the development of the Chinese
military forces.38
Chinese merchants in Hong Kong also participated in the Chinese railways reform
so there were conflicts between the Qing government and Hong Kong Chinese
merchants. The SCMP represented the Chinese merchants’ interests and repeatedly
disclosed the danger of allowing Qing officials to manage investments. In the case of
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the Canton-Hankow Railway, the Hong Kong shareholders were Chinese because
foreign investment had been banned. Nevertheless, Hong Kong Chinese shareholders
declined to hand over the money to ‘Canton representatives of the Railway bureau’
unless these officials satisfied them that ‘the large sum of money’ would be safely
banked and could be accounted for, because ‘these Hong Kong merchants apparently
believe[d] that speculation ha[d] already commenced, although the company [was]
not yet legally established’. 39 In brief, the Hong Kong Chinese merchants would
have liked to take advantage of railways ownership transfer to support the
development of their motherland, but distrusted the government in China.
Similar to these Hong Kong Chinese merchants, the SCMP disliked the corrupt
Qing government and the Empress Dowager Ci Xi. The SCMP said she was
‘remarkable for her cleverness, ability, and attainments, but she shone as a
stateswoman, diplomatist, and subtle intriguer; and when it suited her purpose she
feared not in the cruel and fiendish moments of her wrath to order the use of the
executioner’s knife and the stranglers’ cord’. The SCMP did not trust the ability of
the Emperor Guang Xu and predicted that ‘South China would be convulsed by a
revolution eclipsing in magnitude that of the misguided and unfortunate Taiping
Wang’. 40 The SCMP said that China needed ‘a strong man’ to reform and unite
China.41
Li Guoqi pointed out in his book Minguoshi Lunji (The History of the Republic of
China; 民 國 史 論 集 ) that Chinese revolutionaries had similar attitudes toward
foreign relations. The difference was that the revolutionaries did not advocate
aimless and emotional anti-foreigner activities. Their first priority was to fight for the
independence of the Han Chinese and to unite China; the next step was to unite weak
nations to fight against imperialists. 42 The SCMP’s editorials expressed a similar
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policy. They focused on domestic Chinese issues and expressed a negative tone
toward imperialism, but the newspaper did not publish any lasting anti-foreign
sentiments. Imperialist activities in China, as well as Manchu dominance, was
criticised by the SCMP. Hong Kong Chinese merchants faced obstacles in China;
while they tried to cooperate with the British merchants and even the British Hong
Kong government, they continued to have various conflicted interests with them.

Boycotting American Products
The SCMP disparaged, criticized and denied imperial activities in China, as well
as the Manchu dominance. When slogans like “China for the Chinese” appeared in
the SCMP reporting frequently in the first ten years of the twentieth century, it was
no wonder from time to time the SCMP also published some aggressive comments
about Americans. The Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce liked to
publish meeting minutes in the SCMP. Publishing these minutes was for the
convenience of Chinese merchants who did not participate in the meetings. The
merchants could then read them and their opinions might then be moulded by the
activities of the Chamber. When the incident of “The Chinese Exclusion Act”
happened, Shanghai merchants telegraphed Hong Kong merchants, and required
them:
To telegraph to the Minister of the Board of Foreign Affairs to delay the
signature to the treaty which Liang Ching (Chinese Minister to the United
States) had refused to sign. To consider the advisability of boycotting all
American goods as a protest.
The Hong Kong Chinese merchants finally decided:
(1) The Chinese merchants of Hong Kong approve of the decision that a
telegram should be sent to the Board of Foreign Affairs to delay the signing
of the treaty.
(2) It being against the laws of the Colony to meet in order to discuss the
question of boycotting American goods, this Chamber has nothing to say
regarding the matter.43
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Cai Rongfang researched the stances of Hong Kong Chinese merchants and
claimed there were conflicts between merchants, which were caused by the longterm interests and short-term interests. Cai pointed out the conflicted situation caused
the Chinese merchant leaders to gradually lose their social position, and the original
function of uniting the Chinese community.44 Although the Hong Kong government
regarded the boycotting of American products as a crime, nevertheless, it did not
prevent the SCMP from publishing an article entitled, “A Strong Protest”. The
reporting said “a large gathering of influential and prominent Chinese merchants and
members of the gentry met [in] Shanghai… decided to cease purchasing or
contracting for American goods until the terms of the proposed Treaty be modified
and made to meet the requirements of justice”. The contrast of the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Chinese merchants’ stances showed “there was much fiery rhetoric and
eloquent appeals to patriotism”.45 It did not mean Hong Kong Chinese merchants
were not patriots. Probably, in British Colonial Hong Kong, the SCMP had tried to
show its attitude to say the boycott was patriotic but both the SCMP and the Hong
Kong Chinese merchants could not do more.
The SCMP endorsed the rational but not radical national sentiments through
publishing some correspondences and letters to the editor. More and more people
noticed the disadvantage of the boycott, especially the loss of Chinese merchants in
Sino-US trade. In October 1905, the SCMP published Wai Ting Lu’s letter that
criticized the Queen’s College students’ irrational anti-American movements, such as
the one that “tore all our school books bearing an American imprint”. In other words,
the advertisements of the Schlitz Beer Co. in its donated dictionaries might cause the
students to vandalize all other schoolbooks. Lu pointed out in the SCMP “we have to
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remonstrate against what is called ‘wanton mischief’”.46 On 28 December 1905, Tse
Tsan Tai “advocated a scheme for the termination of the United States boycott
movement in China” in the SCMP. 47 On 24 October 1910, Tse “advocated a closer
understanding between the United States and China, and discussed the future control
of the Pacific” in the SCMP.48 Nevertheless, as a co-founder of the SCMP and the
Chinese Club, Tse’s announcement in the SCMP could influence and even mould
other merchant opinions regarding the boycott.
As long as the reporting would not provoke a riot in Hong Kong or damage
business, the SCMP could parrot quasi-radical reporting that also appeared in some
Chinese nationalist papers. For example, in 1906, some missionary tragedies
happened in China; Chinese people killed missionaries and their family members
when an anti-foreigner sentiment permeated society. In the case of the Lianzhou
Incident, five missionaries and their family members were killed because they
occupied the villagers’ land. Americans were mistreated because the Chinese were
disappointed by the behaviour of the “should be good” Americans. The British were
satirized because they tried to occupy Chinese coalmines when the British protected
them from the exploitation of other powers.49 The SCMP seconded the late British
Minister at Beijing, Sir Ernest Satow, who said that “China was not craving for the
spiritual side (of) European civilization…Missionary interference with civil matters
was largely responsible for massacres”, “our religious propaganda if persevered in
must be modelled on lines that make for peace not war—for soothing influences, not
perpetual irritation—for the bringing of the Bible of peace into the homes of the
Chinese, not the bludgeon of arrogance”.50
The stance of the SCMP in reporting the American missionaries’ case showed
that, firstly, the SCMP had a similar opinion to the British diplomat who thought the
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American missionaries interfered with Chinese national interests. Britain and
America also had certain conflicts of interest in China. Secondly, the paper owned a
limited American audience since its inception, and reports such as the British
diplomat chastising the American missionaries was not offensive, especially since
the paper also reported on the Chinese concern about being invaded by these
American missionaries. Thirdly, even the American press published critical reporting
about the misbehaviours of the American missionaries, so the attitude of the SCMP
could at least be considered a different reporting perspective at that time. Chinese
merchant readers during that period followed the American boycott movement and
expected to restrict American interests in China.51
In short, the SCMP reflected the complex view of, and even contradicted, the
Hong Kong Chinese merchants; however, it should be admitted that those Chinese
merchants were leading and progressive Chinese in a changing China.
As for the SCMP, although its news and editorials were used mainly for its
economic goal, nevertheless, its constant reporting on ideas of change and even the
Reform China Movement could educate and mould Chinese merchants’ opinions. In
other words, although Chinese merchants had differences and conflicts with the
imperialists and Qing government, Chinese merchants should benefit from the
foreign technology, capital and business opportunities from the Qing government
reform. Therefore, even if the Chinese merchants had gusty nationalist sentiments
when important national conflicts rose, they easily compromised and did not reach a
solution for foreign invasion, though they did expect an independent and strong
Chinese government. This phenomenon happened simply because of a pragmatic
issue; viz., it was not the Hong Kong Chinese merchants’ mission to expel the
Western powers from China when they collaborated with British merchants and
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government. In addition, their attitude toward the Qing Reform and 1911 Revolution
was open, optimistic, and thus Hong Kong Chinese merchants’ nationalistic
sentiment was a kind of long-distance and business interest-based nationalism.

May Fourth Movement
To publish reports on China for Chinese audiences, the SCMP used
correspondents from Beijing.52 The SCMP paid greater attention to Chinese news,
and the editors advocated for justice regarding some Chinese events. However, from
time to time, there were restrictions. In this section, I address the reporting of the
SCMP on the Hong Kong nationalist movement and its use of patriotic propaganda
and profit.
As a leading Hong Kong English newspaper, the SCMP reported on the unfair
treatment of the Chinese at the Paris Peace Conference and objected to Japan
obtaining Shandong interests illegally; these were important events for Chinese
readers. On the other hand, as a conservative British colonial newspaper, it obeyed
the local ordinances and objected to the unauthorized demonstrations and riots that
compromised the stability of Hong Kong society. A stable and safe social
environment was good for the business of the SCMP and its advertisers. The SCMP
had Japanese shipping and other consumer advertisers, as well as trade advertisers
selling Japanese products. If any riots compromised the security of the advertisers,
the SCMP’s operations would be affected.
In 1914, the Seditious Publications Ordinance placed a restriction on the SCMP.
Publishing radical comments and announcements against the colonial government of
Hong Kong and other parts of the British Empire was forbidden and disloyal
materials were not allowed.53 In detail, it forbade:
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[Bringing] into hatred or contempt His Majesty, or the Government
established by law in the United Kingdom or in this Colony or in any British
possession or in British India or the administration of justice in any of such
places or any class or section of His Majesty’s subjects in any of such places
or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty or any of the said
Governments.54

Thus, when the SCMP supported Chinese nationalist movements in its articles and
news, it had to self-censor them to protect British imperial interests in Hong Kong. In
Hong Kong, there would not appear a large-scale students’ patriotic movement; any
leap in the dark was soon crushed. In essence, the SCMP obeyed the law, and it
would not support the students’ violent and patriotic demonstrations. What the
SCMP did was to pacify the rioting of Chinese in Hong Kong and to protect the
stability of Hong Kong. As a result, both the audience and advertisers would
sympathize with what the SCMP reported, which was good for the SCMP circulation
and advertising income. In other words, the characteristics of the SCMP’s reporting
on the May Fourth Movement reflected its flexible business strategy.
The May Fourth Movement reporting exhibited complex characteristics. For
example, firstly, the SCMP freely covered the May Fourth Movement in mainland
China on a timely basis, and pointed out that it was illegal and in violation of
equality for Japan to take over Shandong. The SCMP covered Chinese sovereignty
and tracked the development of a solution to the Shandong issue. It also reproduced
anti-Japanese news from mainland Chinese newspapers. 55 Secondly, the SCMP
supported China’s work in search of justice at the Paris Peace Conference, and it
claimed that there was no legal basis for Germany and Japan’s ownership of
Shandong interests. 56 Thirdly, the SCMP’s anti-Japanese news reporting met the
demand of Chinese readers, who felt support from the press.57
At the very beginning, the SCMP only provided peaceful perspectives in reporting
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on the Chinese diplomatic failure at Paris Peace Conference and the student patriotic
movements. The SCMP showed a sympathetic attitude toward arrested students in
Beijing; at most, it recorded the patriot activities happening in mainland China,
especially in Canton. The SCMP did not have a taboo against blocking mainland
Chinese nationalist news; on the contrary, ‘boycott’, ‘demonstration’, and ‘Japanese
products’ were hot topics in the SCMP then. The SCMP used many columns to report
this material because Chinese bourgeoisie readers paid attention to this kind of news,
which might influence their interests and emotions.
When reporting the May Fourth Movement in Canton, the SCMP called the
Cantonese residents an ‘excited crowd’ and ‘mob’ that destroyed every Japanese
straw hat seen on the street. The Cantonese police only came to maintain order.58 At
one time, more than 10,000 male and female students in Canton paraded under the
leadership of Ho Liang, a student of Canton Christian College (格致書院, the name
of Lingnan University in 1919). The students all had flags in their hands with writing
on them that read, ‘Calling up the people to refrain from buying Japanese goods and
urging the punishment of national traitors’.59
In summation, the SCMP’s editorials on the May Fourth Movement depicted
Chinese patriotism through its mainland Chinese news reporting; however, it
objected when similar activities were conducted in Hong Kong, and it supported the
suppression of Chinese youth movements by the Hong Kong government. The
SCMP satisfied the demand of merchants to read about drastic changes in the
business environment of mainland China. It met the need of the Chinese community
to read nationalist reporting on the May Fourth Movement, and it protected the local
British companies’ business interests by helping to suppress potential local riots by
issuing press warnings.
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The SCMP did not mind reporting the activities of people advocating in circulars
that customers ‘patronise native products’ and ‘stop business transactions with
Japanese’. Obviously, these were sporadic propaganda activities, but there were few
large movements. When nine Chinese youths held a demonstration with an ‘oil paper
umbrella, Chinese made, on which was written eight large Chinese characters
“Chinese community should patronize native products”’, the SCMP resolutely
pointed out that this kind of demonstration was detrimental to foreign business
interests and should not be ‘allowed in a British Colony’. The SCMP felt
‘satisfactory that the Police stopped the movement, for such activities, if allowed full
scope might develop into a serious matter’.60 When the government and the SCMP
did not promote these unexpected activities, the only option for anti-Japanese
protesters was plastering Hong Kong with placards in Chinese, which said things
such as ‘advocating the boycott of Japanese goods’, thus escaping ‘the notice of the
authorities’.61
The SCMP was concerned about maintaining the safety of its Hong Kong business
advertisers and the safety of businesses in Hong Kong so that they would continue to
advertise in the SCMP. Simultaneously, it still had to ensure that its Chinese readers
appreciated its reporting about the May Fourth Movement. If Chinese readers felt
disappointed about the SCMP’s reporting on the suppression of the students in Hong
Kong, they might choose not to read the SCMP anymore; if that happened, the
advertisers might feel that the SCMP was not useful to their products and services.
The SCMP had a flexible attitude toward the May Fourth Movement because of
the complex relationship between the reporting on China and the Hong Kong legal
system. For example, it agreed with the arrests of Hong Kong Chinese students who
demonstrated on the streets because they broke Hong Kong ordinances and hurt the
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stability of Hong Kong.62 When the SCMP learned that Chinese readers felt great
sympathy for the arrested students, it published a reader letter to save its reputation.
The letter went against the SCMP’s commentary by claiming that walking on the
street with umbrellas was just like foreign workers wearing native hats and that the
Chinese characters on the umbrellas were a kind of advertising, and the police made
a mistake because schoolchildren were fond of rambling in groups, which was not
the same as a demonstration. The reader boldly hoped his enlightenment of these
facts would ‘also help to lessen the possibility of a recurrence of similar offences
arising out of ignorance, and thus enable the Honourable C.S.P. [chief superintendent
of police] to devote more time to more important matters regarding the welfare of the
Colony’.63 It is unclear whether the letter was written by an SCMP editor, as it was
the newspaper’s convention to publish inappropriate material in the editorial
section.64 For example, the advertisers and the Hong Kong government wanted the
SCMP to obey the law and not support radical movements. On the other hand, the
SCMP still needed to entertain Chinese readers who felt uncomfortable when the
SCMP supported the arrest of ignorant schoolchildren. From this case, we can see
that one of the advantages of the SCMP was that it published different viewpoints for
Chinese and British readers regarding the same events. This was its strategy to use
editorial freedom to increase its circulation while avoiding responsibility for what
had been published previously. With this strategy, the SCMP could win both Chinese
and British readers and pacify different groups of audiences. With regard to the
student arrest issue, it did not mind reprinting ‘a view from Japan’ from the Japan
Chronicle. The Japan Chronicle claimed it might be illegal for the Hong Kong
authorities to arrest students, and Japanese diplomatic officials ‘compelled the
Chinese to suppress newspapers which denounce[d] the Shantung settlement in too
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heated terms and to forbid indignation processions and every manifestation of
popular feeling’. The Japan Chronicle also hinted that the Japanese consuls would
demand that the United Kingdom and Hong Kong enforce similar policies in Hong
Kong to protect Japan. As for the students, ‘boycott is obviously an ineffective
weapon, but, like the strike, it may be carried out in a legal way; however, as
Marquis Okuma said, racial equality is not for uncivilised people like the Chinese’.65
The Japan Chronicle was an independent newspaper founded by Robert Young in
Japan, which had a close relationship with Fleet Street and Chinese newspapers and
belonged to the ‘British imperial press network’, according to Peter O’Connor’s
Japanese newspaper study.66 The Japanese government tried to bribe Robert Young
from time to time.67 It is difficult to analyse the motives of the SCMP in reprinting
the Japan Chronicle’s editorial, which criticized the police arrest of students,
encouraged strikes instead of demonstrations and was biased against the Chinese.
The SCMP might have wanted to ease the pressure from readers who sympathised
with Chinese nationalism, but it also did not want to irritate the Hong Kong
government at the same time. Thus, such editorials were reprinted by the SCMP.
It was also impractical for the SCMP to support Chinese merchants who did not
want to sell Japanese or other foreign products and only sell Chinese products,
because Chinese readers and advertisers contributed only part of the SCMP’s income.
There were still many Japanese products that could not be sold in Hong Kong, and in
some cases, this fact hurt Chinese businesspeoples’ interests. Limiting trade with
Japan was not thought to be in the best interest of the Chinese and British
businesspeople. Thus, it was very understandable that the SCMP reported on the trip
of British Trade Commissioner Bright to Hong Kong and China, and he held
meetings with Hong Kong Chinese businesspeople and encouraged cooperation in
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the expansion of British products in the Hong Kong and Chinese markets, rather than
boycotting them.68
The SCMP also highlighted that there would be a reward for Chinese
businesspeople who cooperated with the British government and sold British
products. 69 Thus, we can understand why the SCMP objected to excessively
promoting Chinese products, because doing so would have hurt British products, and
objecting to buying Japanese products would not be accepted because it hurt the
British and Chinese bourgeoisie’s business. The SCMP’s editorials pointed out that
“this kind of demonstration, being detrimental to foreign (it meant Japanese)
business interests, cannot be allowed in a British Colony.”70 Hong Kong’s foreign
companies, including Japanese companies, provided advertising income to the SCMP,
so the SCMP did not support peaceful demonstrations by students because they hurt
local business.
In short, the SCMP did not support student movements in Hong Kong, nor did the
Hong Kong government because the student movements affected the prosperity and
stability of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it did not mean that the SCMP did not like
reporting on Chinese nationalist movements like the May Fourth Movement, antiJapanese movements, or any other Chinese news. The SCMP did have some
Japanese advertisers, but it did not have Japanese editors. Although the SCMP
reported on the success of Japan in the new world order in its early twentieth century
editorials, it nevertheless set an example for China to study and follow. Japanese
companies were the SCMP’s advertising partners, but interests and demands coming
from Chinese readers were also important. Reporting on China was one part of the
SCMP’s combined reporting strategy, which became more significant in the SCMP’s
reporting in the 1930s.
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The SCMP’s Reporting on Strikes
The attitude of the SCMP toward strikes in Hong Kong showed that the SCMP
represented bourgeoisie readers. While the SCMP paid great attention to Chinese
news, it attempted to minimise the detrimental influence of riots and strikes on its
business. In a trade centre, the Hong Kong merchants, both Chinese and British,
would not like strikes. Although Chinese merchants sometimes had some national
sentiments, it did not mean they would conflict violently with the British. In
particular, when the British and Chinese audience’s lives and fortunes faced serious
danger from Chinese strikers, the natural choice for the SCMP and audiences was to
maintain the social order in Hong Kong.
Lam Man-sum studied the four English newspapers and found they did not object
to the Chinese revolution in 1911.71 In addition, the SCMP’s important advertisers,
HSBC and the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce, also predicted that the revolution
might be helpful for their business in China. 72 However, when the nationalist
movements negatively influenced the stability of Hong Kong, the SCMP had to
consider its business interests. During the 1911 Hong Kong strikes, believed to have
been caused by the 1911 Revolution, the SCMP reported on the 1911 revolution but
helped to suppress company strikes with the solid support of the Hong Kong
government. In its reporting, the newspaper hinted that the strikes were staged by the
underworld or the Triad Society. In fact, it was difficult to prove the connection
between Chinese working class strikes and organised crime.
In the 1925 Canton and Hong Kong strike, the Hong Kong government
cooperated with the SCMP to stabilise Hong Kong society by using the SCMP to
support Chinese merchants and the British community. Benjamin Wylie decided to
support the founding of the Huaqiao Ribao under a request from the Hong Kong
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government and Shum Waiyau, believing the newspaper would be good for the
stability of Hong Kong and for the SCMP itself.73
The SCMP attributed all the responsibilities to two groups of people: the Russians
and the Chinese Nationalist radicals. After Chinese Communist Party member Gu
Zhenghong had been murdered by the Japanese Spinning Company, Shanghai
students organized meetings to start a general strike. 74 The SCMP sent its own
correspondent to impartially investigate and report the details of the incident. The
strike was highly relevant to the Chinese merchant network in Shanghai, and many
Shanghai Chinese merchants had connections with the Chinese merchants in Hong
Kong. Although students were portrayed as “agitators”, “extremists” or a “mob” in
the SCMP when they had demonstrations, the SCMP showed a different attitude
toward Chinese merchants and still generously published the announcement of the
chairman of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, “in view of the assassination of
our brethren, we have decided on a general strike”.75 In addition, the demands of
Chinese students were also published in the SCMP:
Let us overthrow modern Imperialism and abolish unequal treaties. Let
labourers, merchants and students join in one body and fight together in
common cause…boycott of foreign banknotes; withdrawal of Chinese
deposits from foreign banks; control of the Municipal police to be placed in
Chinese hands; withdrawal of foreign warships from the Whangpu; release of
the students and labourers and labourers arrested; trial of the murderers of the
students and labourers; compensation for the sufferers; recognition of the
right of labourers to strikes.76

In addition, the SCMP correspondent also recorded that the police killed eleven
students, but did not identify the nationality of police. 77 In fact, these Chinese
students were shot to death by British police. Meanwhile, the students who were
killed constituted a “mob”. 78 The SCMP not only recorded the participants in the
riots, like students, labourers, merchants, it also reported that the Chinese
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government protested to the Diplomatic Corps about the action of the police at
Shanghai.79 Although the SCMP did not admit it was wrong for the British police to
murder Chinese students, it did publish the telegram of Reuters that:
The Foreign Office has sent a further Note to the Diplomatic Corps, saying
that there are further reports of police firing, while the arrested men have not
all been freed, as requested in the first note. It again requests most urgent
instructions to the Consular officials in Shanghai immediately to order a
cessation of the practice of firing on strikers.80

The SCMP at least cared about the feelings its Chinese merchant audiences when
it reported the Chinese riots and deaths in Shanghai was like a tragedy and the British
should refrain from further killing Chinese. In addition, it pushed the responsibility
on to Russians and Chinese radicals, viz., the Chinese communists. In doing so, it
could divert the Chinese audience’s focus on why British police killed Chinese in
Shanghai and it would not offend British in Hong Kong. The SCMP left the bloody
incidents alone and focused on the Soviet Union. It pointed out China was a “part of
the [Soviet Union’s] revolutionary front”, “without the participation of the Oriental
peoples, the progress of the world revolution was being considerably retarded”.81 The
SCMP had formed its theory that the communists were really convicts other than the
British police. It reported the [British] settlement authorities “conducted their
attention” on “communist centres” and arrested people in the Shanghai University
because of alleged connections with “communist money from the Peking radical
branch of the Kuomintang”.82 A SCMP correspondent managed an interview with E.
Osarnin, the Soviet Consul-General, about whether the Soviet Union supported the
recent uprising and the students. The answer the SCMP got was that “the Consulate
has no connection whatever with the strike, nor gives instruction to anybody with
regard to same. All fictions invested to bind in any way the Consulate with the strike
are nothing else than provocation aiming to discredit the Soviet Government.” 83
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However, the SCMP did not believe this and hinted that the Soviet Union should not
pretend to be innocent after it caused the deaths of Chinese people.84
Toward the riots in Shanghai, the SCMP used Reuters and its own sources to
prove that there was “irrefutable evidence that Bolshevik money and activities are
behind the present disturbances and it is further established that the Russians are
merely using the Chinese students as tools in their efforts to extend the Moscow
programme.” 85 Moreover, “the Communists, taking advantage of the disturbed
affairs, are harming the patriotic movement”. 86 Most important, it published
comments such as “powers defend police action” and “British suffer most”.87 The
SCMP attempted to mould the opinions of audiences that it was the Chinese
communists and Russians’ conspiracy to instigate such a nationalist movement.
Employing such logic, they could convince the Chinese audiences that, even if
strikers were “fighting for national rights” and “the freedom” of Chinese people,
communists actually sold Chinese national rights to Russia and killed Chinese
people. By employing such reasoning, the British became the most vulnerable.88 It
was true that the British faced Chinese hostility; thus British audiences paid attention
to the continuance of the riots. Such kinds of reporting proved that the SCMP
represented British audiences’ interests but could not thoroughly pass the buck to the
Chinese people. As a result, communists and Russians became the scapegoats.
The SCMP became experienced in handling strike issues and news. When the
strikes commenced in Hong Kong in the third week of June 1925, it managed a very
good propaganda campaign to draw a clear distinction between Hong Kong and
Shanghai. It published interviews with the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, who stated
that, “The Shanghai matter was one to be dealt with between the British Minister and
the Chinese Government. It was nothing to do with Hongkong, which was a British
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Colony”. Therefore, “workmen who would not do their work were merely loiterers
and should go back to their own country”. What the Hong Kong government planned
to do was to “stamp out evil and protect the good”. These words published in the
SCMP would warn the Chinese merchants to decide their stances; that is, to be
“stamped out” as evil or “to be the good”. Hong Kong Chinese merchants actually
had no other options. If they worked with the Canton Nationalist Government, the
Hong Kong government would punish them. If they stayed with Hong Kong
government, labourers would leave Hong Kong and their business be forced into
failure. Nevertheless, working with the Hong Kong government would be a better
option for them because strikes would be detrimental to the benefit of Hong Kong
Chinese merchants.
As a result, Chinese merchant readers would not sympathize with the victims of
riots in Shanghai and even Hong Kong, after the SCMP analysed that their readers
would be potential victims of the strike. No wonder, in the Shameen massacre,
though around fifty Chinese people had been slaughtered by British soldiers, the
SCMP pushed all of the responsibility of this tragedy on to the Canton Chinese
Nationalist Government.89 The famous Hong Kong movie director Lu Dun witnessed
British soldiers starting to shoot Chinese students once they saw the students of
Whampoa Military Academy demonstrating in Canton.90 Reporting Chinese news on
the stance of the British interests in Hong Kong in the 1925 strike became
characteristic of the SCMP reporting. In fact, Chinese merchants’ interests tied with
the British interests on the point of maintaining peaceful social order. The SCMP did
this to uphold a secure market for its media business, as well as for the business
safety of its Chinese audience and advertisers in Hong Kong; in addition, the strikers
were not its audience at all. The SCMP and the government together attributed the
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Hong Kong crisis to Chinese nationalism and the Cantonese government.
The SCMP liked to report sensational strike news from China. It did this time, too,
but from its own interest. Even in its reporting of the Shameen Massacre, the SCMP
highlighted the deaths of foreigners but suppressed reporting Chinese deaths. 91
Naturally, the SCMP hoped that the Hong Kong government would stop the incidents
as soon as possible so that it could avoid losing too much in the 1925-1926 strike.92
Thus, the SCMP sent enough messages to the audiences that Hong Kong should not
have a strike because what happened in Shanghai was irrelevant to Hong Kong. Even
if strikes happened in Hong Kong, there would be enough food supplies, so there was
no need for the audiences to be panic. Considering the horrible atmosphere that the
SCMP created for the audiences, such as, “Britisher killed and lady wounded”,
Chinese newspapers demanded “the execution of the British Consul-General in
Shanghai”, “the daily loss of the Chinese in Shanghai during the strike is $3,00,000”,
foreigners were seeking asylum in China. British and Chinese readers could easily
realize the severe consequences of a strike if it happened in Hong Kong. In
particular, the SCMP told its readers “the [Shanghai] Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce had passed a vote to terminate the strike at the weekend, and the reason
given therefore was that commercial interests had already suffered staggering
losses”93. From the beginning of the strike to the end, the SCMP opposed the strike
and had no mercy on strikers. What the SCMP cared about was the food supply and
safety problems in Hong Kong, which reflected the concerns of its Chinese and
British audiences.
While some other Chinese newspapers and English newspapers closed because of
the press strike, the SCMP stayed opened and provided a channel for the Chinese
merchants to save themselves in Hong Kong. The Chinese merchants really had
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nothing much to do to support the nationalist strike at that moment. The British
government said they would secure the lives and property of the British in China,
without “weakness and hesitation”.94 In addition, the Hong Kong governor, Stubb,
passed the message to the Chinese audiences of the SCMP that “any attempts at
disorder will be relentlessly repressed”. 95 Meanwhile, the governor also conveyed
gratefulness to the rich Chinese residents in Hong Kong who helped the British Hong
Kong government in the strike. 96 However, when Chinese merchants hoped the
government would announce they were solving their protection problems, the
governor only said Chinese should “guard themselves” and government “had always
given satisfaction”.97 Even for such a brief answer, it needed the leading Chinese
merchant Chow Shou Son and colonial official Robert Cotewall to discuss the matter
with the governor.98 The SCMP reported that more than two hundred members of the
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce worried about safety and security problems
during the strike.99 Their leaders Chow Shou Son and Robert Cotewall did show their
high position as a bridge between the Chinese merchants and the Hong Kong
governor, but the reply they brought from the Hong Kong government obviously
discouraged the Chinese merchants. For example, the governor said that there were
enough food supplies in Hong Kong, but “Government could not undertake the
distribution, it was up to the public to make their own arrangements to get their
supplies”.100
While the Hong Kong government in the SCMP showed an irresponsible attitude
toward the Chinese community in the period, the SCMP recorded that Chinese
merchant leaders held meetings frequently in looking for solutions protect the safety
of the Chinese community. The Chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce, Li Yau Chuen, held the meeting and approved the proposal that a
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Merchants Self-Protection Corps should be formed to assist the police in the
maintenance of peace and order in the Colony.101 Each Chinese shop would provide
two shop clerks for duty. 102 As for the food supply problems, it was complex:
Chinese might have too much pork to eat because there were too many pigs in Hong
Kong and it became a problem for the Pig Dealers’ Guild to dispose of them in the
Hong Kong summer. 103 The SCMP reported that Li Yau Chuen worked with the
government to allow people to set up meat and vegetable stalls to sell the pork, and
salesmen and hawkers could sell this pork without a license.104 As a result, not only
did the losses of Chinese merchants decrease, but Chinese residents could easily get
the pork.105 From the SCMP reporting, Li Yau Chuen left a more responsible image
to Chinese readers than that of the Hong Kong governor. The SCMP showed that the
Chinese merchant leaders worked for them efficiently. In addition, Chinese readers
provided suggestions to solve the food supply and security problems for other
Chinese readers in the SCMP. For example, reader T.I.M. suggested the Dairy Farm,
the biggest meat provider in Hong Kong, provide more convenient payment methods
to guarantee food sales to Chinese clients during the crisis.106
It is also worthy to mention an ex-police reservist claimed himself one of the
“section of the Chinese community who has no sympathy with the present foolish
and unwarranted adventure”.107 The reader proposed reorganizing a team of 600 or
700 men from the former Hong Kong Police Reserve formed during World War I to
protect the Chinese community.108 The reader believed that if leaders of the Chinese
community accepted his proposal, there would be a good result. 109 Consequently,
beside the Merchants Self-Protection Corps, the famous Chinese lawyer S.W. Tso
and his committee members Messrs Wong Tin, I. M. Wong, S. Wong Tape and F.C.
Mou Fung registered names and allocated duties to over 100 of men, who became the
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members of the special constables. They were under the leadership of F.C. Mow
Fung, who was the experienced ex-inspector of the wartime Police Reserve.110
The SCMP reporting about Mr. S.W. Tso appeared as the headline on the front
page on 30 June 1925, which showed the urgency of the safety problem identified by
the Chinese audience.111 It created a good image of Tso in the hearts of Chinese and
British readers, who believed Tso was courageous, experienced and loyal to the Hong
Kong government and showed an enterprising leadership in the Chinese community.
In particular, Tso contributed to the protection of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong
Kong. Obviously, because his endeavours had been recognized, the SCMP’s
coverage about him during the strike impressed the British Hong Kong officials, and
years later, Tso became the Chinese member in the Hong Kong Legislative
Council.112 It could not be denied that in crises, the SCMP gave hope and support to
the Chinese audiences. In particular, it gave Tso an opportunity to lift his social
reputation and position in the Chinese community and in British colonial Hong
Kong.
The social prestige of Chinese merchant leaders improved especially when the
Chinese audiences complained about the uselessness of the Hong Kong government
to help them. A Chinese reader nicknamed “Town Dweller”, who had many Chinese
trader friends, criticized the Hong Kong government, which did not efficiently solve
the strike problems. “Town Dweller”, a representative of the Chinese businessmen,
under the request of Chinese merchant friends, told the SCMP that:
On every hand Chinese businessmen are hourly asking me why the
Government does not act. I have not yet met with one Chinese [better class
person] who had not heartily condemned these labour unions and the
settlement which the Government made with the Seamen’s Union in 1922.
Surely here is one essential in which the Government can instil confidence in
the large body of peaceful and law-abiding Chinese traders and residents as to
its ability to govern? It is a well-known fact that Chinese despise a weak
Government and nothing would go further to allay these fears of the Chinese
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community than to see the Government take a firm stand on this vital
question and act at once. Further delay will only be construed as
weakness…Of course it may be that there are not sufficient police for such a
distribution but could not aid be sought from the military and let them do the
picket patrols?113

The reader published his and his Chinese merchant friends’ views anonymously
probably because of criticizing the government. That his views in such an unfriendly
attitude were published showed the SCMP’s support of Chinese merchant readers. It
was also possible that the SCMP editor did this anonymous critical piece to please
Chinese readers. In August, a large and representative meeting, a combination of “the
Committee of the Trade Protection Bureau and the Committees of the Co-Operative
Societies of the Twenty-Four Commercial Guilds”, was held and presided over by
the leading Chinese merchant Ho Kwong and thereafter, announced three resolutions
in the SCMP:
1. Chinese merchant residents in the Colony are desirous of expressing their
thanks and gratitude to the Governor of Hong Kong for his promptness in
enforcing the emergency measures for the preservation of peace in the
Colony, to which they owe their safety.
2. Regarding the present strike, we merchants are dead against it.
3. With regard to the enforcement of Bolshevik measures by the de facto
Government in Canton, which are aimed at the destruction of commerce
and the serious entanglement of finance, as well as the cutting off of the
supply of foodstuffs from Canton to Hongkong, as preliminary steps to
sovietising the area under their rule, we merchants are desirous of
expressing our opposition thereto.114

The anonymous Chinese merchant held opinions that the present Hong Kong
government was weak and despised by the Hong Kong Chinese merchants, but the
Chinese merchant resolutions still thanked the governor. It was easy to understand
that the conflicted tones of the Chinese merchants meant they did not like the strikers
and the Canton government as well as the Hong Kong government. They wanted an
exit to such a miserable strike but they did not have many useful channels; for
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example, they did not like the government’s slow action but still flattered the
governor. The SCMP was used to influence the Hong Kong government or the
governor, or at least the British readers, with uncertain effect. Nevertheless, it
showed the courtesy and stance of the Chinese merchants. The SCMP published Ho
Kwong’s response that he would communicate with Chow Shou Son and Robert
Cotewall about sending their resolutions to the British government in London.115
After checking the correspondence between the Hong Kong government and the
British colonial office, I could not find the Chinese merchant resolutions. Thus, it
proved that what Ho Kwong proposed was something like a deformed criticism to
the Hong Kong government. The resolutions showed the Chinese merchants’
attitudes received support in the SCMP and the SCMP sufficiently represented
Chinese merchant interests. Chinese merchants and the SCMP had no interest at that
time in patriotism or Chinese nationalism. In other words, Hong Kong Chinese
merchants did not live on the ferment of patriotism or nationalism; they lived on their
business interests. What they cared about was their business loses and interests. As a
result, they had to show their loyalty to the British government and hoped the
imperialists could respond with harsh action against the Cantonese government.
Although the SCMP sometimes provided anti-foreign news to please the Hong Kong
Chinese merchants, the prerequisite was clear. The Chinese merchants’ interests
should not be negatively influenced because of these kinds of articles.
In the bewildering situation of the strike, the SCMP explained the stances of the
Chinese merchants, and the power of Chinese merchants to maintain their living in
Hong Kong. In addition, it showed that the leaders of Chinese merchants strived to
mould opinions of Chinese merchant readers, and to influence colonial decisionmaking.
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In brief, the goal of boycotting and eradicating the British governance of Hong
Kong seriously conflicted with the essential business interests of Hong Kong Chinese
merchants. That Hong Kong Chinese merchants supported the Chinese nationalist
revolution but compromised in the 1925 Strike just told us that they were rational
nationalists if they supported the Chinese nationalist movement in previous years.
Their changes could be considered rational retreat and progress from a general
situation of nationalism defined by John Plamenatz; nationalism in Asia was an
Eastern nationalism of “both acceptance (to accept Western scholarship and political
systems) and rejection (to seek for reform and a real national independence)”.116
Hong Kong Chinese merchants maintained the rationale that they would not allow
the strikes to hurt their business in the 1925 Strike. They did not have a better choice
when they became pitiful intermediaries between the British Hong Kong government
and the Canton government. Primarily, Hong Kong Chinese merchants imitated
Western business culture, including the international trade, English language and
Western laws, etc. In other words, they desired an independent and powerful Chinese
bourgeoisie government, but the Canton-Hong Kong Strike was led by communists,
Russians and nationalist radicals. Although these merchants admired the Cantonese
government under the leadership of Sun Yatsen and sympathized with the nationalist
movement, nevertheless, the development of the strike superseded their political
ideals and damaged their interests. Thus, their boycott, dissatisfactory behaviours and
even criticisms against the Canton Nationalist Government had nothing to do with
their patriotism.
As for the SCMP, although the Hong Kong government requested its cooperation
in restraining the strike and Chinese nationalist sentiments becoming contagious in
the Chinese bourgeoisie world, nevertheless, it was the SCMP’s natural choice to
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protect Hong Kong’s prosperity. In particular, its circulation had increased to an
amazing extent during the 1925 Strike, which showed that the bourgeoisie readers
recognised the stance of the SCMP, not to mention using the SCMP, as a tool to
mould Chinese merchants’ opinions. Consequently, the SCMP combined its growth
with the fate of Hong Kong Chinese merchants.
To conclude, the SCMP was passionate in spreading the ideas of reforming China
in order to maximize the Chinese merchants’ interests in China. The reporting could
be nationalistic because the relationship between the interests of Chinese merchants
and international merchants were in conflict. In other words, the SCMP imagined an
ideal and powerful Chinese government where the Chinese government could protect
Hong Kong Chinese merchants’ interests and even make the Hong Kong Chinese
merchants’ interests a priority. When the Chinese government sabotaged the Hong
Kong Chinese merchants’ interests and even Hong Kong prosperity, the SCMP did
not do nationalistic reporting but managed to protect the Hong Kong Chinese
merchants.
The SCMP’s nationalistic reporting did not mean it solidly supported a certain
Chinese government. The SCMP showed sympathy with the Chinese Nationalist
Government, founded by Sun Yatsen, but it did not mean an eternal support,
especially when the Chinese Nationalist Government executed a detrimental policy
toward Hong Kong. Largely, the SCMP had no favour of the varied governments in
China in my research period. The nationalistic sentiments and ideals appearing in the
SCMP simply projected an imagined, historical, cultural, mercantile and independent
motherland.
Scholars had various discussions about nationalism in early twentieth century
China. Huo Qichang believed that the leaders of Hong Kong Chinese merchants were
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loyal to the British Hong Kong government and simultaneously the Chinese patriots
or nationalists. 117 Chen Xueran clarified that Hong Kong during the May Fourth
period was not what other sources claimed: full of violence and nationalist
movement in Hong Kong. 118 Cai Rongfang claimed that Hong Kong Chinese
merchants were not always supportive of Chinese nationalist social movements, but
it did not mean Hong Kong Chinese merchants were not patriots.119 As previously
mentioned, now that the Hong Kong Chinese merchants more or less had an
imagined China in their minds, they did not necessarily support a government or
government-led movements, especially when their business interests had been
seriously damaged. When evaluating the nationalism of Hong Kong Chinese
merchants, more attention should be paid to the bottom line of the stratum. Even if
they supported the Great Strike, it might be a tragedy for them in the Armageddon. In
other words, even if the Chinese merchants cooperated with the Canton Nationalist
Government against the Hong Kong government, their business interests might be
severely damaged by the Hong Kong government and betrayed by the Canton
Nationalist Government. In a word, the nationalism of the Hong Kong Chinese
merchants was rational, conditional and not simply biased.
During the turbulent first quarter of twentieth century the SCMP proved to have a
pivotal social, economic and even politic role in helping Chinese merchants to
maintain their business interests, safety, stability and equality in Hong Kong and
even China. Whatever news reporting changed in the SCMP, it was consistent with
the interests of its Chinese merchant readers, especially when it had limited British
readers in the first ten years of its establishment. Thus, it became clear why the
SCMP was full of nationalist sentiment and vehemently represented Chinese
merchant interests. Along with the increase of British readers and in spite of the
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interference of laws against the external press freedom in the second ten years of the
SCMP, vis-a-vis the May Fourth Movement, the SCMP had no hesitation reporting
this event with a sense of justice. But it also chose to be a chameleon in front of the
Hong Kong government interference in light of the potential social disorders. In
particular, it always stood on the side of Chinese merchants in Hong Kong who
expected a stable commercial environment in Hong Kong and China. Thus, it would
be easy for us to understand why it opposed the famous and long-term Canton-Hong
Kong Strike in 1925. The SCMP did not deny the incentive of the incident in
Shanghai was a “patriot movement” as it was at the beginning; rather, the SCMP said
the Chinese newspaper readers and shareholders in Hong Kong would not like the
strike because it mainly hurt Chinese merchants’ interests in Hong Kong. In other
words, the SCMP believed that the “so called anti-foreign movement” was
detrimental to the Chinese merchants because “the majority of Hongkong ‘foreign’
concerns are Chinese owned: wherefore the interests of foreigners and Chinese are
identical and cannot be separated”.120
The nature of Chinese merchant nationalism and the SCMP made the position of
Hong Kong in modern China confusing and ambiguous. Some scholars believe that
Hong Kong had no positive influence on the modernization of China. 121 Chinese
merchants were merely the collaborators of British imperialists, who invaded and
exploited China. Other scholars justify the positive role of Hong Kong in modern
China history. Huo Qichang claimed Hong Kong provided capital and intellectuals to
the development of modern China.122 As previously discussed, Chinese merchants
united to maintain their living and safety under the leadership of some Chinese
leaders. Furthermore, as the in-betweens, they used the SCMP to vent their
dissatisfaction in front of the British and Chinese strikers and call for action from the
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side of the Hong Kong government, which they deemed irresponsible in protecting
the Chinese merchants. The contribution of the SCMP and the Hong Kong Chinese
merchants in the strikes might be neutral but it did not mean Hong Kong was useless
or neutral at the edge of China. In particular, the Great Strike in 1925 brought
Chinese international trade to a sudden dive.123 The SCMP and Chinese merchants
expected the expansion of a business network in China, and the British Empire
caused Hong Kong to play a unique role at the edge of China, along with the
significant influence of Chinese merchant leaders such as Ho Kai, Ho Tung, Wu
Tingfang and Tse Tsan Tai, in Chinese affairs.
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3. LAWN BOWLS REPORTING FOR THE BRITISH
My primary goal in this chapter is to examine how the SCMP made a profit
while meeting the demands of British audiences with lawn bowls reporting. I
disclose the nature of British sports and community and the influence of the SCMP
lawn bowls reporting on the development of British colonial Hong Kong—keeping
in mind the interaction between the British identity and the lawn bowls reporting.
The analysis begins with the history of lawn bowls and the involvement of the SCMP
with lawn bowls activities, and then focuses on why and how the SCMP carried out
the lawn bowls reporting. I conclude by pointing out how the lawn bowls reporting
took advantage to the point of “creating news” by actually forming leagues, playing
up the scores and stories to enlarge the circulation, how the SCMP portrayed the
British identity, and how this particular newspaper showcased the dominance of
British colonial occupation in Hong Kong.
Claude Jeanrenaud and Stefan Kesenne edited The Economics of Sport and the
Media to study the complexly pecuniary relations in the field of sport and
broadcasting.1 Kelby K. Halone improved previous studies on the interplays of sport,
communication and identity and claimed that any two of the three dynamics may
literally constitute the presence of the other; e.g., sport and communication gave rise
to the identity. 2 While Halone’s theory makes sense, I argue that any one of the three
boosts the other two in a small British colonial island; the interaction between the
local English newspaper and sporting development would be simple, direct and
frequent. In addition, the British identity and cultural background of British
expatriates demanded good sports reporting, the effects of which were to improve the
local English media, and vice versa. In other words, The British identity caused the
demand on British sport lawn bowls and the attention of the local newspaper. The
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SCMP took advantage of this to make a profit from lawn bowls reporting.
After the SCMP leanred the road to report Chinese events to attract Chinese
readers, it also searched for the magnet to attract a plentiful British readership that
would spend freely on advertising. In particular, the Hong Kong Daily Press was the
biggest paper for British elite; the SCMP still needed to compete, at its inception, to
achieve its goal to be a paper for the “best classes”. This valuable audience as
potential advertisers was finally realized through sports reporting, especially lawn
bowls. In fact, the SCMP sporting news was one of “the two major news fields” in its
paper.3
The British liked lawn bowls and the SCMP spent many columns reporting lawn
bowls competition results. The SCMP staff also participated in the lawn bowls
organization and led the Hong Kong Lawn Bowls development. As a result, the
SCMP’s lawn bowls news was in a leading position in Hong Kong, and the readers
of the lawn bowl news were older and wealthier.4 Therefore, reporting lawn bowls
for British audiences not only met the demand of British sporting hobby, but also
attracted advertisers, which were interested in the consumption power of the SCMP
readers.5 Furthermore, the SCMP editor noticed the interconnection between sporting
news and film advertisements.6 Both of these contents were attractive to the SCMP
British audiences. The SCMP aimed to add more lawn bowls reporting and get more
film advertisements.7 The result was very optimistic; the SCMP became a leader in
lawn bowls reporting and first-run film advertising in Hong Kong.8 In addition, the
difficulty of getting news from Britain and the laws against criticism of the British
Empire did not make the SCMP become a lively and political newspaper on British
daily politics. Instead, it became a newspaper reporting Reuters news, Chinese
politics and the lawn bowls, etc.9
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Lawn Bowls Appeared in Hong Kong
Lawn bowls had been a traditional British game for hundreds of years. When
English people were not allowed to play lawn bowls widely because of military
reasons during the reigns of Edward III and Richard II, the Scottish fell in love with
it.10 As Scots increasingly found jobs in overseas colonies, including Hong Kong,
they brought the game to Hong Kong, too, and several versions of lawn bowls
emerged in Hong Kong. However, these were always British stories. It was said that
a few Scots played lawn bowls around their houses and then founded a club called
the Kowloon Bowling Green Club (KBGC).11 Later, the number of Scots who joined
this club increased, as well as more English and Americans. Benjamin Wylie, a
Scottish printer, lived with the Scots in Kowloon even after he became the general
manager of the SCMP and the president of the KBGC and the Hong Kong Lawn
Bowling Association (HKLBA). 12 He was the leader of the Scottish Residence
Association and he could play lawn bowls more easily with his Scottish fellows.13
This might be a reason to explain why he lived in Kowloon instead of on the Island,
where the SCMP building was erected.14
The colonial government officially supported lawn bowls. When a property owner
asked a high price to lease the land as bowling green, the governor of Hong Kong
lent a hand. The governor, Sir Henry Blake, granted the KBGC the right to use a
piece of land where the Volunteer Camp was located, and opened the Clubhouse for
one hundred KBGC members.15 At that time, the KBGC president, W Ramsay, Vice
President WC Jack, and other members of the club had a meeting and decided that
the KBGC members should be only British and American, with no Asians being
admitted. 16 In the early twentieth century Hong Kong, racial segregation and
discrimination widely existed. The sport and other social resources were mainly
111

allocated to the British colonizers. Playing cricket, lawn bowls and golf became a
symbol of British superior social position to the Chinese community, including the
Chinese better and lower class.
While the other governor visited the KBGC to watch the matches from time to
time, the chief judge of the Supreme Court could cancel the daily work affairs to play
lawn bowls. ADA Macgregor, a devout lawn bowl fan, invited the chief jailer,
supervisor of the jury and chief inspector to play lawn bowls after a rushed
adjournment of a court hearing. 17 Actually, this was not an exceptional case; Justice
RE Lindsell, a member of the Kowloon Cricket Club, had been revealed by the
SCMP to play lawn bowls at two thirty p.m. on Tuesday afternoons, when he could
normally have been expected to be at work.18 The British officials spent too much
time on sports but did not manage Chinese affairs well. Therefore, Hong Kong
Chinese themselves managed the methods to improve their businesses and lives
through the institutions of their own, such as the Tung Wah Hospital and the SCMP,
which reflected their interests and social demands.

The Involvement of the SCMP in Hong Kong Lawn Bowls Development
British identity played an important role in boosting the development of sports
reporting for the SCMP. Lawn bowls was a popular sport in Hong Kong before 1941,
and was mainly played by British residents. From time to time, the British bowlers
talked about lawn bowls culture, British history, food, sportsmanship and British
music in the SCMP, and in this way, the SCMP cultivated lawn bowls and portrayed
the British life. Thereafter, it could interest British audiences to read its newspaper
and even study how to play lawn bowls. Moreover, the lawn bowls reporting showed
the dominant social position of the British community. In Hong Kong, the British
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occupied the majority of available sports fields, while Chinese occupied the minority
of land allocated for sports. As a result of the inequality, the SCMP mainly reported
on British sporting events.
The first meeting of the HKLBA took place in the building of the SCMP. In
addition, SCMP editor Thomas Petrie participated in the foundation of the HKLBA
and held meetings in the SCMP boardroom from time to time.19 Benjamin Wylie, as
the SCMP general manager, had been the vice-president and president of the
HKLBA many times and even AO Brawn, the 1932 president of the HKLBA, could
not remember the exact number of Wylie’s appointments.20 When Ben Wylie left
Hong Kong for Britain and could no longer be the vice-president or president,
HKLBA elected AL Shield as the vice-president, who later became a board member
of the SCMP.21 The editors, shareholders and general manager of the SCMP strongly
supported lawn bowls and became the chairs of the lawn bowls club and association
one by one. Due to its special relationship with the lawn bowls, the SCMP’s sporting
pages were frequently filled with lawn bowls news, especially its club events.
The SCMP’s participation in the lawn bowls management, innovation and
organizations improved the SCMP’s lawn bowls reporting. For example, the SCMP
covered the league matches in Hong Kong and generated frequent sport events for
the SCMP to report. Its abundant reporting made the lawn bowlers a loyal audience
of the SCMP, and some of them formed the habit of reading the SCMP lawn bowls
news in the morning. For example, the reports of Robert MacWhirter, the SCMP
sport editor, excited some bowl enthusiasts with the news they could have by
breakfast time.22
Playing lawn bowls was not popular until the first half of the twentieth century.
It was said that it was the SCMP editor Thomas Petrie, who became the first Hong
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Kong lawn bowls association president in 1909, and brought the lawn bowls games
to Hong Kong. 23 The general manager of the SCMP, Benjamin Wylie, was the
president of both Hong Kong Lawn Bowl Association and Kowloon Bowling Green
Club.24 The other editor of the SCMP, GT Lloyd, and former cashier EB Ayris, also
participated in the KBGC activities.25 John Scott Harston, the SCMP board chairman,
was, however, a cricket fan.26 Therefore, it was understandable that reporting on the
two sports occupied the most part of the sporting page. Sometimes, lawn bowls score
results and editorials occupied the most obvious position of the sporting page. Many
editors in the SCMP liked lawn bowls and did well in the game, such as Robert
MacWhirter, who chaired the KBGC in the pre-war years and wrote a book entitled
Lawn Bowls in Hong Kong, which was published and advertised by the SCMP. As a
result, both the SCMP business and the lawn bowls sport prevailed.27 The SCMP
sometimes recorded emotional lawn bowl stories and portrayed the British
sentiments in its reporting. The British in Hong Kong learnt to play lawn bowls in
their spare time and went back home ‘with gratitude’ to the British fellows in the
Hong Kong Lawn Bowls Association. This was Mr CB Hosking, the secretary of the
HKLBA’s, experience. He did not have the opportunity to learn to play lawn bowls
in Britain, but he gained the opportunity to play the game in Hong Kong, which
made him very thankful to the HKLBA, and he would often remark that he had learnt
lawn bowls in Hong Kong.28 This case enlightens us that, to a certain extent, as a part
of the British Empire, Hong Kong was a place where British culture was
disseminated. The Hong Kong Lawn Bowls Association was a member of the
English Lawn Bowls Association. Any HKLBA ‘member going Home would have
the privilege of playing on any Club green affiliated with the English Lawn Bowls
Association’. 29 Furthermore, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Hankou British would

114

register a Far Eastern Lawn Bowl Association in Britain to improve the
communication among British bowlers in the Far East.30 Lawn bowls was not only a
sport genre, but also an agent of British cultural identity in Asia.
This British cultural identity had been well protected because the Hong Kong
government granted large tracts of land on which to play lawn bowls and cricket to
the British. Although the Hong Kong government granted the Kowloon Bowling
Green Club sports land from time to time, the room was still considered inadequate.
In June 1925, the club decided to invest HK$25,000 in a bigger clubhouse.31 The
British liked lawn bowls so much that they even worried about the expansion of their
sports land when the Chinese were on strike and Hong Kong’s infrastructure was in
upheaval as a result. This not only uncovered how much the British were addicted to
lawn bowls, but also disclosed the nature of the British community who lived outside
the Chinese society and maintained their own identity and lives. They could sustain a
more decent life than the strikers and enjoyed more playing fields than the Chinese
because they exploited the Chinese merchants and working class but did not offer
reciprocal interests to the Chinese in Hong Kong.
The contribution of Benjamin Wylie, who advised the KBGC in evincing ‘such
shrewdness and foresight necessary for the new building’, should not be left out.32 At
the KBGC annual meeting of 1927, Benjamin Wylie became the vice-president of
the KBGC because he had done much for the club and the president thought that
Benjamin Wylie was ‘always for the good of the club’ though ‘his remarks
sometimes are very antagonistic’; Wylie admitted that this was true.33 In 1928, Wylie
also became the president of the Hong Kong Lawn Bowls Association because he
had ‘all the qualities needed’ for the position.34
Benjamin Wylie frankly confirmed discrimination against female bowlers in the
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pre-war years.35 However, there was no apology to the Chinese community, because
as early as the founding of the KBGC, Chinese had been officially refused
membership in the club. 36 As far as masculinity and sports go, Patrick McDevitt
approached the intersection of sports, British imperial history and masculinity in May
the Best Man Win: Sport, Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain and the
Empire, 1880–1935. He probed the interactions between the imperialism of Britain
and the nationalism of its colonies. Sports, which linked the British imperial
metropolis and its colonies with masculinity, reinforced the domination of the British
in their colonies.37 It was true that British men were addicted to this game and liked
winning. Peter Hall testified that Hong Kong British expatriates played lawn bowls
in the afternoons because they liked the thrill of success in the game.38 In other words,
the lawn bowls reporting was merely a business strategy of the SCMP. Nevertheless,
it portrayed the conquerors who subjugated Chinese enjoyed sporting privileges in
Hong Kong.
The assumed superiority of the British residents in Hong Kong and gave the SCMP
the opportunity to report lawn bowls for British readers; nevertheless, it was also a
great pity that the SCMP rarely reported sporting events for Chinese readers in the
pre-war years. The explanation was the serious inequality of land allocated for sports
between Chinese and British residents. More than 97 percent of the Hong Kong
population consisted of Chinese residents; however, it was difficult to get a small
piece of land for Chinese to play games in Hong Kong. The land was precious and
expensive to use solely for occasional sporting purposes by only 3 percent of the
population, though no more than 14.75 percent of available playing fields were
allocated to the Chinese in Hong Kong.39 The Chinese merchant leader and lawyer
Man Kam Lo did not publicly conflict with the British and deemed this a racial issue,
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but a mistake of neglecting the rapid growth of demand of Chinese on sports
activities.40 John Carroll pointed out that there was a British identity in pre-war Hong
Kong sports clubs.41 Carroll not only adduced the British sports players’ monopoly in
the cricket game, but also argued there was a simultaneous racial discrimination
against Chinese communities.

42

Carroll asserted, “The Hong Kong Chinese

bourgeoisie never embraced the British sports and game culture as wholeheartedly as
did the new local bourgeoisies elsewhere in the British Empire”; what these Chinese
sports clubs leaders attempted to show was their elite status and prestige to “each
other, to their European opponents and to the Chinese lower classes”. 43 In fact,
besides the demands of widening the living space and lifting the social positions of
Chinese merchant leaders, the Hong Kong Chinese, who were excluded from British
clubs due to racial segregation, wanted to form more sport clubs of their own, but
could not because they could not get the same quantity of land. M K Lam pointed out
that “the Chinese, who are taking very extensively to open-air games and outdoor
sports, do not enjoy the facilities comparable to the other sections of the
community”.44 The limited amount of land restrained Chinese sports development in
Hong Kong. As a result, such British hegemony harmed advertising opportunities of
the Chinese in the SCMP who would have been equally or more interested in
advertising as wealthy Britishers. Should there have been more sport fields and more
Chinese players, there would have been more sports reporting for Chinese, which
would have brought the SCMP more advertising income and Chinese subscribers.
Admittedly, the SCMP itself was very likely aware they contributed to the British
audiences’ sense of privilege by reading about and playing lawn bowls.
Unexpectedly, while the SCMP promoted the development of lawn bowls and
attracted British bowlers into this game, it also created more demand from the British
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residents to occupy sporting grounds, with the unintended result of boycotting
possible space the Chinese residents would have used for sports of their own. While
the SCMP portrayed the success and power of the British lawn bowlers, it also
reminded Chinese residents of the failure of competition with British residents and
racial discrimination in allocation of land for sporting venues.

SCMP Lawn Bowls Reporting
The SCMP had abundant lawn bowls reporting and left a new reader an impression
that lawn bowls clubs were ‘in abundance, and it seems that this sporting business is
being just a little overdone’.45 Around 1920, the SCMP sometimes put lawn bowls
reporting in its front page, which further attracted British audiences.46 Later on, the
editor suggested, “Effort must be made to interest advertisers in our sport page”.47
One important advantage the SCMP had in reporting on lawn bowls was that SCMP
executives were themselves involved in the development of the game in Hong Kong.
SCMP Ltd. owned two newspapers, the SCMP and The Hong Kong Telegraph, both
of which reported on lawn bowls. The readership drew in abundant advertising
income for the paper, but also a 10 percent commission directly into the pocket of
Benjamin Wylie, the general manager.48 In 1932, the president of the HKLBA, AO
Brawn, said Wylie ‘has done much to mould this Association into the form that it is
now’ and ‘has done more for bowls in Hong Kong than any other man I can think
of’.

49

Wylie’s involvement in the lawn bowls development provided good

opportunities for the SCMP to receive timely news sources for lawn bowls and
highlighted the paper’s reputation among bowlers.
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The Interplay Between the SCMP Reporting and Lawn Bowls
For British bowlers, playing lawn bowls was an addictive hobby. They played the
game with their friends, compatriots, and colleagues. The SCMP reported on these
games just to meet the demand of its readers, since more lawn bowls matches would
draw more readers’ attention and improve the audience’s loyalty to the SCMP. The
SCMP not only reported the events and their results, but also portrayed a kind of
culture, because in addition to the games, there were activities such as barbecues and
dances.50 Since the 1930s, the SCMP added more interactive content on lawn bowls,
such as the letters from bowlers, the discussion of lawn bowls development in Hong
Kong and match results in the paper. There were more and more lawn bowls matches
exhibited in the SCMP. On the right or left side of lawn bowls reports, there were
often English film advertisements.
As previously mentioned, the SCMP lawn bowls page became a bulletin board and
a forum for bowlers. There were columnists like ‘Jack’, ‘Toucher’ and ‘Rinker’ in
the SCMP lawn bowls reporting who frequently commented on the matches and the
development of lawn bowls in Hong Kong. Lawn bowlers and the audience also had
the opportunity to critique matches and players’ attitudes. In other words, the lawn
bowls page was more interesting and attractive than the previous period when the
newspaper reported only competition results.
‘Jack’ once worried about the sports standard of Hong Kong lawn bowls very
much and said ‘there was a danger of the premier bowling club in the Colony being
in less distinguished company next year, unless they bucked up. I do not mean to
suggest that this had anything to do in putting a little bit of ‘devil’ into them, but they
certainly must have recognised the danger. Their victory over Taikoo and the defeat
of both the other Kowloon clubs mean that there are now four clubs in the running
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for relegation’.51
Jack’s comments received some feedback from the SCMP readers too. For
example, ‘I agree with your opinion of the HKLBA being an unbusinesslike body,
judging by their decisions’; ‘the decision regarding selection for the Interport team
was only agreed to after many years of deliberation’; ‘I think it is absurd to confine
this competition to four players from each Club, when in league games more than
twelve players participate’; ‘I am afraid the Association is overdoing it in
Championship games’. 52
Sometimes, there were serious criticisms from the audiences to the bowlers,
especially when they did not accept the audience’s criticism; reader ‘Sport’ once said:
The inevitable has again taken place. Can you tell me, Mr Editor, how it is
that year after [year], lawn bowlers in this Colony resent criticism of their
play? Apparently, the same applies also to those players of the game in
Shanghai. During the last two Interport Bowls seasons in Hongkong, among
the bowling fraternity there was resentment shown both in speech and writing
to newspaper criticism of players and the game. This year, it would appear,
we are having a recrudescence of the same thing. When newspaper writers
criticise the play of footballers, cricketers and tennis players either at
interports or ordinary games, we never hear of any back chat. Is it that
bowlers in general are not nearly such good sports? Or is that, in their own
superior minds, they deny any but themselves the right to criticise the game?
I wonder.
Yours, etc.,
Sport
Hongkong, 9th Oct. 1925. 53

These criticisms illustrate that lawn bowls was a sport about which British
expatriates in Hong Kong cared deeply. In addition, they participated vicariously in
the game through the SCMP, which had the media function of endorsing, advocation
and criticism. The columnists could mould the audiences’ opinions through such
criticisms and reform the mechanism of the sports clubs in Hong Kong. Although the
British had no universal suffrage in the Hong Kong government, they at least could
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elect their representatives or a committee to protect their interests. Bowlers used the
SCMP to inform other Hong Kong bowlers and members of clubs and associations
about meetings at which they could discuss important issues. For example, the reader
‘JR’ once noticed there were alterations to arrangements of the Aitkenhead Shield
Competition when he read articles in the SCMP from ‘Spectator’ and ‘Rinker’. As a
result, he suggested in the SCMP:
A meeting of two representatives from each Club should be convened
previous to the match in order to build up the Hongkong team so that the
available strength of the various rinks should be nearly equal…In any case I
think all bowlers in Hongkong will agree to the necessity of a small
Committee to deal with any matter affecting their interests. The arrangements
are evidently to be on a big scale, and again I should remark this should have
had the consideration of the board as constituting the Hongkong Lawn Bowls
Association. To Hongkong bowlers I would suggest a meeting at the Civil
Service Club House on the 7th October, at 5.30 p.m., to appoint a Committee
and arrange a team for the Aitkenhead Shield Competition. 54

British civil servants, professionals and merchants would have been the majority
of bowlers. They resided in Hong Kong to maintain the role of Hong Kong as the
agent of the British Empire. The British took Hong Kong as the eternal land of the
Empire and played British sports in Hong Kong.
The SCMP sometimes represented its audience and published its readers’
suggestions on lawn bowls. In 1938, when the Shanghai and Hong Kong Interport
Lawn Bowls Match was held in Hong Kong, reader ‘B Up’ suggested the ‘esteemed
paper’ SCMP publish a suggestion, or an open letter to the bowlers:
As every follower of Lawn Bowls is aware, Mr H Wallace is the present
Singles Champion of Shanghai, and Mr BW Bradbury our local Champion.
Could not a match be arranged between the two here and a nominal small
charge to see the match, proceeds to be devoted to charity?
Trusting this suggestion will bear fruit.
B. Up. 55
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The SCMP provided bowlers an interactive platform and comprehensive
information channel. With increasing lawn bowls reporting and types of contents, the
SCMP could attract more high quality audiences and advertisers.

Portrayed British Identity in the SCMP
When the lawn bowls game was introduced into more clubs, more British
expatriates had the opportunity to play. It was common that the bowlers’ wives and
kids would crowd onto the green to watch the match for a whole week’s afternoons
because it was just like the way they spent their holidays or the way they lived in
Britain. 56 They bowled, barbecued, danced and drank.
The SCMP also portrayed the Hong Kong British residents’ British identity in the
1934 British Empire Games in London, which was regarded as the biggest
international lawn bowls competition. The SCMP reported consistently about the
British Empire Games that year but it had to admit that the British expatriates tried
their best but did not do very well in the matches.57 In order to encourage the sporting
news audience, the SCMP still told the readers some good news, such as that the
Hong Kong team had defeated Ireland in a single match, the Hong Kong team
defeated Rhodesia, South Africa and Scotland in a pairs match, or that Hong Kong
had, amazingly, defeated Australia and Wales in the pairs match. 58 Finally, Hong
Kong ranked seventh out of eight teams in the Empire Lawn Bowls single matches
and ranked third in the pairs match. The SCMP commented that Hong Kong teams
did not do very well in every match like cricket, swimming, etc.; as for lawn bowls,
the team members upheld the best British traditions in Hong Kong.59
The SCMP recorded how the Hong Kong colonial government officials liked lawn
bowls and supported it. In other words, the SCMP became a virtual platform on
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which the British elite could communicate during their leisure and working time. On
the eve of World War II, Governor Sir Geoffry Alexander Stafford Northcote was
watching a lawn bowls match when he heard the news that the Second World War
had broken out in Europe, which was a piece of bad news for him because he had to
leave the match.

60

Before 1941, the governor’s lawn bowls team played two

afternoons a week; thus, the administrative officials had to be very efficient in
handling the administrative affairs. 61 The SCMP recorded that the governor and
colonial secretary sometimes had dinners at the Hong Kong Hotel with bowlers and
reviewed the British lawn bowls history with bowlers. The SCMP loyally conveyed
the ‘royal and ancient’ lawn bowls history of several British monarchs, including
Edward III and Charles I, to its readers in British colonial Hong Kong.62 Governor
Northcote was a celebrity in the SCMP, which reported Northcote invited bowlers to
play bowls at the governor’s house. 63 He also played bowls with other bowlers
during work time.64
Lawn bowls was such an important ingredient of British life that they could not
live well without it. They would even sacrifice their working time to play the game.
While the SCMP reporting recorded the activities of bowlers who loved lawn bowls
and shared a British identity in a Far East colony, it also portrayed a group of British
who parasitized a Chinese city, whose fortunes were mainly created by Chinese
merchants. Hong Kong Chinese could not share equal sport fields or sports reporting
in a newspaper that targeted Chinese audience. That such exploitation existed
showed the British hegemony and imperialism in Hong Kong.

The Boom in the SCMP’s Business
It was a big opportunity for the SCMP to participate in the development of lawn

123

bowls in Hong Kong. Even through the financially troubling early years, through
1941, The SCMP provided a boardroom for the HKLBA to hold occasional
meetings.65 Sometimes Wylie, though no longer president of the HKLBA, presided
over the HKLBA conference in the SCMP boardroom.66 The reports became a good
opportunity to obtain the latest information for the South China Morning Post as well
as its readership. The SCMP was the sponsor of lawn bowls in Hong Kong.
Compared with other newspapers in Hong Kong that reported the sports news every
day, the SCMP was unique because it reported the lawn bowls consistently,
sensationally and in depth. Other newspapers, such as the Hong Kong Daily Press
and the China Mail, sometimes promoted the status of the SCMP when they reported
on the Lawn Bowls Association meetings held in the SCMP’s offices.67 In addition,
Hong Kong’s English newspapers sometimes reported lawn bowls matches’
charitable donations to the SCMP war fund.68 It was a wise strategy to sponsor a
game with little cost, even though the bowlers were rich enough to afford the cheap
membership fee. After they paid for the game, they played lawn bowls and bought
newspapers to read the reports of game results later. Those British who were busy
working in their offices and could not attend the matches had to read the SCMP the
following day to find out their friends’ scores. As a marketing method, sports
sponsorship greatly stimulated the circulation of the SCMP. There were only a few
bowlers in the 1900s, but later there were hundreds of bowlers in a given club, and
there might have been thousands of bowlers in Hong Kong who were sure to have
heard of the name of the SCMP and read the lawn bowls reports. The British cultural
background of lawn bowlers might remind them to find their British fellows in the
clubs and associations. Thomas Petrie, Benjamin Wylie and Robert MacWhirter, as
representatives of the SCMP, would bring more readers when they appeared in the
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bowls. MacWhirter even published a small book through the SCMP to educate the
lawn bowlers on how to play the game, including psychological strategy in
bowling.69
The interactions between the SCMP and lawn bowls games garnered very
profitable returns for the SCMP. The circulation of the SCMP in 1903 was 300; in
1916, it was about 500 to 600. It was after 1911 that the SCMP had a better financial
situation and the lawn bowls game in Hong Kong became popular through the
paper’s advocacy. As a partial result of the explosive popularity of lawn bowls, the
circulation of the SCMP increased to 2,900 in the 1920s, and it once almost doubled
to 5,500 in 1932.70 Having the general manager, Benjamin Wylie, as the president of
the Hong Kong Bowling Association in 1928 and 1930, as well as the president of
the KBGC in 1928 and 1934, was no hindrance to circulation growth, either. With
the publication of Robert MacWhirter’s book about Hong Kong lawn bowls in 1931,
plus the sensationalised reports about lawn bowls and the increasing number of
readers as wells as bowlers, the SCMP’s reputation increased in Hong Kong along
with that of lawn bowls.
As previously mentioned, the SCMP editor Henry Ching believed that the SCMP
was the best newspaper reporting on lawn bowls in Hong Kong. The readers usually
had higher social positions and purchasing power in Hong Kong society.71 The highquality readership and the significant circulation would seize the advertisers’ hearts
right away, which was one of the reasons why they preferred to spend money on the
SCMP. No doubt, through sponsoring the lawn bowls, the SCMP became one of the
most valuable media sources in Hong Kong. The SCMP Ltd.’s afternoon paper, The
Hong Kong Telegraph, also reported lawn bowls news, which would have increased
the SCMP’s reputation for lawn bowls reporting in Hong Kong. Thus, if readers
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wanted to read lawn bowls news, the SCMP or The Hong Kong Telegraph would be
their best choices.
All things considered, the SCMP helped the Hong Kong British community
establish a closer connection with the British Empire via lawn bowls, Interport and
imperial lawn bowls competition, and lawn bowls reporting. Lawn bowls, just like
boundary stones, helped the British people who occupied Hong Kong playing fields
and even one of the most aggressive Chinese members of the Legislative, Council
Man Kam Lo, did not take it as a racial discrimination. In fact, it showed the vast
social changes from Britain to Hong Kong. The British had universal suffrage in
Britain but not in Hong Kong. Therefore, they had varied clubs to select the
representatives in the councils to manage Hong Kong with the governor of Hong
Kong. Lots of them led a poorer life in Britain but finally became bourgeoisie or
professionals in Hong Kong and led a much better life. The British not only simply
shipped their families and goods between Britain and Hong Kong, but also shipped
the views and practices of dominators and imperialism. It is difficult to deny the
control of British community in occupying the majority of playing fields, which also
influenced the quantity and nature of sports reporting in the SCMP.
When the SCMP portrayed British identity in the lawn bowls reporting, it also
announced the bowlers were agents of the British Empire. When British families
attended the afternoon lawn bowls competition, the women observed a sporting show
and established a social and cultural network between British families in Hong Kong.
British families enjoyed good sunshine with delicious cookies, while the majority
Chinese lower class struggled to feed these British families. As a result, the working
class, or Chinese merchants, challenged these privileges in Hong Kong. As long as
the SCMP passionately reported lawn bowls or crickets, it manifested that strong
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British men were powerful enough to control Hong Kong as part of the British
Empire.
In any case, the Chinese community did not have enough sporting grounds to
exercise their bodies. To change the social inequality, Chinese chose, according to
the scope of this study, three methods. First, the working class walked out on strikes
against the British, though the Chinese merchants were on the side of the British.
Second, the Chinese merchants collaborated with the British who did not share their
everyday life and privilege with Chinese merchants, but Chinese merchants had to do
business with the British merchants within a British imperial business network to
show their loyalty to the British Empire and got higher social status. The third way
was that the Chinese bourgeoisie struggled to share the British colonial power via the
Legislative Council and the Executive Council, or used the SCMP to mould Chinese
opinions and improve their audience freedom in specific situations.
To summarize, this chapter studied the origin of lawn bowls in Hong Kong and the
interplay between media and the sport. I highlighted that the SCMP benefitted from
its sponsorship of lawn bowls, and the management worked very hard to promote
lawn bowls and lawn bowl reporting in Hong Kong. Lawn bowls was an important
game to unite the British in Hong Kong, and reporting lawn bowls news was
beneficial for the SCMP. The alliance between the media and lawn bowls was an
innovation in Hong Kong. Particularly, the SCMP cultivated lawn bowls in Hong
Kong and organized the league matches and tournaments. When the SCMP reported
on lawn bowls events in Hong Kong, the newspaper company also benefitted from
these activities.
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4.

MAKING “AN EMPIRE SHOP WINDOW”: THE BRITISH
EMPIRE EXHIBITION REPORTING

In the previous three chapters, I illustrated reporting on China news and British
sports in the South China Morning Post, (SCMP), to meet the various demands of its
Chinese and British readers. Business reporting on China or the British Empire
sometimes attracted both Chinese and British audiences. Although there was a
factual segregation within the Hong Kong society; e.g., the Chinese community and
British community resided in different districts, and Hong Kong belonged to a
collaborative colonialist model, which meant the British had to cooperate with the
local Chinese community to execute some policies and develop colonial business.
John Carroll in his Edge of Empires clearly illustrated that the Chinese business elite
had an indispensable role in colonial government.1 In addition, the British had to
reward these Chinese to gain their loyalty to the colony and the British Empire. Aside
from Carroll’s study, Elizabeth Sinn in her Power and Charity: A Chinese Merchant
Elite in Colonial Hong Kong used a small case of the Tung Wah Hospital to exhibit a
big picture of Sino-British segregation to the British and Chinese integration in
hospital management and the colonial power.2 This chapter argues that the SCMP
positively and enthusiastically supported Hong Kong to participate in the British
Empire Exhibition, something like the World’s Fair, which took place near London at
Wembley Stadium in 1924 and 1925. The SCMP not only added some content to
attract Chinese and British readers, especially Chinese and British bourgeoisie
readers, but also advocated that an integration of Hong Kong Chinese merchants into
the British imperial business network through this Exhibition would advertise the
Hong Kong colony and bring long-term benefit to this port. Since the SCMP lived on
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advertising and subscriptions from bourgeoisie readers, especially the merchant
readers, participating in the Exhibition and all the resulting advertising revenue
would greatly benefit the company.
Chinese merchant leaders also sometimes used the SCMP to mould Chinese
merchants’ opinions to achieve their goals. In the 1920s, the SCMP relied on
shipping, trade and consumption advertisements. The Empire Exhibition was an
important opportunity to promote international trade in Hong Kong. If the Exhibition
improved Hong Kong’s position in the imperial business network, the SCMP would
also significantly benefit from increasing shipping and trade advertisements.
Therefore, the SCMP had sufficient reason to advocate to its audiences, especially
the Chinese merchant audience, to support the British Empire Exhibition. In addition,
the potential British Empire business travellers to Hong Kong were also helpful to
the SCMP’s circulation as an important source of clients.3
Simon Potter believed that sometimes the British imperial identity equalled the
colony or dominion’s merchant commercial interest.4 In the case of the Exhibition,
the SCMP also showed a similar commercial position as well as an imperial identity
in its reporting, which integrated Chinese and British participants’ loyalty to the
Empire, the desire to attain a higher position from establishing a closer relationship
with the Empire and the expectations of benefiting from business activity. The SCMP
consistently reported in a manner that encouraged Hong Kong merchants’
participation in the Exhibition and believed that being a part of the British Empire’s
commercial network would eventually benefit Hong Kong. Thus, the SCMP
expressed its suggestion to the Empire and its readers that Hong Kong
representatives should participate in the Wembley Exhibition “permanently” if it
opened every year.5 In brief, the colonial paper owned by an American, British and
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Chinese was eager to utilize this opportunity to make money.
Robert Bickers posits that, as the nominal subject of the exhibit, Hong Kong
brought its Chinese image to Wembley, rather than something closer to the reality of
Hong Kong itself.6 John Carroll noted that by doing so, Chinese merchants could
distinguish themselves at home and within the British Empire.7 Both Bickers and
Carroll noticed the influence or feedback of the Wembley Exhibition to the Chinese
from two different perspectives. I will expand Bicker’s observation and point out that
there was also a team of British expatriates in the Hong Kong section that did not sell
products but was part of the Hong Kong section. They were also representatives from
Hong Kong who went to support the British Empire Exhibition; for example, the
former SCMP editor Thomas Petrie and SCMP board chair John Scott Harston both
went to Wembley and sat in the Chinese restaurant of the Hong Kong section.8 Thus,
it was not a pure Chinese Wembley exhibition in the Hong Kong section. Instead, the
SCMP portrayed a Chinese and British cooperative project in a British Empire
advertising platform. Chinese were exhibitors, merchants, lower staff and even
cooks, and the British were engineers, journalists and officials. Due to reasons
outlined later, the merchants lost a great deal of money. Since the first venture was
not lucrative, they needed to decide collectively whether to return in 1925. Not all
the participants wanted to disclose their inclination about returning to the 1925
Exhibition. Some Chinese merchants even tried to withdraw from the Exhibition.9
Obviously, loss at Wembley was not a good factor for the Chinese merchants to
distinguish themselves well in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the SCMP chose to
positively portray those merchants who were pro-Wembley; they reported at great
length on those who made profits at the Exhibition or who cooperated with the
commercial network. Similarly, Anne Clendinning argued that the Wembley
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Exhibition provided Canada with a chance to assert its national identity as a selfgoverning “white” dominion and let visitors deal directly with Canadian
businesspersons, increasing export and import.10 I could not find supporting evidence
for a national identity in the reports of the event but it was clear that the SCMP did
report on the British Empire. Although we could not know how every exhibitor
thought about their identity, the British imperial identity was what the SCMP reports
of Wembley used to influence the society and to make a profit.

The British Empire Exhibition Reporting in 1924
Fifty-six colonies and dominions came to Wembley in 1924, and the British
Empire Exhibition that year was one of the biggest ever held. It was first proposed as
an event in 1913; however, World War I, poor preparation work, and bad weather
delayed the event until 1924. The aim of the Exhibition was to highlight the
importance of the British Empire to the world, whether on the side of economy,
politics, or its powerful and positive image; an empire on which the sun never set. In
the first days of 1924, the Hong Kong governor appointed Mr Edward Richard
Halifax to be the Commissioner and Mr Chow Shou Son and Sir Robert Ho Tung to
be Honourable Associate Commissioners of the Hong Kong Section of the British
Empire Exhibition 1924.11 Additionally, there were three Chinese individuals (Hon.
Sir Chow Shou Son, Sir Robert Ho Tung, and Mr R. H. Kotewall) on the Hong Kong
committee; de facto, a joint committee of the Hong Kong General Chamber of
Commerce and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The Chinese Chamber of
Commerce also had an independent committee of its own, under the leadership of Mr
Ip Lan Tsun, which led other Chinese businesspersons to Wembley in 1924.12 There
were more than one hundred Chinese workers in the Hong Kong sections. The
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British Hong Kong government financed 50 percent of the cost of the exhibition; the
other costs were met by exhibitors or from donations.13 With the financing solution,
Hong Kong “went to” Britain.
When the SCMP reported on the Wembley Exhibition, it portrayed the British
Empire Exhibition as a great cooperative effort in which governments and Hong
Kong merchants would partake in a national or imperial project. For instance, the
SCMP reported that the purpose of the British Empire Exhibition 1924 was:
To find, in the development and utilization of the raw materials of the
Empire, new sources of Imperial wealth; To foster inter-Imperial trade and
open fresh world markets for Dominion and home products; To make the
different races of the British Empire better known to each other; and to
demonstrate to the people of Britain the almost illimitable possibilities of the
Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies overseas.14

The SCMP used Reuters, The Times and other channels to get information from the
Exhibition and sometimes just simply repeated verbatim Reuters or The Times
reporting in its pages. Simon Potter’s News and the British World and Chandrika
Kaul’s Reporting the Raj argued that the British news agency and media united the
British dominions and Colonies into a single British press system and formed a
British imperial identity in those colonies. On one hand, I think these arguments
make sense when the SCMP sympathized with the British press including Reuters
and The Times reporting. On the other hand, the SCMP was proud of being part of
the British Empire. Moreover, it announced its standing point of supporting the
Empire and the will of co-prosperity within the Empire.
The SCMP did not avoid reprinting praiseworthy imperial information from the
Reuters telegrams or The Times and Manchester Guardian editorials, demonstrating
admiration for the Royal family and highlighting the importance of the exhibition
itself. Before the King came to Wembley, the SCMP reported there was an audience
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of 150,000 in the Wembley Stadium to listen to his speech. Unfortunately, using the
Reuters exaggerated figures sometimes meant making international mistakes for the
British Empire papers, but it was good for imperial propaganda.15 There were many
fewer than 150,000 in the audience at that time. The SCMP used Reuters to create an
image of representatives of the dominions and colonies being honourably and
proximately arranged to sit at the corner of the Royal Dais largely created an
imagined British Empire.16 Not only did the atmosphere show the grandness of the
ceremony, it also underscored the power and vastness of the British Empire.
The SCMP published some of the other dominion’s comments on the Exhibition,
especially the words of the Australian premier Mr Bruce. In a cable to the Australian
High Commissioner in London, he concluded that “in the spirit that animated and
sustained our fathers, [we should] pledge ourselves by loyalty to the Empire’s
products to build up on a lasting foundation of prosperity for every individual citizen,
a greater and nobler Empire than we have yet known.”17 Mr Bruce’s words showed
his British imperial identity was a combination of loyalty and materialism, and
materialism within the British Empire was a final goal of Australia. The SCMP
agreed with Mr Bruce’s theory and maintained that Hong Kong had been fittingly
represented at the British Empire Exhibition, though not every Hong Kong citizen
could “pop home” just like children of the British Empire, and the British Empire
Exhibition was honoured by the SCMP as the “eighth wonder of the world”. The
SCMP also suggested that the Hong Kong display would undoubtedly be worthy of
the “tout ensemble”, and that this Colony would receive its due reward of publicity
and profit.18 It was hoped that this exhibition would endow the British Empire with
increasingly economic connections and make it increasingly powerful via
coordination and cooperation.
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Shaping the Elite Status Image of Chinese Merchant Leaders
The members of the Hong Kong Section were listed in the newspaper because they
were the most important representatives of the Hong Kong section, and the SCMP
tried to interview them whenever possible. The SCMP used exaggerated rhetoric to
express the popularity of the Hong Kong section, which was “apparently” visited by
tens of thousands of visitors. The SCMP told its readers that Hong Kong “notables”
Mr Chow Shou Son and Mr Sir Robert Ho Tung had been arranged to sit “adjacent to
the Royal dais” while “many other Hongkongites” were arranged to sit in the
Stadium. In addition, the SCMP proudly announced, “Hongkong’s contribution to the
British Empire Exhibition is one of which the Colony may be proud” and “Hongkong
is taking its share also in the many brilliant functions”.19 In the SCMP’s reporting,
Mr Chow Shou Son and Mr Sir Robert Ho Tung “represented Hong Kong at Princess
Mary’s reception”. In reporting this event, Chow was brought to the position of elite
Chinese person in Hong Kong.
Chan Lau Kit-Ching believed that leaders of the Chinese merchants gained their
elite status in British colonial Hong Kong through three channels: first, “directorship
of Tung Wah Hospital (Donghua Yiyuan) and the Po Leung Kuk (Baoliangju),
membership of the District Watch Committee (Tuanfangju), membership of the
District Watch Committee (Tuanfangju) which ‘ranked at the top of the hierarchy of
Chinese societies in terms of its political status, influence and prominence,’ and
appointment as unofficial Justice of the Peace and unofficial member of either the
Legislative Council or Executive Council or both”; second, “the merchants had close
ties with the leading local professionals, lawyers, doctors, accountants, and others”;
third, “the merchants effectively disseminated their views and popularized their
attitudes through the major local Chinese newspapers, prominent among which in the
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1920s and 1930s were the Huazi ribao, Xunhuan ribao, Huaqiao ribao and
Gongshang ribao”.20 While doubting the assertion of the Chinese press as a tool of
the leaders of Chinese merchants to influence the complete Chinese community in
Hong Kong and mainland China, without sophisticated research on the classification
problem of the Chinese readership, I could not simply believe the Chinese press
could influence the elite status of the leaders of Chinese merchants in the eyes of the
British, few of whom read Chinese newspapers. In other words, the Chinese working
class could read Chinese newspapers, but they did not respect the leaders of Chinese
merchants very well during the 1925 Canton and Hong Kong Strike.
Furthermore, the Chinese newspapers in 1920s and 1930s did not report some
important events in which Chinese merchant leaders were involved, such as the
British Empire Exhibition. Instead, reporting on the British Empire Exhibition was
one of the most important reporting works of the SCMP in 1924. While the SCMP
self-claimed the contribution of Hong Kong to the British Empire Exhibition, it did
not, and in fact, it could not, neglect the importance of Chinese merchants in the
British Empire Exhibition. In other words, Hong Kong relied on Chinese merchants
in the Exhibition in the short-term project and in the long term, Chinese merchants
would steer the trade and business in Hong Kong. Thus, it was no wonder that the
prosperity of the Chinese community won their leaders like Chow Shou Son and Ho
Tung the opportunities to meet King George and Princess Mary and enjoyed an
honourable position in the Empire Exhibition. Most importantly, the SCMP reporting
on these events portrayed the image of Chinese merchant leaders being decently
received by the British Royal family, which was an unmatched honour for both
British and Chinese bourgeoisie readers in Hong Kong. The respected status of Chow
Shou Son and Ho Tung was also formed while they could influence other Chinese
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and even British.
The SCMP was inclined to report how the Chinese elites like Chow were involved
in British imperial activities and expected people like Chow to support and praise the
British Empire and its exhibition. In addition, as a colony full of Chinese residents,
the SCMP also exhibited the influence of Chinese elites like Chow to unite Chinese
under a British administration, which met the best interests of the British Empire in
Hong Kong. For example, during the Wembley Exhibition, Chow visited and talked
with the Chinese Students’ Union in Britain, and spoke on the benefits of Western
education, urging the students to persevere and become men able to construct their
country.21 Whether Chow Shou Son wanted to use the SCMP to establish his elite
status in Hong Kong is unknown, but the SCMP did show Chow’s power in
influencing and even moulding the Chinese young students’ ideals and opinions on
receiving a British education, who might work with the British Empire in the future.
In fact, the SCMP had already recognized the elite status of Chow Shou Son and Ho
Tung and even wanted them to influence other Chinese merchants when necessary.
Mr Sir Robert Ho Tung was presented to the SCMP readers as an image of a loyal
and distinguished Chinese business leader through the reporting and interviews in the
SCMP. In fact, Ho Tung showed solid support and loyalty to the British Empire and
the Hong Kong government and held the same stance on the Exhibition as the SCMP.
Before Ho Tung went to the Exhibition, the Hong Kong government required him to
introduce the silkworm business to the British in London.22 Ho Tung fulfilled the
wish of the Hong Kong government and announced to the world that “the Hongkong
section at Wembley, particularly the silkworm exhibit, had been a pronounced
success and was a popular feature of the Exhibition”.23 Ho Tung had been given such
an admirable opportunity to announce the success of the silkworm exhibition to the

136

world, which would favourably impress the Hong Kong governor because of the
success of his entrusted mission.
The SCMP’s exhibition reporting solidified Ho Tung’s reputation as a Chinese
merchant leader and supporter of the exhibition. This was particularly significant in
reporting about a Chinese General Chamber of Commerce meeting at which the
Hong Kong government representative Robert Cotewall announced that Sir Robert
Ho Tung’s contribution of HK$15,000 to the Exhibition insurance fund raised to
guarantee that no merchant would incur losses if they participated in the Exhibition.
Cotewall also said that Ho Tung at the very beginning desired to contribute more
than HK$25,000. Nevertheless, he had been prevented in doing so because Cotewall
thought that more Chinese merchants would contribute if given more time. In fact,
Chinese merchants each contributed around HK$200 or HK$500 to the fund. Ho
Tung was commemorated by the government at a special meeting for his generous
contribution to the Exhibition Insurance Fund. The SCMP recorded Kotewall’s
comment that “this is another act of public-spiritedness and generosity of his which I
am sure the community will not easily forget”.24 While the Hong Kong government
endowed Ho Tung’s reputation and trust, the SCMP audiences also saw Ho Tung as a
prestigious merchant who helped them overcome business difficulties during the
international exhibition. That is to say, Ho Tung, as a Chinese spokesperson and
representative, consolidated his social position and influence through the SCMP’s
reporting about him.
Furthermore, the SCMP also portrayed Sir Robert Ho Tung as a very important
person in British colonial Hong Kong because “he has been approached unofficially
to continue the Hongkong section to 1925”. In particular, the SCMP showed that Ho
Tung held such an important position in Hong Kong because he would “discuss the
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question with the Hong Kong government” and decide whether Hong Kong would
participate in the Wembley Exhibition in 1925.25
Ho Tung’s elite status had been portrayed and shaped in the SCMP, not only
because the SCMP reported his indispensable position in Hong Kong. Ho Tung had
also been reported to have established relationships with distinguished political and
commercial people in London, Lisbon, and Genoa, including the Governor of
Portuguese Macau in London.26 Furthermore, readers of the SCMP would have been
impressed by Ho Tung’s power and influence in China because it was reported that
“Sir Robert Ho Tung hopes that if it is still necessary he will resume his work in
assisting the restoration of peace and establishment of unification in China”, which
would not be “an anti-foreign movement”.27 These kinds of relations were good for
furthering business development, and especially good for his escape to Portuguese
Macau during World War II. Having multiple identities sometimes brought more
advantages, including business opportunities, higher political positions and so on. As
a British subject, he had business partners and opportunities in Europe and the
British Empire; as a Chinese merchant leader, he had investments in mainland China
and government friends. Ho Tung did not see his multiple relationships with the
British Empire, Western nations and China as a conflict of interest because he touted
that the relationship between Western nations and China was peaceful and he would
be an important person in either China or the British Empire. Whether Ho Tung’s
expression was correct or not did not matter; what really mattered was he could
mould the opinions of the SCMP readers, especially the Chinese merchant readers.
For example, now that the most notable Chinese merchant in Hong Kong decided to
go to Wembley again in 1925 because 1924 was a great success, the other Chinese
merchants might want to follow Ho Tung to continue the Wembley Exhibition in
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1925.
The privileged status of Ho Tung and Chow Shou Son not only brought them
respect from the merchants, but also put them into the top of the list of names that the
Hong Kong government could consult with, rely on and communicate with when the
government dealt with Chinese community affairs; for example, whether Hong Kong
should attend the Wembley Exhibition in 1925. The special position of these Chinese
elites also help themselves obtain trust, reputation and business opportunities from
other Chinese merchants.

Mercantile Reporting on the Exhibition
Hong Kong was too small of a place in the British Empire and it was much less
valuable compared to Australia, India and Canada in the British Empire Exhibition.
Nevertheless, the SCMP had already discovered the advantage of Hong Kong as a
trade and shipping centre for the British Empire, China and other parts of the world.
The Empire Exhibition was not only a chance to show the loyalty of Chinese
merchants to the British Empire; most importantly, it was a chance to allow other
dominions and colonies to learn about Hong Kong and bring more and more business
opportunities to better the future of Hong Kong. Thus, the SCMP managed a
passionate mercantile reporting to depict Hong Kong’s bright future to its audiences.
The SCMP frequently used words like “little” and “miniature” to describe the
Empire in Exhibition reporting. This was done in order to imply the vastness of the
Empire: Canada, Australia, India, Hong Kong and scores of other dominions and
colonies, all were now neighbours in Wembley, visitable, at least in a small sense, in
a day. The SCMP readers could realize they were not alone, but belonged to the
British Empire “family”.
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The SCMP highlighted the large number of visitors in its editorials: “The eighty
thousand (the Reuters’ 150,000 was an overestimated figure) people who attended
the opening of the stadium overflowed into the dominions and colonial pavilions,
which often could not be passed though, especially the smaller buildings of the
African colonies and dependencies, Palestine and Hong Kong.”28 The relative size of
Hong Kong in comparison to the other nations in the exhibition at Wembley gave
some SCMP readers and Chinese businesspersons the impression that Hong Kong
belonged to an unexpectedly large empire, making Hong Kong readers of the SCMP
feel proud of the big size of their “big family” or “home”. The SCMP competed with
other media outlets such as radio, but the newspaper’s staff still recorded the King’s
voice in their newspaper from the radio as the British Empire Exhibition opening
ceremony began. 29 The King’s speech was recorded and was sent to radio
broadcasters around the world. This was an innovative method of royal
communication, which showed how modern the British Empire Exhibition was, and
how powerful and advanced the British Empire could be.
The SCMP was very proud of Hong Kong’s position in the British Empire. It
admitted that many of the larger pavilions, such as those from Canada and Australia,
were more popular in 1924, and appeared again at the Exhibition in 1925. In other
words, they had more products and industrial progress than Hong Kong. For
example, they had longer railways and rich natural resources, including woods, grain,
and various mineral deposits. Australia provided mutton, cotton, and bread for the
Empire. While highlighting the importance of other dominions and colonies, the
exhibition as a whole succeeded in lowering the perceived position of power of Hong
Kong both in the British Empire and in the British Empire Exhibition. The SCMP did
not conceal that Hong Kong Chinese entrepreneurs knew they had fewer favourable
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economic conditions in the British Empire Exhibition. However, the SCMP liked to
show Hong Kong as an international trade and shipping centre in the British Empire
and highlighted the important influence of participating in the Empire Exhibition in
long-term return.
The newspaper, however, spun the disappointing event into a success. For
example, the SCMP quoted information from C H P Hay, Secretary of the London
Committee of the Hong Kong section at the British Empire Exhibition, who told the
local committee that the Hong Kong section was decidedly popular. 30 The SCMP
compared the Hong Kong section with other parts of the empire and regarded Hong
Kong as attractive due to the colourful appearance of its architecture.31 Although the
Hong Kong section did not have as many natural resources to display, nevertheless,
the SCMP portrayed an overseas Chinese merchant network in the British Empire,
and the Chinese merchants made up for this lack through hospitality, inviting the
distinguished Chinese to dinner at the Hong Kong Chinese restaurant within the
Hong Kong section.32 They improved the business connections among each other and
these activities were Chinese in their traditional style and good for future business
deals, which was also an expected result of the Exhibition.
The SCMP’s main reports on the Exhibition were focused on economy. However,
the paper did offer a unique opportunity to display some of the British Empire’s
military prowess in front of the SCMP readers. For example, the navy, army, and the
air force had been reported to organize “impressive displays, and many important
aspects of Empire communication, Empire trade, Empire settlement and imperial
economic development”. The air force’s exhibition of models, for example, was later
supplemented by exhibits of actual airplanes and aircraft in an aerodrome. In
particular, there was a British Empire war medals exhibition.33 The SCMP Chinese
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readers might have complex feelings in front of these exhibits: considerable shame,
and embarrassment or subjection for Hong Kong as a ceded colony because they
were nationals defeated by the British Empire. The British Empire Exhibition at
Wembley, therefore, was not simply a trade and economic exhibition; it was also a
proclamation of power to the SCMP Chinese and British readers and showed that the
British Empire still had important and powerful international military influence.
During reporting the 1924 Wembley Exhibition, the SCMP kept close pace with
the British press and echoed its loyalty and pride to be part of the British Empire. For
example, at the end of the British Empire, the SCMP vindicated its position toward
the Exhibition. The most detailed reporting on the Wembley Exhibition in the Empire
was not the SCMP; that would have been a British newspaper such as The Times.
Although The Times was a potential newspaper competitor in Hong Kong, the SCMP
recommended its readers read The Times’ special Exhibition numbers. The SCMP
obviously sympathized with what The Times said and believed its record about the
Exhibition would be “worth preserving for historic reference” and “will be read in
Hongkong with the greatest interest”. The SCMP summarized its reason for such a
recommendation: it was a “worthwhile” and “vast imperial enterprise”.34 The SCMP
believed this was a “beginning of a new epoch in the history of Empire”, just as the
Chairman of the Exhibition Board, Lord Stevenson, said.35 In addition, the SCMP
seemed to prepare for a theory to comfort its readers and the disappointed Chinese
merchants when they finally found out that the Exhibition was a financial failure.
The SCMP’s theory was that even if the Exhibition “had done nothing else”, it
improved the understanding about the united Empire in the imperial people and at
least created an “Empire shop window”. 36 The SCMP believed this could be
considered an “advertisement”, which cost money and would affect Hong Kong in

142

the future.37

The Reporting on the Exhibition of 1925
In July 1924, there were discussions about extending the British Empire Exhibition
to the next year, due to the bad weather and the lack of attendance; the Prince of
Wales supported this movement. 38 The president of the Exhibition administration,
Lord Stevenson, agreed.39 Replying to questions in the House of Commons, Colonial
Secretary Mr. Thomas said that it was too early to expect any definite indications of
an increase in exports in the Crown Colonies pursuant to participation in the Empire
Exhibition.40 At the same time, Chinese businesspeople were not making money at
Wembley and discussing how to cover the loss.41 Nevertheless, thirty-nine exhibitors
at Wembley had been rewarded with the Exhibition Certificates of Honour
(medals).42
At the end of the British Empire Exhibition in 1924, some of the dominions
withdrew from another season in 1925, due largely to the cost. Hong Kong also had
issues with the cost, but the SCMP suggested that there were both advantages and
disadvantages to continuation. In terms of advantages, it could promote the imperial
atmosphere, meet the needs of visitors and advertise the products of Hong Kong
while prolonging Hong Kong’s publicity. The exhibitors could sell products at their
counters. The problem was that the Hong Kong section’s support came mainly from
the government.43 The SCMP advocated joining the 1925 British Empire Exhibition
to support the British Empire, not only to portray an imperial identity within the
colony, but also to maintain further and greater interests for Hong Kong across the
empire.
The SCMP paid much attention to the Chinese merchants’ attitudes toward the
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British Empire Exhibition and wanted to mould a united response on the approval of
attending a Wembley Exhibition in 1925. According to SCMP previous editorials
about the Exhibition, it expected Chinese merchants to participate in the Empire
Exhibition, which had an “advertisement” function. 44 Therefore, the SCMP sent a
reporter to “sound the opinion of different merchants yesterday and obtained some
interesting details bearing on the Exhibition”. The reporter first interviewed the
commissioner of the Hong Kong section, Chow Shou Son. However, Chow
expressed his hesitation to the SCMP.45 Chow paid more attention to the feelings of
the Chinese merchants. He told the SCMP “it was a very difficult question to answer
until the return of the exhibitors. The attitude of the merchants might be swayed by
the reports of their representatives and also the extent of the help from the
Government next year”. 46 Obviously, Chow cared about the realistic benefit of
Chinese merchants other than the invisible and unpredictable business interests
described by the SCMP. Chow’s expression factually represented the other Chinese
merchants’ concerns. In further interviews with more Chinese merchants, other
Chinese merchants expressed similar attitudes to the SCMP and disclosed another
condition for them to go to Wembley again in 1925: there needed to be some
contracts signed before the decision deadline of 1925 Exhibition.47 The SCMP was
very passionate about this important British imperial event in 1924, and reported
some exciting news; for example, some Chinese merchants found out the financial
results were up to expectation and “have sent instructions to their men to arrange for
an extension of their stay in London”.48
Participating in a long-term international event not only consumed time, labour
force and fortune; it was detrimental to the merchant’s original business if they
wasted time in the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1925. Chow showed his
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cautious and responsible image in the SCMP. As a leader of the Chinese merchants in
Hong Kong, Chow did what he should and represented the opinions of Chinese
merchants, which was a “wait and see tone”.
The SCMP did not achieve its goal to get a positive response from Chow and other
Chinese merchants, so it sent the reporter to do an exclusive interview with Robert
Ho Tung and hoped he would express his optimistic and supportive attitude toward
the Exhibition of 1925. As a long-term reader of the SCMP, Ho gave his explicit
reply to the SCMP journalist, “My opinion is that, should resumption of the
Wembley Exhibition in 1925, as has already been done in the case of South Africa,
then Hong Kong should not stand out”. In other words, Ho recommended that Hong
Kong merchants should not boycott the Exhibition, as South Africa had done. Ho
said he had several “good reasons” for his consideration but avoided the fiasco of the
Chinese merchants in the 1924 Exhibition.49 In addition, Ho Tung informed other
Chinese merchants that 1925 might be a good year for the exhibitors because there
would still be visitors to the Hong Kong section. 50 Especially, other Chinese
merchants who did not go to Wembley in 1924 might want to go to the Exhibition in
1925.51 Most importantly, Ho Tung spoke very encouraging words that the SCMP
published:
The main consideration for the Hongkong Government would be one of
expenditure. Personally, from a cursory estimate, I should say that one quarter
or one third of what was spent by Government this year should be sufficient
to cover the expenses for next year, in view of the fact that the buildings are
still intact, these requiring only slight renovation or alteration. Of course, a
great deal of reorganization work on the whole would have to be undertaken
and I am inclined to think that the other commissioners will agree with me in
this respect.52

In fact, neither the Hong Kong government nor Chow Shou Son held a similar
opinion to that of Ho Tung. However, the SCMP provided Ho Tung an opportunity to
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be the opinion leader to influence and even mould the opinions of other Chinese
merchants in Hong Kong. Such a privileged status was rarely enjoyed by general
Chinese merchants in Hong Kong. As for why Ho Tung wanted to use the SCMP to
influence the other Chinese merchants, probably he wanted to maintain a good
relationship with the Hong Kong governor and show his loyalty to the Royal family
in London.
For the 1924 Empire Exhibition reporting, the SCMP had very frequent coverage,
often daily. The SCMP did not worry about the losses of the Chinese merchants;
what the SCMP cared about was the international benefit from the British Empire;
for example, it echoed the Manchester Guardian’s report on Hong Kong:
The official of the Hong Kong pavilion divides the success of their pavilion at
Wembley into two sections. They feel that, first of all, representation at
Wembley has brought them tremendous publicity and that, secondly, it has
had a certain direct influence on the trade of the port.53

Furthermore, the SCMP suggested the Hong Kong exhibitors should reform and
change their products list and should not sell too expensive antiques and ancient
paintings in the Exhibition. In addition, the SCMP continued its view that the
Chinese merchants should not expect to make immediate money from the Exhibition
and should take the Hong Kong section Exhibition as a successful and good
“advertisement.”54
Nevertheless, the Chinese exhibitors had a serious difference about going to the
1925 Wembley Exhibition. For example, Chinese merchant Ho Kwong said that the
object of “introducing to foreigners goods dealt with in Hong Kong had been
achieved”, thus, “there was no need to do so again”. Obviously, Ho did not
understand the advantage of enhancing business development in the British imperial
business network.55 Another merchant, T. N. Chau, felt that “if most of the other
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Colonies are represented next year, except Hong Kong, it will arouse unpleasant
curiosity”. Thus, Chau had taken himself as a British colony subject and would not
disgrace Hong Kong in the Empire. Furthermore, he wanted to place himself as a
member of the British imperial business network.56 Other exhibitors, including Tsu
Woon-man and Wo Siu-kui, wanted to go to Wembley again if the Hong Kong
government would help the exhibitors to the same extent as 1924 season.57 However,
the Chinese official in the Hong Kong government, Robert Kotewall, believed that
“the government would not feel disposed to give the support it had already given to
the exhibitors in view of the report that a good many firms had suffered losses.”58
Kotewell considered financial results as the most important reason for a return to
Wembley. The exhibitor Chu Yeung-so believed that the Exhibition was not very
disappointing, because the Empire Exhibition provided no gainsaying trade
opportunities to Hong Kong.59
The SCMP tried to participate in the Exhibition discussion actively, and criticized
the shortsighted Chinese merchants by saying that “it is a pity that the local
exhibitors have allowed the immediate profits to overshadow their minds.” 60 In
addition, the SCMP showed its strong British imperial sentiments:
In justice, however, it must concede that they cannot be expected to
appreciate the value of advertisement, much less to appreciate the honour and
privilege of a part in an all-Empire show… Were we to canvass our readers,
we feel sure the verdict would be that Hong Kong must represent at whatever
reasonable cost. It remains for the Government to devise a way that will be
least expensive yet worthily represent the colony and at the same time
preserve the intimate sympathy between Hong Kong here and Hong Kong
there.61

After the discussion and editorials in the SCMP, the Hong Kong government
decided to participate in the 1925 British Empire Exhibition, though there was less
immediate reason than ever for the colony to be represented.62 The British Empire
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Exhibition 1925 secured British Empire government backing and its blessing, and
when other colonies and dominions dropped out, it was an opportunity for Hong
Kong to show its loyalty and support to the British Empire. The Hong Kong Chinese
merchants, including Chow Shou Son and Robert Ho Tung, participated in the new
season at Wembley largely to maintain their British imperial identity and support the
British Empire. Chinese “face saving” contributed to this. The size and scope of the
Exhibition meant that despite the Hong Kong section having few contracts and deals,
maintenance of the Hong Kong section at the event was continued in order to
maintain prestige.
Before the British Empire Exhibition, both the Hong Kong government and
Chinese business elites knew that they would not see immediate business prosperity
results from the Exhibition. After the 1924 season of the British Empire Exhibition,
and despite its previous financial losses, the Hong Kong government and Chinese
business elites decided to participate again in the 1925 season. The SCMP’s support
for the British Empire Exhibition did not change much throughout the year, though it
admitted the results were not encouraging. The SCMP supported the Exhibition
because it aimed for a potential long-term benefit from Hong Kong as an
international shipping and trade centre in the British Empire and the Far East.
In encouraging participation in the British Empire Exhibition in 1924-25, the
mercantile motive of the SCMP combined with the leadership of Chinese merchants
to provide Chinese merchants a platform to discuss and share their opinions. Most
importantly, while Chinese newspapers were indifferent to the business opportunity
provided by the Exhibition for the development of Hong Kong and Chinese
merchants, the SCMP shouldered this responsibility and gave Chinese business
leaders chances to mould the opinions of their fellow Chinese merchants in its paper.
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As bellwethers of bourgeoisie readers, Chinese leaders used the SCMP to play an
important role in British colonial consensus building.
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5.

THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR REPORTING

During the period of the 1930s, the SCMP served the British and Chinese
bourgeoisie audiences and thus enjoyed the status of being one of the most influential
newspapers in Hong Kong. The newspaper reported or supported the Chinese in the
Anti-Japanese War unambiguously between 1934 and 1941 and in doing so, its
circulation and income increased. The SCMP management worried that reporting on
Sino-Japanese conflicts would be offensive to British readers, some of whom did not
like the Chinese to attack Japanese residents in Hong Kong. More importantly, they
were concerned that Japanese advertisers might abandon the SCMP and advertise in
other newspapers. However, if the SCMP did not report the Anti-Japanese War
sentiment or how China bravely battled Japan, Chinese readers might abandon the
SCMP, which would be a disaster for the SCMP too. Although Chinese and British
readers had different interests in Hong Kong, which were reflected in the SCMP,
nevertheless, the management finally realized they had to publish Anti-Japanese War
reports if they wanted to make long-term profits. The SCMP Ltd formed almost a
monopoly in the Hong Kong English press. Therefore, Japanese advertisers had to
place their advertisements in the SCMP if they wanted good results. Even if the
Chinese readers boycotted the Japanese advertisements, there were still British and
other foreign readers. The SCMP still had a good advertising value.
Japanese advertisers especially had no better options after the other morning paper,
the Hong Kong Daily Press, became the fortune of the Chinese Nationalist
Government. 1 This acquisition would make the Hong Kong Daily Press a “proBritish and pro-Chinese” newspaper; viz., a newspaper working with the Hong Kong
government and the Chinese Nationalist Government.2 In addition, China Nationalist
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Government General Wu Teh Cheng and Madame Sun Yatsen made former United
Press journalist Israel Epstein an editor of the Hong Kong Daily Press.3 As Madame
Sun Yatsen’s friend and partner in the Chinese Defence League, Israel Epstein later
became the assistant editor at the SCMP because of the unpopularity of the Hong
Kong Daily Press.4 In other words, the SCMP was more popular in Hong Kong.
From 1931 to 1941, the population in Hong Kong doubled because of war in
China. The majority of the immigrants were civilian refugees who had difficulties
making a living in Hong Kong.5 The minority of these immigrants or refugees were
businesspeople and celebrities.6 Those businesspeople and celebrities were similar to
the existing Chinese readers who were bourgeoisie, or the “better class”, as the
SCMP called them. The new Chinese audiences could help the SCMP slightly offset
the decreased circulation in China’s cities lost to the Japanese army.7 Meanwhile, the
thousands of British and other European refugees could bring more potential
audiences and advertisers to the SCMP.8 As a result, the “circulations generally have
shown a steady increase”.9 However, the newspapers were mainly subscribed to by
companies, and “street sales” were “negligible and the figure fell last Sunday to less
than HK$600 ($48USD).10 As previously mentioned, readers of the SCMP usually
owned businesses and permanent residences in Hong Kong, and were considered the
upper class.
There is some conflicted research on Hong Kong newspapers in the 1930s. Li
Gucheng thought there were two periods for Chinese newspapers before the fall of
Hong Kong in 1941. The first period was from the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident
to the fall of Guangzhou. In this period, newspapers in Hong Kong were
conservative, non-political or with amorous content because they were supervised
and suppressed by the Hong Kong government. To a certain extent, the newspapers
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were influenced by pornographic tabloids from the early period of the nationalists’
Republic of China. Therefore, before the fall of Guangzhou in 1938, Hong Kong was
considered by mainland Chinese intellectuals as a cultural desert. After the fall of
Guangzhou, many anti-Japanese newspapers crowded into Hong Kong. Hong Kong
became the base of the Anti-Japanese War. 11 Huo Qichang believed anti-Japanese
reporting was the main theme of the majority of Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong
in 1930s, which also promoted the development of Chinese nationalism in Hong
Kong.

12

It is true some Chinese newspapers run by the China Nationalist

Government and the Communist Party of China were of an anti-Japanese style.
Zhong Yunqing discussed that the anti-Japanese characteristics of the literature and
art supplement (Hong Kong edition) of Ta Kung Pao, a Chinese communist member,
Yang Gang, was responsible for this leftist supplement. In particular, it introduced
Yan’an in literary works, Chinese communist guerrilla and Nationalist Party
governing areas and the thoughts and lives of intellectuals. It also disclosed the ugly
image of the Japanese invasion and occupation in the Hong Kong edition. Hong
Kong Chinese censorship officials sometimes were not alerted about the writings in
the newspaper; sometimes they declined to publish a Chinese patriotic poem.13
However, Wang Xiaolan’s comprehensive research on the anti-Japanese reporting
strategy of the China Nationalist Government pointed out the anti-Japanese
propaganda in Hong Kong was not satisfying. There were still significant media in
Hong Kong supporting Japan until May 1941. In particular, anti-Japanese media of
the China Nationalist Government was still censored. As a result, the China
Nationalist Government sent a memorandum to the British Embassy in China about
this matter. After this incident, the Hong Kong government expressed it would
change its present policy.14 In other words, the China Nationalist Government did not
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have an ideal public sphere in Hong Kong.
Things were much worse in Britain. Two scholars did some context analysis about
reporting on the Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 1930s. Zhang Wei noticed that The
Times provided one piece of news on average daily when the September 18 Incident
of 1931 and the July 7 Incident of 1937 happened. When reporting the first incident,
The Times was not friendly to China and Chinese people, which obviously meant The
Times did not sympathize with China nor did it criticize the Japanese invasion in
China. In reporting the latter incident, initially The Times still argued in favour of
Japan.15 Chen Shuping and Li Zhuping held a similar opinion that The Times was
indifferent toward China when reporting the July 7 Incident, though it changed its
stance to support the Chinese Resistance against the Japanese War after 1938.
However, it was then still not confident about China’s anti-Japanese capability.16 As a
result, in February 1939, a representative of the China Nationalist Government
visited the general manager of The Times to remind The Times not to support Japan
with Japanese news sources and that they should use more China government news
sources. Thereafter, The Times expressed that it would adjust its content as
required.17
There has been no detailed study on the influence of the SCMP in the SinoJapanese War period. While China published international propaganda against the
Japanese in World War II, the SCMP played a pivotal role in Chinese Anti-Japanese
War reporting in Hong Kong, which was the Nationalist Government propaganda
centre in Asia. The Hong Kong government increased its budget of the censorship
department to ensure that Chinese newspapers were not in a position to provoke
Chinese nationalism and riots in their newspapers. The censorship department had a
larger room to accommodate more employees,18 as more people had been employed
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as censors. As a result, the monthly budget for the employees was about
HK$27,000.19 To put it differently, the British feared the Chinese, whose land had
been invaded by one of the imperialist nations: Britain. At that moment, Japan was
another invader in China and threatening to invade Hong Kong. Anti-Japanese and
anti-imperialism newspaper articles made the British Hong Kong government
nervous. Between 1939 and 1940, Hong Kong suffered pressure from Japan.
Mentioning words like “Japanese invasion”, “War Atrocities” publicly in the Chinese
language newspapers was not allowed.20 After Chinese newspapers were asked to
delete the anti-Japanese words and reports, the SCMP still reported such news to
encourage an anti-Japanese spirit. From the perspective of the editor, Henry Ching
thought it was wrong for the Japanese to invade China and slaughter Chinese
civilians. 21 In addition, he thought anti-Japanese reporting could better attract
Chinese readers.22 As a result, he decided that the SCMP should execute an AntiJapanese War reporting policy. From the perspective of the SCMP management, they
worried about the possible detrimental impact of anti-Japanese reporting to the
SCMP, but they chose finally to acquiesce.23
My primary goal in this chapter is to examine why and how the SCMP undertook
anti-Japanese reporting in the 1930s. I will study factors including the SCMP
management and journalists, the involvement of political parties, advertisers and
readers—keeping in mind that the SCMP was free of censorship—and to show that
profit was the most important thing the SCMP management worried about.
The analysis begins with evolution of the SCMP management and journalists’
attitudes and conflicts, which gave rise to the editorial freedom of the SCMP, then
focuses on the audiences’ discussions about the Sino-Japanese War that emerged as
harbingers of improving Chinese bourgeoisie readers’ audience freedom and social
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positions. I conclude by considering how the SCMP’s anti-Japanese reporting
influenced Chinese audiences’ right to know accurate new information, the right to
be respected in the public sphere created by the SCMP, and the right to participate in
Hong Kong colonial consensus building. Simultaneously, as a complicated result, the
SCMP also contributed to anti-Japanese propaganda in the international community.

SCMP Management and Journalists
Cooperating with the SCMP met the best interests of the HSBC during the antiJapanese invasion period. The evidence of this assertion is seen in the paper’s
rejection of one director’s advice. In 1933, a Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC)
and SCMP director argued that anti-Japanese reporting would “do harm to the
company’s newspaper interests” and actions should be taken “to refrain from
inserting any further” anti-Japanese reporting. 24 However, the dual directors in
HSBC and SCMP Ltd., R. G. Shewan and A. L. Shield, did not interfere with antiJapanese reporting after the HSBC formed its position toward the Sino-Japanese war:
to support China against the Japanese.25 The SCMP attempted to retain some longterm Japanese advertisements; at the same time, the SCMP printed Anti-Japanese
War reporting in a big scale.
As the Hong Kong English newspaper with the largest readership, the SCMP
played the most important role in the Anti-Japanese War movement because the
editor, Henry Ching, negotiated with the board chairman, John Scott Harston, on the
issue of Anti-Japanese War reporting. Henry Ching “shared the Chinese sense of
nationalism and their indignation against Japanese aggression”; 26 in addition, he
“stuck to his guns on the ‘Bird’s Eye View’ and resisted pressure by saying that “a
conviction for alleged insubordination and ungentlemanly conduct before I had been
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adequately heard” was “wholly wrong” in the SCMP minute book.27 Ching finally
made Anti-Japanese War reporting the main theme of the news reporting in the
1930s.
Henry Ching was the backbone of the SCMP. In Robin Hutcheon’s SCMP: The
First Eighty Years, Ching was depicted as a man who possessed “Britishness” and
Chinese nationalism. Profoundly influenced by Japanese invasion topics among his
Chinese friends, Ching told the board that Chinese readers paid extremely close
attention to this momentous event.28 The board finally realized its best strategy was
non-interference to the editor’s decision: namely, to enjoy the increased circulation
figure, and accept advertisements from pro-China or China government advertisers,
as well as Japanese advertisements, which had been declined by the Hong Kong
Chinese press and later by the Hong Kong Daily Press.29 As a result, for 1939, the
paper’s net profit increased about 300 percent over that of 1936.30 The increase was
high partly because the profit of 1936 was very low because of economic
depreciation.
The SCMP employed what would now be called a diverse staff. When Violet
Sweet Haven worked for the SCMP in 1940, there were only nineteen men for the
two newspapers—the morning paper SCMP and SCMP’s afternoon paper Hong
Kong Telegraph—and she was the only female journalist in the Hong Kong
newspaper industry. They were two Australians, three Australian-Chinese, six
Englishmen, four English-Eurasians, one Scot, one Chinese, one Indian and one New
Zealander. Half of the editors and the majority of the SCMP staff were Chinese.
Some of the journalists had graduated from Yanjing University.31 Henry Ching, the
editor of the SCMP, played cricket with other Chinese in his spare time. All the close
connections with the Chinese made it understandable that the SCMP’s reports
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positively portrayed Chinese nationhood. The British, Australian, and New Zealander
editors disliked the Japanese invasion and also supported the Chinese people. Their
feelings toward the invasion may have been different, however, from their Chinese
counterparts: they might have been sympathetic toward the plight of the Chinese in
the war, while the Chinese editors were angry.
Reporting the Sino-Japanese disputes was a correct ethical and financial decision
for the SCMP, and this act of showing loyalty to the British Empire was not limited
to publishing anti-Japanese articles. Henry Ching also wrote articles from time to
time on the subjects of St George’s Day, Empire Day, or ANZAC Day with an easy
fluency that came spontaneously from a sense of natural pride and commitment.32
The SCMP raised more than two million HKD for a war fund to purchase airplanes
from the British Empire.33 The most generous donors were Chinese bourgeoisie in
Hong Kong, not the British. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) local office in
Hong Kong received millions of HKD donation from anonymous local people.34 The
Chinese staff of the SCMP also purchased some Kuo Min Tang (KMT) bonds, about
HK$935. 35 The general manager of the SCMP, Benjamin Wylie, received a
commemorative brass plaque from the Minister of Aircraft Production for a generous
donation to the United Kingdom.36
Israel Epstein was not Chinese, but he dared to write articles to criticize the
Japanese invasion. When the Japanese occupied Hong Kong, the British were sent to
an internment camp. Before the fall of Hong Kong, the CCP Hong Kong branch
believed the Japanese would arrest and kill Epstein, who had a Westerner’s face and
wrote lots of anti-Japanese propaganda in a British newspaper. 37 Liao Chengzhi
managed to fabricate Epstein’s death and another communist journalist, Yang Gang,
sent him to a safe house. Although Epstein was arrested later, he finally fled to
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Macau after the Japanese took over Hong Kong in 1941.38 Israel Epstein’s articles
appeared in both the SCMP and China Defence League Correspondence.39 His main
theme was to call for help for the Chinese people to resist the Japanese invasion.

The Involvement of the Political Parties
The SCMP had not been strictly censored before because of the different
censorship policy toward English newspapers. During the 1930s, the China Defence
League and the Nationalist Party (KMT) were trying their best to get financial and
international support from Westerners and overseas Chinese in Hong Kong. An
English newspaper that had a powerful influence and was immune to the censorship
restriction would be helpful for anti-Japanese reporting.
Both the CCP and KMT had connections with the SCMP in the 1930s and 1940s
Anti-Japanese War period. Chiang Kai-shek sent his representative Chen Qiyou to
Hong Kong to meet Tse Tsan Tai, the founder of the SCMP, who still participated in
the business activities of the SCMP.40 The KMT hoped Tse would use his influence
to persuade the SCMP to support the KMT Anti-Japanese War movement. Tse Tsan
Tai said he would help.41 He wrote to Chiang Kai-shek and hoped Chiang could unite
all the parties in China to fight against the Japanese invaders.42 In addition, Tse Tsan
Tai wrote articles for the SCMP, and called on different political powers in China to
unite to fight against the Japanese.43 Tse had a long-term influence on the SCMP,
which was happy to publish his articles. In addition, the Tse family held important
positions in the SCMP. At annual meetings, for example, Tse made proposals and the
SCMP investors accepted them, including employing account auditors and
nominations for directors.44
The SCMP sometimes printed books compiled by the Nationalist Government.
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After Japan invaded China, the SCMP subscriptions in Chinese cities had fallen,
though this was compensated by increasing numbers of readers in Hong Kong who
escaped from the Mainland. Still, the SCMP did not print as many newspapers as
before and the advertisement income dropped too. For example, in 1939, the
advertisement income dropped 22 percent and the newsprint use dropped 18 percent.
Unexpectedly, the SCMP income dropped only 4 percent.45 The explanation was that
the SCMP had new printing orders from the China Defence League and the China
Nationalist Government. When SCMP profits had declined due to the war, it found a
way to stop the profit losses through doing business with anti-Japanese parties.
Between 1938 and 1941, the SCMP printed pamphlets entitled Japanese Trample on
Foreign Rights in China, Sino-Japanese Hostilities in North China, Can China
Win? 46 These pamphlets were edited by the China Information Committee, which
was an international department of the Nationalist government founded for the
purpose of anti-Japanese propaganda. According to Wang Xiaolan’s research, the
Nationalist government decided to found its own media and cooperated with
international media to produce anti-Japanese propaganda beginning in 1937. 47 In
1938, the SCMP started to print pamphlets by the China Information Committee,
probably because of the introduction of Tse Tsan Tai.48 Most importantly, the SCMP
actively took part in cooperating with Chinese resistance against the Japanese
invasion, which called on Hong Kong to support Chinese industry in the war.49
Furthermore, the SCMP printed the publications of the China Defence League, a
powerful anti-Japanese organization in Hong Kong and mainland China chaired by
Madam Soong Ching Ling. The China Defence League Correspondence actually
became a co-publication of the SCMP; SCMP editor Israel Epstein wrote articles for
it and the SCMP printed it. The circulation increased from one thousand to two
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thousand copies per issue worldwide. 50 Reporting differences between the two
publications were not obvious after 1940.
The decision to work for anti-Japanese propaganda publishers brought new
business orders but endangered the lives of SCMP journalists. Epstein was one heroic
example of a SCMP journalist who supported the Anti-Japanese War.

Anti-Japanese Banking Advertisers
The SCMP had long-term banking advertisers in its finance section, including the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Bank of China, the Bank of Canton, and the Bank of
East Asia. All of them were assets or important partners of the Republic of China
government. The HSBC had participated in the Chinese government’s loans and
economic development since the late nineteenth century.

51

The HSBC was

particularly involved in national affairs: “Throughout the 1930s, in keeping with its
long-standing connections with government finance in China, the bank took a
leading part in efforts to stabilise the Chinese national currency”.52
Frank H. H. King studied how the HSBC cooperated with and supported Chinese
governments closely and vigorously. He pointed out that after 1937 the HSBC
changed its policy from “active support for China” to “opposition to Japan”53 other
banks’ influences were slightly less direct. The Bank of Canton was owned by
overseas Chinese reformer and patriot Li Yutang, who funded Sun Yatsen’s
revolutionary activities, the Bank of China and the Bank of Kwangsi (Hong Kong
Branch) were owned by the China Nationalist Government, and the Bank of East
Asia was a Hong Kong Chinese merchant-owned bank. All of these banks targeted
Chinese clients and advertised in the SCMP to attract higher class Chinese to open
accounts and do business with them. The HSBC did not target common Chinese
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clients, thus the Bank of Canton and the Bank of East Asia covered many Chinese
bank account holders in Hong Kong. The Bank of China was located in the building
of the Bank of Canton after 1938,54 and was in close cooperation with the Bank of
East Asia.55 These banks all had clear anti-Japanese attitudes;56 the SCMP had to pay
attention to these advertisers’ reactions when it reported news.

Japanese Advertisements
Chinese newspapers had united activities against the Japanese invasion as early as
1931. That is, all the local Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong had a meeting to
announce their decision to reject all Japanese advertisements and shipping news.57
However, Japanese shipping firms had advertised in the SCMP since its founding. In
1907, an editor published anti-Japanese editorials in the SCMP and Japanese
shipping advertisements were withdrawn by a Chinese agent. As a result, the
journalist had been warned, “Care has always to be exercised so as to avoid if
possible the rendering of any such boycott possible”. 58 As a result, the Japanese
shipping advertisements appeared in the SCMP. They were with the Anti-Japanese
War reporting in the 1930s until Japan took over Hong Kong.59 The explanation is
simple: the SCMP had important advertising value and the Japanese shipping
companies did not want to abandon it. There would be potential clients in the British
and even some Chinese readers. Thus, the SCMP still collaborated with the Japanese
merchants for profit.
Until July 1941, the sole agent of Asahi Beer, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., still
advertised in the SCMP, although few other Japanese commercial advertisements
were printed alongside the SCMP’s anti-Japanese articles. The SCMP criticized the
Japanese invasion but accepted advertisements from a Japanese beer company.
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However, the SCMP Asahi Beer advertisement changed its look; for example, the
picture of the Japanese flag on the Asahi beer bottle disappeared, as did the beer
bottle, and only a glass of beer with an indication of the Asahi brand showed in the
SCMP.60 The SCMP did not like to miss any opportunities to make money, especially
from a long-term client.
The SCMP editors were worried about an invasion by the Japanese. One journalist
recorded, “the Japanese are on the boarder [sic] thirty miles away. If they bomb
Hong Kong it would be wholesale slaughter, and we, sitting here in this newspaper
office, are in the centre of the most densely populated square mile on earth. It would
go up in flames like paper.”61 Placing Japanese advertisements showed the SCMP
management wanted to kept its income stable and benefit from Japanese advertising
income and Chinese reader subscription. In a word, the SCMP management had a
different attitude than the editor, Henry Ching. However, Ching still had a big family
to feed with his salary, which meant he had to work for the SCMP; otherwise, he
could not find such a good job with HK$1400 per month, which was partly from the
Japanese advertisers.62
The SCMP kept Japanese shipping and consumption advertisements while it did
abundant anti-Japanese reporting. In the tough wartime economy, Japanese
advertising income was important for the SCMP and the practice was accepted. For
example, Japanese shipping advertisements occupied 10 percent to 20 percent of the
SCMP shipping advertising columns. However, the remaining advertisers still
expected Chinese readers, who were no less than 30 percent of the SCMP audiences,
and who liked to read Anti-Japanese War reporting, to support them by buying their
products. Furthermore, the British audience, some of whom had businesses in China,
also needed to check the SCMP Anti-Japanese War news. The SCMP was the rare
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medium accepting Japanese advertisements in Hong Kong. Therefore, whatever
Anti-Japanese War reporting the SCMP did, Japanese advertisers had no say in the
cooperation with the SCMP. Thus, the SCMP had no pressure to worry about the
Japanese advertisers and could appeal to Chinese readers with numerous AntiJapanese War reporting.

Readers
The SCMP was not keen on an anti-Japanese reporting at the beginning of the
1930s. As the Chinese in Hong Kong became angrier about the Japanese invasion,
the SCMP brought the facts of the Japanese invasion and anti-Japanese activities to
the attention of Chinese and Westerners in Hong Kong. The SCMP was independent;
reporting the crimes of the Japanese army was also a brave decision because Japan
had a good relationship with Britain. The paper reported boycotts, attacks, and riots
against Japanese in China and Hong Kong. 63 The SCMP also portrayed the
humiliation of the Chinese and their nationalism via many editorials on the KMT
government’s Anti-Japanese War activities and the local Chinese community’s hatred
toward the Japanese. For example, the SCMP reported the half-mast flags on Chinese
Humiliation Day.64 In addition, they also reported the slogans calling for Chinese to
unite to fight against Japanese on the Hong Kong streets.65
The SCMP also cared about its Western readers’ demands for security during the
anti-Japanese riots in turbulent Hong Kong. For example, in 1931 it published a letter
from a reader called “Englishman” who supported the Japanese suppression of
Chinese anti-Japanese movements:
How many right thinking Chinese must bow his head in shame after the
disgusting incidents of the past week-end? A very appropriate “Humiliation
Day” might be held now (they are very good at holding such days it seems).
These events bring us back to the events of the past few years which have
163

been one long string of murders and worse, i.e.,
The Nanking Outrage 1927.
The Hankow incident 1927.
The Tsman affair where again innocent Japanese were
murdered.
The murder of Priests in Hupeh.
The murder of missionaries all over China on different dates.
The affair of JOHN THORBURN which every Briton must
justly feel ashamed of the inability of his own Government to obtain
satisfaction over. The Japanese it seems are the only nation who have the
courage to try and put a stop to all this fool beastliness. I wonder what would
be the reaction if Chinese were murdered by mobs in Britain?
ENGLISHMAN66

The newspaper could select and publish letters from readers, but this case
exhibited that the SCMP still had no exclusive policy to support the Chinese antiJapanese sentiments at that time. In particular, this letter reflected that the British
residents feared Chinese anti-foreign activities and stood with the Japanese army
which invaded China. Overall, the SCMP mistakenly evaluated the potential
influence of this reader’s letter. The SCMP just wanted to represent the needs of
British residents who advocated a safe and stable Hong Kong, and no Chinese rose
up to kill British in uprisings. This tone of calmness was evident upon occasion in
the SCMP. In 1931, the SCMP recriminated against the Chinese community in
editorials indicating the British were intolerant of the anti-Japanese riots in Hong
Kong, and Chinese nationalists were regarded as hooligans:
The air is full of recrimination and the Editor’s box is choked with letters
[from British], all anonymous all indignant, almost all making personal
attacks on this or that official… Let it be stated again also that the attitude of
the Chinese community and its leaders calls for condemnation. The rioting,
looting and killing were, of course, the work of hooligans; but the great
majority of Chinese residents regarded the excesses with complete tolerance,
even amusement and gloating, entirely oblivious to the human suffering and
to the moral and political considerations involved… A taunt in many letters
directed against the Chinese members of Council is of undue timidity; but it
is surely cowardly to abuse them from behind the shelter of assumed names.
We agree that the Chinese members were not effective. A suggestion made in
one letter is that they could easily have broadcast by radio their condemnation
of the riots and their appeals for order. That would probably have been of
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much help to Government; and if the advice did not reach the hooligan
understanding it might at least have brought about a different outlook among
the better classes and saved the Chinese community generally from the heavy
reproach which now lies upon it…Responsible comment we shall publish, but
we shall not print letters which are offensively recriminatory and abusive.
The crisis is too recent to permit any encouragement of verbal brickbats to
add to the damage.67

The permanent policy of the SCMP was to make a profit from the Chinese and
British audiences in a peaceful Hong Kong. From the foresaid editorial, the SCMP
clearly stated its stance: it wanted to be a judge and tool to stabilize Hong Kong
through “a recrimination”. It blamed the Chinese bourgeoisie readers, their leaders,
and even the Chinese community, though it also took a punch at the indignant British
readers for criticizing Chinese leaders. 68 The SCMP respected Chinese readers and
protected them when they were attacked. This showed that the SCMP realized that it
should maintain a peaceful relationship with the Chinese community, especially
Chinese leaders. Irritating Chinese audiences was not in the best interest of the
SCMP.
The SCMP at that time still encouraged people to respect Japanese civilians and
boycott any anti-Japanese activities in Hong Kong. It also wanted to win the trust and
favour of both Chinese and British audiences by its judgement; in other words, it
criticized the Chinese overall, so that British audiences would be satisfied. Similarly,
it reprimanded angry British audiences. Nevertheless, it was not easy to find a
balance at that time between Chinese and British audiences. In particular, in a British
reader letter published in the SCMP, the Japanese invasion was said to be a kind of
“courage”, the Chinese rising had been considered “fool beastliness” and Chinese
were expected to be “murdered”. 69 As a result, Chinese audiences showed their
resentment about the SCMP’s stance. A Chinese named P. Chan sent a protest to the
SCMP the next day:
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Your leading article of this morning calls for a word of protest from the
Chinese community…No doubt, the Chinese members of Council who you
say have been attacked anonymously are equally capable of defending
themselves, should they wish to do so. What seems to me to call for an
answer from me is your remark…I say that you had absolutely no reason for
it…Your sweeping statement was as unfair as it was mischievous…The
Chinese, while being indignant over the high-handed action of the Japanese
in Manchuria, are all for the preservation of good order in the Colony…Your
remark is libellous, and I think that the least you can do is to withdraw it.70

More Chinese readers sent letters to the SCMP to require the SCMP to withdraw
the previous editorials. The SCMP had to clarify that they had never suggested that
the better class Chinese residents approved of the outbreaks, and they regretted if
their comment could be so interpreted.71 Another Chinese claimed that the Germans
were badly treated by the British in the World War I, and he asked the SCMP why it
did not report much on the wholesale massacre of Chinese people in Korea and in
Manchuria while stating the Japanese must not be molested in Hong Kong.72 The
editor of the SCMP explained that local incidents concerned the SCMP more than
external news in the neutral British colony.73
During the anti-Japanese riot in 1931, Chinese leaders did not react, and
condemned Chinese discord immediately. They did not prevent such movements in
time, obviously, because they had their specific concerns, which included
understanding Chinese patriotism and even indignation that they could not speak out
in the public. In other words, silence was a kind of acquiescence. However, British
community leaders were not happy about this and suggested they take further and
effective action. Lieutenant Colonel T. A. Robertson claimed, “A punishment of
HK$5.00 or seven days to an offender seems futile”.74 Members of the “Reform”
Club “proposed, seconded and carried unanimously that arrangements be made to
hold an emergency meeting of the Executive and Legislative Councils” immediately
and to “stand in solemn silence with bowed heads and hands firmly on the Board
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table, for one minute” before the meeting. 75 On the same page, the SCMP also
printed the declaration of the Hong Kong Government that “Sections 7-14 of the
Peace Preservation Ordinance 1886 are in force”, so it was “the citizen’s duty” to
“keep off the streets” because arrests were on the way.76
Under such a pressure, the three Chinese Legislative Council members, Robert
Kotewall, Shou Son Chow and S. Y. Tso, arranged a meeting with the SCMP
reporter. These three Chinese leaders hoped the SCMP would pass some messages to
the Chinese community: firstly, they had already informed the Chinese press of
“condemning the unfortunate incidents of the last few days and advising the Chinese
to observe the law”.77 Secondly, the Chinese leaders did not berate Chinese residents
but criticized “the real agitators generally go unpunished by remaining in the
background”.78 Thirdly, instead of deploring the Japanese victims, Chinese leaders
showed their concern about Chinese residents, hoping Chinese residents would not
suffer from disturbances and agitation. In particular, there were “more Chinese
residents in Japan than there [we]re Japanese living in Hongkong”, so it would not be
wise to continue to injure and kill Japanese. 79 Finally, Chinese leaders told the
SCMP, “Love of country is a virtue we all cherish, but we serve our country best by
pursuing the right course”. 80
In brief, the three Chinese leaders held the same opinion that “the Government
could not have done anything to prevent people from showing their [patriotic]
feelings, provided that nothing was done to disturb the peace of the Colony”. 81
Chinese leaders showed tolerance for Chinese residents and attributed the riots to
unknown agitators even if the police had arrested some Chinese residents had been
arrested. Chinese residents in the eyes of Chinese leaders were not mobs and the
SCMP portrayed an image of responsible and patriotic Chinese leaders. Although
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patriotism in the eyes of Chinese leaders was obeying the law with buried feelings,
nevertheless, it was more progressive than the neutral position of the Hong Kong
government. As a result, their support of the SCMP protected not only Chinese
national esteem but also improved Chinese social position because they tried to build
a consensus that Chinese feelings should be respected though riots were not
accepted.
The SCMP made periodic attempts to report anti-Japanese news. This stance
formed under the pressure of the SCMP Chinese readers. The SCMP had to treat their
Chinese readers with respect because most of them were bourgeoisie. In fact, days
before the Chinese audiences’ protest, the SCMP had already pointed out that the
“Chinese [man] is not so much cowardly as discreet as peace loving: he fights
ferociously when he is sufficiently angered.” 82 However, this was still far from
enough. A stance of “sympathizing with Chinese” should be changed to “antiJapanese invasion” to meet the needs of its Chinese readers. In particular, the change
of the SCMP stance rested with a series of complex and integrated factors of
management, readers, editor, advertisers and political parties, which have been
previously elaborated upon.
While some international newspapers were still uncertain about the nature of SinoJapanese conflicts after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a Chinese reader pointed out
in the SCMP that the SCMP “can be taken to represent the views [of] practically
every thinking Chinese”. Obviously, the audience had such an impression because
the editor of the SCMP was seriously influenced by the Chinese community in Hong
Kong and the SCMP had to report Anti-Japanese War news more frequently.83 In
addition, Chinese readers had been granted the power to criticize the Japanese
invasion and even Western powers that did not help China during the war. In
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particular, the SCMP also became a place where Chinese audiences supported
“Chinese people who have already reached their last limits of endurance” and had
“no alternatives except to meet force with forces in an endeavour to preserve their
existence as a race on the surface of this earth which they have learnt to love and
treasure for more than four thousand years”. 84 Although the SCMP was a British
colony paper, it was bold to publish Chinese audiences’ voices such as labelling
“governments of both Europe and America” as responsible for the invasion of
Japan. 85 Not only had the SCMP achieved its goal of ingratiating itself with the
Chinese audience to make a profit, the SCMP also tried to maintain Chinese
“territorial integrity and national independence in the face of an alien invasion” via
its pages; for example:
Today the Chinese people are united as one man behind the Central
government and are resolved to wage a war of prolonged resistance against
their insatiable invaders who are by far superior to them in modern equipment
of war on three fronts—physical, spiritual and intellectual, while the world
Powers apparently look on and are merely concerned over the evacuation of
their own nationals and the International Settlement and the Concessions…It
is to be hoped, therefore, that all the sane peoples of the world will give
China at least their moral, if not material, support for furthering her noble
mission.86

Furthermore, in its editorials the SCMP showed a solid support to Chinese people
and asserted that Japan would lose the war and the Chinese would win. Such a stance
was much more progressive than British mainstream newspapers such as The Times,
which did not report the Sino-Japanese War in a big scale and showed an indifferent
attitude. By doing so, the SCMP differentiated itself from Western English media,
which at the very beginning, did not understand the nature of the Japanese aggression
and the justice of Chinese resistance, let alone the SCMP’s affinity with Chinese
audiences, which the Western media did not own.
The Japanese invasion unambiguously damaged Hong Kong Chinese merchants’
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normal trade and manufacture. Therefore, Hong Kong Chinese merchants had a
strong anti-Japanese motive. Thus, although the management once hesitated, they
finally acquiesced to the readers regarding the Anti-Japanese War reporting.
Moreover, the SCMP even published a War Edition for a short time after 1937.
Nevertheless, the limited Chinese readers themselves could not support the SCMP’s
new venture and finally it became a failure. This case showed that the SCMP had
been tempted by the profitable combined reporting strategy, viz., attracting Chinese
and British readers. Without the Anti-Japanese War reporting, Chinese readers would
not be happy. However, if the SCMP emphasized the same topic too much, it would
not help get more sales in the British community.87
When Hong Kong was attacked by the Japanese army, Madam Sun Yatsen
published a statement in the SCMP calling on all Chinese to unite to expel the
Japanese.88
In the same day’s SCMP, a Chinese reader named Walter Hanming Chen pointed
out the hypocrisy of Japan’s “sincerity” and “real desire for peace”, and asserted
“Japan will regret this day for the mighty forces of America, Britain and China will
bring about her extermination”.89 The SCMP had no choice but to exhibit a clear
anti-Japanese attitude, whether from the perspective of justice or the perspective of
business.
Chen Junbao, the librarian of the Hong Kong University Library, pointed out that
anti-Japanese reporting was beneficial and the Hong Kong and Guangdong students
would like to use the SCMP to call for support to the mainland Chinese resistance
against the Japanese. 90 In addition, he asserted the SCMP provided detailed and
accurate Anti-Japanese War news, while Chinese newspapers avoided mentioning
some news. 91 In a word, the SCMP was cooperative under demands of Chinese

170

readers and provided a platform for anti-Japanese reporting.
The present analysis of the SCMP news on Sino-Japanese conflicts in the 1930s
revealed the SCMP had the following characteristics in reporting anti-Japanese news.
First, the SCMP retained a freedom of the press policy and reported the truth of the
Japanese invasion of China, even under pressure from the Hong Kong government
and the board of the SCMP in the colony, which remained neutral. Next, although the
SCMP did not like communists for a long time, it still reported the CCP’s
cooperation with the central government of China to fight against the Japanese.
Third, the SCMP criticized the non-interference policy of Western powers from time
to time. Fourth, the SCMP reported events like the boycott against Japanese and
murders of Japanese in a quasi-indifferent tone; in other words, it did not criticize
these kinds of terrorist behaviours, but displayed an attitude of schadenfreude.
Finally, after 1938, the SCMP started to encourage the mainland China anti-Japanese
movement, criticized the Japanese frequently, and wished for the success of the
Chinese in the Anti-Japanese War, though the Chinese suffered failures most of the
time. That is to say, based on the demands and requests of Chinese readers and
various nationalist parties, the SCMP published anti-Japanese reporting.

The Wide Influence of the SCMP anti-Japanese Reporting
The SCMP was the most influential anti-Japanese reporting medium in Hong Kong
though it was considered a very conservative British newspaper.92 The unmatched
position of the SCMP in Anti-Japanese War reporting not only attracted a Chinese
audience, but also increased its popularity worldwide, which was potentially
beneficial for its business. In other words, the SCMP built up a positive public image
of supporting the Anti-Japanese War movement, which helped its branding.
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The SCMP’s influence was not only noticed by the China Defence League and
KMT, political moderates also considered the SCMP’s support in their anti-Japanese
reporting. Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper for Chinese moderates, said in an editorial that
all the Hong Kong English newspapers sympathized with China and the SCMP was
the most powerful. Therefore, the SCMP’s comments had an important influence in
encouraging the anti-Japanese movement and Chinese nationalism in Hong Kong.93
Some of its encouraging editorials were translated elsewhere, and Chinese nationals
were greatly encouraged.
Hong Kong local newspapers like The Industrial & Commercial Daily, Chinese
Mail and Ta Kung Pao reprinted SCMP editorials from time to time. In the reporting
of the Wang Jingwei incident, the American appeasement policy, and in regard to the
notorious Japanese invasion of mainland China, the SCMP was the flagship firing at
Japan and the puppet Wang Jingwei government.94 The Chinese Mail stated that the
SCMP’s editorials encouraged anti-Japanese parties and advocated Chinese
nationalism.95 The effect was magnified by the Hong Kong Chinese newspapers and
mainland Chinese newspapers like the New China Daily. Therefore, in January 1939,
CCP representative Liao Chengzhi said that the SCMP represented powerful British
persons and looked down upon the Chinese Nationalist Party traitor Wang Jingwei
through its editorials. 96 As a result, the SCMP’s reporting of anti-Japanese news
brought it big fame and grew its circulation and advertising business.
Greedy and ugly images of the Japanese appeared in the SCMP and other Chinese
newspapers after 1937. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Japanese invasion
was respectively criticized by the SCMP, whose articles were reprinted in Chinese in
The Industrial & Commercial Daily. The SCMP pointed out that it was illegal for the
Japanese to blockade the China coast; it also decried the uselessness of international
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law and regulations. The Chinese were doing their best to cope with this difficult
situation. This editorial also highlighted that Hong Kong played an important role in
assisting the Anti-Japanese War effort during this period, as long as Japan did not
blockade Hong Kong’s sea transportation. 97 The Industrial & Commercial Daily
considered the SCMP an impartial medium while the SCMP depicted the Japanese as
clowns.98 Furthermore, the SCMP predicted that the Japanese policy of enticing the
Kuo Min Tang to capitulate was unbelievable in the views of the Chinese army and
government. The Industrial & Commercial Daily used the translated SCMP reports
more than a dozen times a year on average between 1938 and 1941. For example, it
would reprint or retell the SCMP editorials that described the British public’s dislike
of the Japanese, the Japanese atrocities in China and the international conflicts
caused by the Japanese. The newspapers told its readers that Japan would regret what
they did to China.99
One SCMP editorial could be reprinted in several Chinese newspapers at the same
time, which would generate a heavy influence on the anti-Japanese movement in
Hong Kong. The SCMP constantly condemned the cruelty and violence of Japanese
air raids, which wounded the British Ambassador and killed Chinese soldiers and
common citizens. The SCMP not only criticized the Japanese; it also criticized the
Western powers that compromised with Japan on the China issue. The SCMP
expressed its position that it would not compromise with Japan.100
The SCMP portrayed a harsh image of the national traitor Wang Jingwei, the
president of the puppet Nanjing Nationalist Government. These reports were
reproduced on a large scale by Hong Kong Chinese newspapers, and the SCMP
pointed out that Nationalist government leader Wang Jingwei had caused serious
damage to China. 101 The SCMP commented that the Chinese Nationals could not
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tolerate Wang Jingwei’s traitorous behaviour and he would be abandoned by his
Chinese friends.102
The SCMP praised the Chinese Anti-Japanese War spirit and encouraged China to
fight Japan to the end. The SCMP claimed that China, as the sole nation to fought
Japan at that moment, would never surrender.103 The SCMP also highlighted its faith
that China would defeat Japan in the end. It reported on Japan’s trouble in China and
the success of the Chinese army.104 Numerous such reports increased nationalism in
Hong Kong and the reproduction of the SCMP anti-Japanese editorials in Chinese
newspapers elevated the position of the SCMP in the Anti-Japanese War reports.
Through cooperation and compromise with social organizations, including
political parties, advertisers, and the SCMP staff, the SCMP became one of the most
important English media outlets that transmitted Sino-Japanese war news to the
international community. At that time, the Nationalist government opened up an antiJapanese propaganda office in Hong Kong and provided war information to English
newspapers in Hong Kong.105 The SCMP valued such a free information source and
cooperated with the Nationalist government. When the SCMP reported Japanese
atrocities in 1937, some newspapers could not believe these stories and accused the
SCMP of fabrication. 106 The effect of the SCMP’s reports on the international
understanding of what was taking place in China was important because there were
many “neutrality” and “isolation” voices in the United States. The New York Times of
that era supported the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and reported Japanese atrocities to
American fortunes in China. 107 Even though President Roosevelt proclaimed,
“Isolation is not protection” to the public, the anti-war attitude in the USA did not
change much.108
Under such circumstances, the SCMP continuously spread important information
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to the world. For example, in a 1938 editorial, it sent a warning to the United States
and Britain that Japan had finally abandoned hope of diplomatic or other assistance
from Great Britain and no longer cared whether she provoked Britain by trespassing
in the Hong Kong area.109 It had important influence in the international media when
some news agencies such as the United Press International focused on Japan instead
of China or Hong Kong after 1938 because the United Press International believed
the Chinese war was in a “strategic stalemate” and spent more of its budget on
reporting about Japan. 110 In other words, Western media reporting on the SinoJapanese War did not target Chinese audiences; Western media need not care about
Chinese concerns when they designed their reporting strategy. Thus, it was no
wonder newspapers such as The Times had much less relevant reporting than the
SCMP, which provided abundant anti-Japanese propaganda and faithful news
reporting.
In conclusion, the SCMP achieved its goal of making money through AntiJapanese War reporting and supporting China when it met its Chinese audience’s
expectations. This was not the original intention of the SCMP Ltd. Nevertheless, the
SCMP’s advertisers, editors and staff pushed the SCMP to stand on the side of the
anti-Japanese camp. Meanwhile, the SCMP enjoyed much external press freedom in
Hong Kong, so it could publish sentimental comments of Chinese readers against the
Japanese invasion and the advice of Chinese leaders to mould Chinese readers’
opinions. As a result, during the anti-Japanese period in the 1930s, the SCMP
improved the freedom of Chinese audiences and shaped the elite status of Chinese
leaders.
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CONCLUSION

The SCMP published a combined reporting style for Chinese and British
communities in its business operation. As a result, the SCMP, on one hand,
represented the British audience interests and safeguarded the privilege of British
colonisers in Hong Kong, and on the other hand, represented the Chinese merchant
audience’s interests, improved their audience freedom and social position, and
provided a channel for the Chinese merchant leaders to mould Chinese audience
opinions and even built consensus in the British Hong Kong. That is to say, the
history of the SCMP closely connected the economic, political and social aspects of
Hong Kong history.
The inception of profit-oriented English newspapers like the SCMP and the Hong
Kong Telegraph which were founded, funded, and operated under the cooperation of
the British and Chinese, took advantage of British cultural identity, British imperial
identity, and Chinese nationalism in its reporting to promote its business. Just as the
SCMP itself claimed, it was a newspaper that represented a wider audience,
including the British and Chinese, for the first time with the title of a ‘modern
newspaper’ in Hong Kong. The Chinese and British audiences had varied identities
and needs, which were respected and met by the SCMP, whose goal was to profit
from its readership and advertising. In doing so, it quickly occupied the Chinese
readership market and gradually encroached on the traditional market of the British
audience, which had previously focused only on the China Mail and the Hong Kong
Daily Press.
The SCMP benefitted from the economic development of Hong Kong. Thus, it
endeavoured to promote Hong Kong’s economy integrated into the business network
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of the British Empire and China. The SCMP assisted in the development of Chinese
enterprises through its advertisements and editorials. It almost perpetually listed the
advertisements of Chinese banks in its pages and was concerned about the business
interests of Hong Kong Chinese merchants. This practice was also applied to the
development of British firms in Hong Kong; for example, the advertising of the
HSBC in the SCMP helped develop the bank into a well-known business, and it
made Hong Kong a potentially international financial centre after 1941. A combined
reporting style in a newspaper also advocated that British and Chinese merchants
together attend the British Empire Exhibition for mutual prosperity in Hong Kong. In
doing so, the SCMP helped make the British and Chinese community wealthy. The
development of the SCMP shows that it became a profit-oriented newspaper, serving
the Chinese and British upper classes in Hong Kong. Thus, it played an important
role in the development of Hong Kong.
Although the British Hong Kong governors and their governments were the
predominant power in Hong Kong, the Chinese also established some institutes like
the Tung Wah Hospital, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and so on, to share the
power in managing the Chinese community. However, the Hong Kong government
deprived the Tung Wah Hospital of power around the turn of the twentieth century.
Thereafter, history witnessed the director of Tung Wah Hospital and the National
Bank of China, Fung Wa Chuen, participated in the founding of the SCMP. The
development of Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie won only pitiful positions in the
Hong Kong Legislative Council and the Hong Kong Executive Council, but they
realized the power of the English press and used it to obtain their social powers
which were insulated from the universal suffrage. The external press freedom and
internal press freedom of the SCMP offered its Chinese audience the freedom to use
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the SCMP as their forum to maintain their interests and position in Hong Kong;
particularly when their fortune, reputation and safety were threatened during social
and political disorders.
The role of the SCMP in some social changes disclosed the nature of Hong Kong
Chinese merchants who showed their rational and conditional nationalist sentiments,
or patriotism, toward China. The SCMP combined reporting style reflected the close
relationship between China and Hong Kong Chinese merchants, who had a stable
identity and compliance toward the Chinese national territory, culture and blood
relationship. Nevertheless, their factual attitudes varied with favourable and
disadvantageous Chinese influence toward Hong Kong. Their Chinese nationalist
sentiments weakened when Chinese social movements damaged their interests, but
they still claimed they had patriotism of their own, or a complex emotion of inability
to avoid the dilemma.
Whether China was insusceptible to the unique factor of the British colonization of
Hong Kong in the first half of twentieth century was uncertain without accurate
economics statics. Nevertheless, sporadic data and cases in critical situations showed
the close relationship between Hong Kong and China. The SCMP benefitted from the
investment and business expansion of its advertisers and audiences in China. Thus,
while highlighting the contribution of Hong Kong at the edge of China in the first
half of twentieth century, the role of the SCMP should not be neglected. More
importantly, the conspicuous propagandising of the SCMP in the 1930s AntiJapanese War period should not be neglected in media history and modern history
studies.

178

Notes:

Introduction
1

Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong. (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2003).
2
John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005).
3
Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong. (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2003).
4
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi 香港人之香港史 1841-1945. (Hong Kong People’s
Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 73.
5
Siu-kai Lau, Zhaojia Liu, Society and Politics in Hong Kong.(Hong Kong: Chinese University Press,
1984), 123-133.
6
Luk, Chi-hung, Collaboration and Conflict: Food Provisioning in Early Colonial Hong Kong.
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Thesis, 2010), 4.
7
Huo Qichang, 霍啓昌, Xianggang yu Jindai Zhongguo 香港與近代中國 (Hong Kong and Modern
China). (Hong Kong: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1992).
8
Elizabeth Sinn, Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press. Modern
Asian Studies (2002), 36, 421-65.
9
Joseph Man Chan, Lee Chin-Chuan, Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press in
China's Orbit. (New York, London: Guilford Press, 1991); Carol P. Lai, Media in Hong Kong: Press
Freedom and Political Change, 1967-2005. (London; New York: Routledge, 2007).
10
Huang Zhenquan, 黃振權, Xianggang yu Qingji Yangwu Jianshe yundong zhi Guanxi 香港與淸季
洋務建設運動之關係(The Relationship between Hong Kong and Westernization Movement in Qing
Dynasty).(Hong Kong: Zhuhai Shuyuan Zhongguo Wenxue Lishi Yanjiusuo, 1980).
11
Huo Qichang, 霍啓昌, Xianggang yu Jindai Zhongguo 香港與近代中國 (Hong Kong and Modern
China). (Hong Kong: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1992).
12
Cindy Yik-yi, Chu, Chinese communists and Hong Kong capitalists: 1937-1997. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
13
Yu Shengwu, Liu Shuyong (ed.), 余繩武, 劉蜀永主編, Ershi Shiji de Xianggang 20 世紀的香港,
（Twentieth Century Hong Kong).(Hong Kong: Qilin Shuye, 1995 ).
14
Yu Shengwu, Liu Cunkuan (ed.), 余繩武, 劉存寬主編, Shijiu Shiji de Xianggang 十九世紀的香港
(Hong Kong in Nineteenth Century). (Hong Kong: Qilin Shuye, 1993); Yuan Bangjian 元邦建,
"Xianggang Gongren Yundong Lishi de Jige Tedian 香 港 工 人 運 動 歷 史 的 幾 個 特 點 "(The
Characteristics of Hong Kong Working Class Movement History), Jindaishi yanjiu, 近代史研究
(Modern Chinese History Studies) 1(1989):176.
15
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi 1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 63-66.
16
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi 1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 75.
17
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi 1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 56.
18
Carol P. Lai, Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change, 1967-2005. (London;
New York: Routledge, 2007).
19
“For the Best and the Most, Read Today’s Morning Post”, South China Morning Post, 18 March
1933, 4; Hong Kong Telegraph, the evening paper of the SCMP Ltd also “ahead of its rival, the China
Mail, in both circulation and advertising”, cited in Robin Hutcheon’s SCMP: The First Eighty Years.
(Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 81.
20
Elizabeth Sinn, Index to CO 129 (1842-1951), Great Britain. Colonial Office, Original
Correspondence: Hong Kong.
21
“Mr. Franklin’s Memorandum, Re: the Report of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn’s Divorce, As appearing
in ‘The Hong Kong Telegraph’ on January 14, 1939”, SCMP ltd Minute Book, Vol. K, 180-90.
22
"Motion", Hong Kong Sessional Paper, 26 August 1936.
23
Xianggang Huashang Zonghui Yuekan, February 1936, 20.
24
J.J. Hall, “Correspondent Wanted”, SCMP, 22 February 1935.
179

25

Tse Tsan Tai to Ben. Wylie, SCMP Ltd. Minute Book, Vol. K, 4 March 1937.
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 55.
27
Frank H. H. King, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911. (Cambridge, Mass.:
East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965), 71.
28
W. H. Donald, ‘The Press’, in Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright (ed.), Twentieth Century
Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China: Their History, People,
Commerce, Industries, and Resources. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908),
352.
29
‘Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited’, Hong Kong Daily Press, 31 December,
1908, 2.
30
Walter Williams, The Press Congress of the World in Hawaii. (Columbia, MO: E.W. Stephens Pub.,
1922), 430-431.
31
Walter Williams, The Press Congress of the World in Hawaii. (Columbia, MO: E.W. Stephens Pub.,
1922), 430-433, 14, 33.
32
“News Value”, SCMP, 5 March 1930, 10.
33
SCMP Limited Minute book, Volume K, 5 June 1936.
34
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 14.
35
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 12.
36
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 21-25.
37
SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume G, inside cover.
38
“National Bank of China”, SCMP, January 8, 1904, 3.
39
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 62, 66.
40
Hu Daojing 胡道靜, Shanghai Xinwen Shiye zhizhongde Fazhan 上海新聞事業之中的發展 (The
Development of Shanghai Journalism). (Shanghai: Shanghaishi Tongzhiguan, 1935), 1.
41
“Ordinance passed and assented to: Emergency Regulations, No. 5 of 1922”, GA 1922 no.102,
HKGRO; Censorship on English press placards or display-sheets” GA 1939 no.622, HKGRO.
42
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 72.
43
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 26.
44
Tse Tsan Tai, Personal [information] in the Papers of George Ernest Morrison Collection, 18721911, 157-165, New South Wales State Library.
45
Wang Gengwu, 王 賡 武 , Xianggangshi Xinbian 香 港 史 新 編 (Hong Kong History: New
Perspectives). (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian (xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1997), 493-531.
46
Wang Gengwu, 王 賡 武 , Xianggangshi Xinbian 香 港 史 新 編 (Hong Kong History: New
Perspectives). (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian (xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1997), 496.
47
Li Gucheng, Xianggang Zhongwen Baoye Fazhanshi. (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2005).
48
Zhou Jiarong 周佳榮, Zhong Baoxian 鍾寶賢, Huang Wenjiang 黃文江, Xianggang Zhonghua
Zongshanghui Bainianshi 香港中華總商會百年史(The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce 100
Years History). (Hong Kong: The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, 2002).
49
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 72.
50
Wang Gengwu 王 賡 武 , Xianggangshi Xinbian 香 港 史 新 編 (Hong Kong History: New
perspectives). (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian (xianggang) youxian gongsi, 1997), 512
51
John Y. Wong, 黃宇和, Sanshisui Qian de Sun Zhongshan: Cuiheng Tandao Xianggang, 18661895 三十歲前的孫中山: 翠亨、檀島、香港, 1866-1895. (Sun Yatsen before his Thirties: Cuiheng,
Hawaii, Hong Kong, 1866-1895). (Hong Kong: China Publishing House, 2011), 563.
52
Lam Man Sum, Hong Kong and China’s Reform and Revolutionary Movements: An Analytical
Study of The Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers , Master Thesis of Hong Kong
University,1984
26

180

53

Lam Man Sum, Hong Kong and China’s Reform and Revolutionary Movements: An Analytical
Study of The Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers, Master Thesis of Hong Kong
University, 1984, 349.
54
Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha hen; Honkon Senryōchi Sōtokubu Hōdōbu kanshū, 東洋經濟新報社編; 香
港占領地總督部報道部監修.Gunseika no Honkon : shinseisita Dai Tōa no chūkaku 軍政下の香港 :
新 生 し た 大 東 亞 の 中 核 (Military Administration of Hong Kong). (Hong Kong: Honkon
TōyōKeizaisha), 1944.
55
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 73.
56
Zou Yizheng, The Revolutionary Propaganda Pioneer Tse Tsan Tai. Taiwan: The Journal of
Biographical Literature. 2010 (4), 70-82.
57
Tse Tsan Tai to C.C. Greenway, in the Greenway Family Papers (1817-1903), CY Reel 271, 9th
November 1903, p. 321
58
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 6.
59
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 73.
60
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 12.
61
James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power without responsibility: press, broadcasting and the internet
in Britain. (London: Routledge, 2010), 11-2.
62
Jean K. Chalaby, The Invention of Journalism. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).
63
SCMP, 1903-1941.
64
SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume G, December 22, 1923.
65
Michael Schudson, “Toward a Troubleshooting Manual for Journalism History”, J&MC Quarterly,
Vol. 74, No.3 Autumn 1997, 463-76.
66
Edward Herman, Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002).
67
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, June 5th 1936.
68
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 67.
69
C.M. Turnbull, Dateline Singapore: 150 Years of the Straits Times. (Singapore: Singapore Press
Holdings, 1995), 385.
70
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 27.
71
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 27.
72
Herbert Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
73
Henry Ching Jr., Personal Communication, March 04 2013;
74
Hu Daojing 胡道靜, Shanghai Xinwen Shiye zhizhongde Fazhan 上海新聞事業之中的發展 (The
Development of Shanghai Journalism). (Shanghai: Shanghaishi Tongzhiguan, 1935), 1.
75
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 11.
76
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 12.
77
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press. December 31,
1908, 2.
78
Zhang Li 张丽,“Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Xianggang de Neidi Nanmin Wenti 抗日战争时期香港
的 内 地 难 民 问 题 ” (The Refugee Issue in the Anti-Japanese War period Hong Kong), Kangri
Zhanzheng Yanjiu 抗日战争研究 (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War against Japan) 4
(1994):132-141.
79
John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005), 5, 13
80
Noam Chomsky, “What makes mainstream media mainstream.” Z magazine 10.10 (1997): 17-23.
181

81

John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005), 13.
82
Carl Smith, “The Emergence of a Chinese Elite in Hong Kong”, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 11, 1971, 74-115.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005).
86
Fung Chi Ming, Governorships of Lugard and May: Fears of Double Allegiance and Perceived
Disloyalty in Lee Pui-tak (ed.) Colonial Hong Kong and modern China: interaction and reintegration.
(Hong Kong : Hong Kong University Press,2005),87.
87
Law Wing Sang, Collaborative Colonial Power - The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese. (Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 28.
88
Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tao and Reform in Late Chʻing China.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University: Distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1987).
89
Hu Daojing 胡道靜, Shanghai Xinwen Shiye zhizhong de Fazhan 上海新聞事業之中的發展(The
Development of Shanghai Journalism). (Shanghai: Shanghaishi Tongzhiguan, 1935), 69.
90
Lai Guangjian, 賴光監, Zhongguo Xinwen Chuanboshi 中國新聞傳播史(The Chinese History of
News and Communication). (Taibei: San Min Shuju, 1978), 49.
91
Ge Gongzhen, 戈公振, Zhongguo Baoxueshi 中國報學史(China Newspaper History). (Beijing:
Zhongguo Xinwen Chubanshe, 1985), 92.
92
Zheng Guanying, 鄭觀應, Shengshi Weiyan 盛世危言（Warning at Prosperous Time）, quoted
in Ge Gongzhen, 戈公振, Zhongguo Baoxueshi, 中國報學史 (China Newspaper History). (Beijing:
Zhongguo Xinwen Chubanshe, 1985), 86.
93
Zheng Guanying, 鄭觀應, Shengshi Weiyan 盛世危言（Warning at Prosperous Time）, quoted
in Ge Gongzhen, 戈公振, Zhongguo Baoxueshi, 中國報學史 (China Newspaper History). (Beijing:
Zhongguo Xinwen Chubanshe, 1985), 86.
94
Yong Z. Volz and Chin-Chuan Lee, “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence:
British-American Press Competition in Early Twentieth-Century China,” Journalism Studies 12 (5)
2011; Zhou Jiarong 周佳榮, Jindai Riren Zaihua Baoye Huodong 近代日人在華報業活動(Japanese
Newspaper Activities in Modern China). (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian (Xianggang) Youxian Gongsi,
2007).
95
Elizabeth Sinn, Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press.
Modern Asian Studies (2002), 36, 421-65.
96
Elizabeth Sinn, Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press.
Modern Asian Studies (2002), 36, 421-65.
97
John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005).
98
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press. December 31,
1908.
99
‘Seditious Publications Ordinance, 1914’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, accessed August
27, 2012, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/1282.
100
“Printers and Publishers Ordinance, 1927”, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, accessed
September 29, 2013, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/1603.
101
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 12.
102
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press. December 31,
1908, 2.
103
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983),
76.
104
E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality. (Cambridge
[England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.
105
E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. (Cambridge
[England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.
106
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections On The Origin And Spread Of
Nationalism. (London; New York: Verso, 1991), 58.
107
Carlton Hayes, Essays on Nationalism. (New York: The MacMillan, 1933), 56.

182

108

Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background. (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1944),15.
109
Daniel Dayan, and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9.
110
Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain.
([England]; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 311.
111
Kelby K. Halone, “The Institutional (ized) Nature of Identity in and Around Sport(s).” In
Examining Identity in Sports Media, edited by Heather L. Hundley and Andrew C. Billings. (Los
Angeles: Sage, 2010), 239–59.
112
Robert L. Stevenson, Global Communication in the Twenty-first Century, (New York: Longman,
1994), 120-121.
113
_____, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved Jan 1 2014, from
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng.
114
“Censorship Regulations”, 1917 GA 1917 no.112; “Emergency Regulations Ord., 1922, Censorship on English press placards or display-sheets” GA 1939 no.622, HKGRO.
115
Joseph Man Chan, Lee Chin-Chuan, Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press
in China's Orbit. (New York, London: Guilford Press, 1991).
116
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 66.
117
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 69.
118
Political and Economic Planning, Report on the British press, a survey of its current operations
and problems with special reference to national newspapers and their part in public affairs. (London:
PEP, 1938), 53.
119
Alfred Cunningham, To-day in Egypt: its Administration, People and Politics. (London: Hurst &
Blackett, 1912), 237-8.
120
Ibid.
121
Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: the British Press and India, c. 1880-1922. (Manchester; New
York: Manchester University Press: Distributed exclusively in the U.S.A. by Palgrave, 2003).
122
Lam Man Sum, Hong Kong and China’s Reform and Revolutionary Movements: An Analytical
Study of The Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers. Master Thesis of Hong Kong
University, 1984, 43.
123
“One Man’s Opinion”, SCMP, 6 August 1932, 9.

1. The Formation of the South China Morning Post Combined Reporting Strategy
1

W. H. Donald, “The Press”, in Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Other
Treaty Ports of China : Their History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources, edited by
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 352.
2
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP：The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983),
16.
3
Ibid, 44.
4
Ibid, 53.
5
Ibid, 71.
6
Ibid, 76.
7
SCMP Ltd Minute Book Volume K, 15 December 1938, 173.
8
Interview with Robin Hutcheon, 14 February, 2011, Sydney, Australia.
9
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983),
12-3; I also checked the SCMP 1903-1906 correspondence columns.
10
SCMP Limited Minute book, Volume K, 5 June 1936.
11
Douglas Story, To-morrow in the East. (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1907), 50
12
Douglas Story, To-morrow in the East. (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1907), 199.
13
Interview with Robin Hutcheon, 14 February 2011.
14
SCMP Minute Book Volume K, 15 December 1938, 173.
15
SCMP 22 September 1936, 16.
16
Li Jinwei (ed.), 黎晉偉, Xianggang Bainianshi 香港百年史 (One Hundred Years of History of
Hong Kong). (Hong Kong: Nanzhong Fanyi Chubanshe, 1948), 128.

183

17

“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”. Hong Kong Daily Press. 31 December,
1908, 2.
18
Robin Hutcheon to ZOU Yizheng, Personal Communication, 6 August 2012
19
Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist (Jianzheng Zhongguo, Aipositan
Huiyilu), (Beijing: Xinshijie Chubanshe, 2004), 124.
20
A. CHINAMAN “C.”, “Cost of Living”, SCMP, 4 June 1928.
21
Chen Junbao, The Diary of Chen Junbao. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1999). Vol.1. 131,
341, 422, 441, 510.
22
Chen Junbao, The Diary of Chen Junbao. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1999). Vol. 1, IV.
23
____, “Another Case”, SCMP, 15 December 1938, 8; Another Ph.D., “Voice of Another Returned
Student”, SCMP, 15 December 1938, 8.
24
Li Jinwei (ed.), 黎晉偉, Xianggang Bainianshi 香港百年史 (One Hundred Years of History of
Hong Kong). (Hong Kong: Nanzhong Fanyi Chubanshe, 1948), 120.
25
C.Y.C., “Chinese Officials”, SCMP, May 3, 1938, 9.
26
Chen Junbao, the Diary of Chen Junbao. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1999). Vol.1., 375,
27
Chen Junbao, the Diary of Chen Junbao. (Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1999). Vol.1, 3.
28
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 31 December,
1908, 2; Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 77; Henry
Ching Jr. Personal Communication, 4 March 2013.
29
He Xingfeng and Zhang Yongmei on 22 October 2004, from Huaqiao Ribao Fukan Yanjiu 《華僑
日報》副刊研究資料冊 published in 2006)
30
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd. 1983), 12.
31
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press), 1965, 27.
32
Director of Public Work Office to the Colonial Secretary, March 12, 1905. in the document of
Kiosk On Blake Pier - The Manager Of The South China Morning Post Asks for Erection Of A - For
The Purpose of Selling Books, Newspapers, etc. HKRS58-1-27-30. Hong Kong Public Records Office.
33
Director of Public Work Office to the South China Morning Post, October 28, 1929. in the
document of Kiosk On Blake Pier - The Manager Of The South China Morning Post Asks for
Erection Of A - For The Purpose of Selling Books, Newspapers, etc. HKRS58-1-27-30. Hong Kong
Public Records Office.
34
Tse Tsan Tai to C.C. Greenway, in the Greenway Family Papers (1817-1903), CY Reel 271, 321, 9
November 1903.
35
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 12.
36
W. H. Donald, “The Press”, in Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright (ed.), Twentieth Century
Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and other Treaty Ports of China: Their History, People,
Commerce, Industries, and Resources. (London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908),
171.
37
Greenway Family Papers, CYA1451, 333-35, in the State Library of New South Wales Library.
38
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright , Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 171.
39
Tse Tsan Tai to Ben. Wylie, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 4 March 1937.
40
American University Club of Shanghai, American University Men in China. (Shanghai, The
Comacrib Press, 1936), 134.
41
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 31 December
1908, 2.
42
R.T. Walker, “The Noble story. (Joseph Whittlesey Noble)”, British Dental Journal, 1984, Vol.157.
43
Ibid.
44
R. T. Walker to Linda F. Smith, May 7, 1987. Cumberland County Historical Society Library,
reference No.F-N747W; Photo of Dr. Noble, China Light and Power Company: Dr. J.W. Noble
(Member of Consulting Committee, 1903-1912). Source: China Light & Power Company Limited.
Ref. (67) - (68) in PRO 32/3 II.
45
Jonas E. Warrell, “Brief Biography of Joseph Whittlesey Noble”, Cumberland County Historical
Society Library Document, Pennsylvania, USA, 1969, 2.
46
Lin Quan, The First Taiwan Compatriots’ Enterprise in Beijing, the Journal of Beijing Observation,
Oct 2002.
47
Ibid.
184

48

“Green Island Cement Co., Ltd”, SCMP, 5 April 1911.
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 35
50
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 46.
51
“Fate Botched up Will Which Left Millions”, Waterloo Daily Courier, 26 March 1950, 35.
52
Interview with Hellen Franklin, 14 Feburary 2011, Sydney, Australia.
53
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai, and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 173.
54
Tse Tsan Tai, The Chinese Republic Secret History of the Revolution. (Hong Kong: South China
Morning Post Ltd, 1924), 23.
55
“To H.E. Major General G. M. Maltly, M.C. August 16th, 1941”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume
L.
56
Henry Ching Jr. Personal Communication, January 18, 2011.
57
Robin Hutcheon, Personal Communication, December 19, 2009.
58
Zou Daofen, Jingli 經歷 (Experience). (Chongqing: Shenghuo Shudian, 1938), 272.
59
“Editorial: Comment on South China Morning Post”, Ta Kung Pao, August 19th, 1938, 2.
60
Henry Ching Jr. Personal Communication, January 18, 2011;
61
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 77; Henry Ching Jr. Personal Communication, 4 March 2013.
62
“List of shareholders”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume G.
63
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 44-5.
64
“High cost of Living Allowance”, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume L.
65
Ibid.
66
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 38
67
SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K.
68
“SCMP Limited Chinese Employees’ Benevolent Schemes, Outline of General Benefits”. SCMP
Ltd Minute Book, Volume L.
69
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume L, 19 December 1939, 5.
70
“High cost of Living Allowance”, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume L.
71
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1983), 71.
72
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai, and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 213.
73
See SCMP front pages, 1903-1925.
74
“List of Shareholders”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume G.
75
“Shewan Tomes & Co., Ltd., to SCMP Ltd.”, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 16 June
1939.
76
Newsprint Data of the SCMP from 1931 to 1939, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K.
77
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-Kong, Shanghai, and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 173.
78
Nigel Cameron, Power, the story of China light. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1982), 17.
79
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai, and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 213.
80
Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong-kong, Shanghai, and
other Treaty Ports of China. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain publishing co., ltd., 1908), 620.
81
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years, Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 12.
82
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years, Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 25.
83
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years, Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 21.
84
Government Notification, No.339, quoted in the Hong Kong Government Gazette, 6 May 1904,
831.(HKGRO)
85
“The National Bank of China”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 9 April 1891, no page number.
86
“The National Bank of China”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 9 April 1891, no page number.
87
Ibid.
49

88

“National Bank of China”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 22 September 1892, no page number.
“The National Bank of China, Limited”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 31 August 1891, no page
number.

89

185

90

Ellis Kadoorie, “National Bank of China, Limited, Notice to Creditors”, Hong Kong Government
Gazette, GA 1911 (suppl), Advertisement, No page number.
91
“The National Bank of China”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 6 October 1892, no page number.
92
SCMP, 8 January 1904, 3.
93
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 278.
94
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 279.
95
HSBC
Holdings
plc,
The
HSBC
Group:
a
Brief
History,
quoted
in
http://www.hsbc.com.hk/1/PA_esf-ca-app-content/content/about/about-hsbc/hsbc-shistory/pdf/brief_history_apr10.pdf.
96
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 358.
97
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
98
“Mr. Franklin’s Memorandum, Re: the Report of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn’s Divorce, as appearing
in ’The Hong Kong Telegraph’ on 14 January, 1939”, in the SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 18090.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
101
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 6 February 1939.
102
“Grayburn to Wylie”, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 9 February 1939.
103
“Wylie to HSBC”, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 3 March 1939.
104
“Mr. Franklin’s Memorandum, Re: the Report of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn’s Divorce, as appearing
in ‘’The Hong Kong Telegraph’ on January 14, 1939”, in the SCMP Ltd Minute Book K, 180-90.
105
Wylie to HSBC, SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 3 March 1939.
106
“The Bank’s Review”, SCMP, 26 February 1912, 6.
107
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 69.
108
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 69.
109
See the SCMP 1930s.
110
Yao Songling, 姚崧齡, Zhonghang fuwu ji 中行服務記 (The Service Record in the Bank of China).
(Taibei: Biographical Literature Press, 1968), 31
111
Elizebeth Sinn, 冼玉儀, Yu Xianggang Bingjian Maijin: Dongya Yinhang 1919-1994 與香港並肩
邁進 : 東亞銀行 1919-1994 (Walk with Hong Kong: Bank of East Asia 1919-1994). (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 1994), 49-50.
112
Huazi Ribao (華字日報 Overseas Chinese Daily), March 12 1939; Zhongguo Yinhang Zonghang,
Zhongguo Di’er Lishi Dang’an’guan, 中國銀行總行, 中國第二歷史檔案館合編, Zhongguo Yinhang
Hangshi Ziliao Huibian 1912-1949 中國銀行行史資料匯編 1912-1949 (Records of the Central
Office of the Bank of China 1912-1949). (Beijing: Beijing Dang’an Chubanshe, 1991), 1586-7.
113
F.P. Franklin to B. Wylie, SCMP Limited Minute book, Volume K, 1 June 1936.
114
Franklin to the Board, SCMP Limited Minute book Volume K, 12 October 1939.
115
F.P. Franklin to Harston/ I.W. Shewan, SCMP Limited Minute Book Volume K, 26 May 1939.
116
SCMP Limited Minute book Volume K, 30 May 1939.
117
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 38.
118
“K. Selby-Walker to the SCMP and Hong Kong Telegraph”, SCMP Limited Minute book Volume
K, 21 June 1939.
119
“The China Mail and the Sunday Herald to Sir Roderick Jones”, SCMP Limited Minute book,
Volume K, 24 June 1939.
120
“Censorship of Native Press”, SCMP, 5 February 1931.
121
“One Man’s Opinion”, SCMP, 6 August 1932, 9.
122
“News Value”, SCMP, March 5, 1930, 10.
123
Frank H. H. King, Prescott Clarke, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
(Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, distributed by Harvard
University Press, 1965), 64.
124
“Chinese Publisher Charged”, SCMP, 25 June 1919, 11.
125
“Censorship Regulations”, 1917 GA 1917 no.112; “Emergency Regulations Ord., 1922, Censorship on English press placards or display-sheets” GA 1939 no.622, HKGRO.
186

126

“Ordinance passed and assented to: Emergency Regulations, No. 5 of 1922”, GA 1922 no.102,
HKGRO.
127
Li Jinwei (ed.), 黎晉偉, Xianggang Bainianshi 香港百年史, (One Hundred Years of History of
Hong Kong). (Hong Kong: Nanzhong Fanyi Chubanshe, 1948), 173.
128
“Motion”, Hong Kong Sessional Paper, 26 August 1936.
129
“Motion”, Hong Kong Sessional Paper, 26 August 1936.
130
“Motion”, Hong Kong Sessional Paper, 26 August 1936.
131
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume G.
132
Interview Helen Franklin, Daughter of F.P. Franklin, 14 February 2011, Sydney, Australia.
133
CO 129/500/1, Letter from B. Wylie to Sir Cecil Clementi, 13 May 1927, 139-40.
134
Henry Ching Jr., Personal Communication, January 18 2011; Robin Hutcheon, Personal
Communication, 19 December 2009.
135
“To What Purpose”, SCMP, June 24 1925, 4.

2. The “Modern Newspaper” Competed with Empire “Ambassadors”: Reporting on China
1

“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong, SCMP Ltd, 1983), 14
3
“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
4
“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
5
“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
6
“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
7
Hu Daojing, Baotan Yihua, 24. Frank H. H. King, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers,
1822-1911, 58-71.
8
“Sunday Journalism”, SCMP, 6 November 1903, 4.
9
Frank H. H. King, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911, 71.
10
Frank H. H. King, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911, 71.
11
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd. 1983), 55.
12
Frank H. H. King, A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911, 71.
13
Paul French, Through the Looking Glass: China's Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao.
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 84.
14
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 53.
15
H Guard to General Manager of the SCMP, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, July 10, 1939.
16
W. H. Donald, ‘The Press’, in Arnold Wright, H.A. Cartwright (ed.) Twentieth Century Impressions
of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and other treaty ports of China : Their History, People, Commerce,
Industries, and Resources. (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing co., ltd., 1908), 352.
17
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd. 1983), 12.
18
Director of Public Work Office to the Colonial Secretary, 12 March 1905. in the document of Kiosk
On Blake Pier - The Manager of The South China Morning Post Asks for Erection of A - For The
Purpose of Selling Books, Newspapers, etc. HKRS58-1-27-30. Hong Kong Public Records Office.
19
Director of Public Work Office to the South China Morning Post, 28 October 1929. in the
document of Kiosk On Blake Pier - The Manager Of The South China Morning Post Asks for
Erection Of A - For The Purpose of Selling Books, Newspapers, etc. HKRS58-1-27-30. Hong Kong
Public Records Office.
20
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, China Mail, 15 December 1909, 4.
21
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 31 December,
1908, 2.
22
“Company Meeting: ‘South China Morning Post’ Limited”, China Mail, 15 December 1908, 4.
23
The No.15 Ordinance, Hong Kong Legislative Council, 11 October 1907.
24
Chen Ming, ‘Xianggang Baoye Shigao’ (The History of Hong Kong Newspaper). (Hong Kong:
Huaguang Newspaper Ltd), 2005, 132-3.
25
Editorial, SCMP, September 18, 1906, 6.
26
“Reforms in China”, SCMP, 9 September 1908, 6.
27
“China is Now Awake”, SCMP, 20 June 1905.
28
“Editorial Article”, SCMP, 30 June 1905, 6.
29
“Editorial Article”, SCMP, 23 June 1905, 6.
2

187

30

See the SCMP between 1904-1941.
Editorial, SCMP, 21 March 1906, 6.
32
Editorial, SCMP, 1 December 1906, 6.
33
Editorial, SCMP, 20 February 1906, 6; Editorial, SCMP, 2 December 1927, 6.
34
Editorial, SCMP, 20 April 1906, 6.
35
Editorial, SCMP, 1 May 1907, 6.
36
Editorial, SCMP, 3 January 1907, 6.
37
Editorial, SCMP, 29 October 1906, 6.
38
Editorial, SCMP, 11 October 1907, 6.
39
Editorial, SCMP 14 August 1906, 6.
40
Editorial, SCMP, 2 March 1906, 6.
41
Editorial, SCMP, 2 March 1906, 6.
42
Li Guoqi,李國祁, Minguoshi Lunji 民國史論集 (The Research Collection of Republic of China
History). (Taiwan: Nantian Shuju Youxian Gongsi, 1991), 27.
43
“Chinese Exclusive Act”, SCMP, 17 May 1905, 7.
44
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi 1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 73.
45
“A Strong Protest”, SCMP, 17 May 1905, 7.
46
Wai Ting Lu, “The Incident at Queen’s colledge”, SCMP, 11 October 1905.
47
Tse Tsantai, the Chinese Republic: secret history of the revolution. (Hong Kong: SCMP, 1924), 24.
48
Tse Tsantai, the Chinese Republic: secret history of the revolution. (Hong Kong: SCMP, 1924), 25.
49
Editorial, SCMP, 11 July 1907, 6.
50
Editorial, SCMP, 1 February 1907, 6.
51
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 71-5.
52
“Reporter Factory in China”, The Chinese Recorder, Volume 56, 1925, 297.
53
Chen Ming, Xianggang Baoye Shigao. (Hong Kong: Xianggang Huaguang Baoye Youxian Gongsi,
2005), 133.
54
“Seditious Publications Ordinance, 1914’, Historical Laws of Hong Kong Online, accessed August
27, 2012, http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/items/show/1282.
55
SCMP, 4 June 1919, 8.
56
SCMP, 27 May 1919, 1; SCMP, 5 June 1919, 6.
57
SCMP, 6 June 1919, 6.
58
“Posters in Hong Kong”, SCMP, 30 May 1919, 6.
59
Our Own Correspondent, “The Student Parade’, SCMP, 31 May 1919, 6.
60
“Demonstration in Hong Kong”, SCMP, 4 June 1919, 6.
61
“Posters in Hong Kong”, SCMP, 30 May 1919, 6.
62
SCMP, 4 June 1919, 6.
63
W.Y.S, “The Student and the Umbrellas”, SCMP 17 June 1919, 6.
64
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 63.
65
“Arrest of Hong Kong Students”, SCMP, 20 June 1919, 6.
66
Peter O’Connor, The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945. (Folkestone &
Leiden: Global Oriental, 2010).
67
Millard's Review, 5 November 1928.
68
SCMP, 7 May 1919, 10.
69
SCMP, 7 May 1919, 10.
70
“Demonstration in Hong Kong”, SCMP, 4 June 1919, 6.
71
Lam Man Sum, Hong Kong and China’s Reform and Revolutionary Movements: An Analytical
Study of The Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers, Master Thesis of Hong Kong
University, 1984.
72
“The Banks’s Review”, SCMP 26 Feb, 1912, 6; “Revolution and Commerce”, SCMP 2 Mar, 1912,
6.
73
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd), 62.
74
“Shanghai Riot”, SCMP, 2 June 1925, 8.
75
“Shanghai Riot”, SCMP, 2 June 1925, 8.
76
“Shanghai Riot”, SCMP, 2 June 1925, 8.
77
“Shanghai Riot”, SCMP, 2 June 1925, 8.
78
“Shanghai Riot”, SCMP, 2 June 1925, 8.
79
“The Shanghai Riots”, SCMP, 3 June 1925, 9.
31

188

80

“Shanghai Strike Spreading”, SCMP, 8 June 1925, 9.
“Soviet Propaganda”, SCMP, 3 June 1925, 9.
82
“The Shanghai Disorders”, SCMP, 5 June 1925, 9.
83
“Soviet Consul Denies Responsibility”, SCMP, 5 June 1925, 9.
84
“Shark’s Tears”, SCMP, 5 June 1925, 9.
85
“Bolshevist influence Proved”, SCMP, 5 June 1925, 11.
86
“The Shanghai Trouble”, SCMP, 5 June 1925, 11.
87
SCMP, 5 June 1925, 11.
88
“Anti-Communist Manifesto”, SCMP, 9 June 1925, 9.
89
“Fault of Shooting belongs to Chinese”, SCMP, 27 June 1925, 1.
90
Guo Jingning 郭 靜 寧 , Nan lai Xianggang 南 來 香 港 (Come to Hong Kong). (Hong Kong:
Xianggang Dianying Ziliaoguan, 2000), 121.
91
South China Morning Post, 25 June 1925.
92
South China Morning Post, 24 June 1925.
93
“Strikes and the Public”, SCMP, 2 June 1925
94
“Britain and China”, SCMP, 20 June 1925, 12.
95
“The Intimidators and What to do with them”, SCMP, 24 June 1925, 1.
96
“The Intimidators and What to do with them”, SCMP, 24 June 1925, 1.
97
“Chinese Merchants Meet”, SCMP, 23 June 1925, 1-2.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
101
“Chinese merchants Protection Corps”, SCMP, 26 June 1925, 3.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
“Chinese merchants Protection Corps”, SCMP, 26 June 1925, 3.
106
T.I.M, “The Meat Supply”, SCMP, 23 June 1925, 4.
107
Ex-Police Reservist, “The Hong Kong Police Reserve”, SCMP, 23 June 1925, 4.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid.
110
“Hong Kong Chinese”, SCMP, 30 June 1925, 1.
111
“Hong Kong Chinese”, SCMP, 30 June 1925, 1.
112
The Hong Kong Government Gazette, 3 May 1929, No. 227.
113
Town Dweller, “Strike Remedies”, SCMP, 13 July 1925, 3.
114
“Chinese Views”, SCMP, 5 August 1925, 5.
115
“Chinese Views”, SCMP, 5 August 1925, 5.
116
J. Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism,” in E. Kamenka(ed.) Nationalism: The Nature and
Evolution of an Idea. (London: Edward Arnold 1976), 34.
117
Huo Qichang, 霍啓昌, Xianggang yu Jindai Zhongguo 香港與近代中國 (Hong Kong and Modern
China). (Hong Kong: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1992), 170-174.
118
Chen, Xueran 陳學然. “Wusi Zai Xianggang Huayu De Xingcheng Yu Chongtang 五四在香港話
語的形成與重探” (The Formation and Revisit of the Discourse of May Fourth Movement in Hong
Kong), Twenty-first Century, 131.6 (2012): 74-86.
119
Rongfang Cai, Xianggangren Zhi Xianggangshi1841-1945 香港人之香港史 1841-1945 (Hong
Kong People’s Hong Kong History 1841-1945). (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2001), 142143.
120
“To What Purpose”, SCMP, 24 June 1925, 4.
121
Li Guangxiong [et al.] 李光雄 ... [et al.], Lishi yu Wenhua: Xianggangshi Yanjiu gongkai Jiangzuo
Wenji 歷史與文化: 香港史研究公開講座文集 (A collection of speeches and papers from the
seminars on Hong Kong history). (Xianggang: Xianggang Gonggong Tushuguan, 2005), 242.
122
Huo Qichang, 霍啓昌, Xianggang yu Jindai Zhongguo 香港與近代中國 (Hong Kong and Modern
China). (Hong Kong: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1992), 87-174.
123
Huo Qichang, 霍啓昌,Xianggang yu Jindai Zhongguo 香港與近代中國(Hong Kong and Modern
China).(Hong Kong: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1992), 89.
81

189

3. Lawn Bowls Reporting for the British
1

Claude Jeanrenaud, & Stefan Késenne, The Economics of Sport and the Media. (Cheltenham, UK;
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006), 102.
2
Kelby K. Halone, “The Institutional (ized) Nature of Identity in and Around Sport(s).” In Examining
Identity in Sports Media, edited by Heather L. Hundley and Andrew C. Billings. (Los Angeles: Sage,
2010), 239–59.
3
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 5 June 1936.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
____,“Proclamation Forbidding Bowls by King Edward III”.
11
Kowloon Bowling Green Club, A Record of Fifty Years at the KBGC.
12
“Memorandum Concerning the Company’s Building and Property”, SCMP Company Minute Book,
Volume L.
13
“Ben Wylie”, China Mail, 23 April 1948, 6.
14
“Yesterday’s Association Committee Meeting”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 27 September 1929, 10.
15
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 9.
16
“Kowloon Bowling Green Club”, China Mail, 5 October 1901, 4.
17
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 17.
18
“Single and doubles”, SCMP, 6 December 1938, 7.
19
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 65.
20
“HK Lawn Bowls Association”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 24 March 1932, 8.
21
“HK Lawn Bowls Association”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 24 March 1932, 8.
22
Robert MacWhirter, “Cheat at Money”, South China Morning Post, 13 June 1925, 10.
23
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 31.
24
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 65.
25
“Annual Dinner”, SCMP, 23 March 1910, 6.
26
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 66.
27
“Third Division”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 25 August 1941, 12.
28
“Annual Meeting of Lawn Bowls Associations”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 18 March 1939, 16.
29
“Annual Meeting” Hong Kong Daily Press, 16 January 1924, 5.
30
“Far Eastern Bowls Association Suggested By Shanghai”, SCMP, 24 October 1938, 8.
31
“New Pavilion. For Kowloon Bowling Green Club”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 13 June 1925, 1.
32
“Members’ Appreciation of New Club House”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 16 April 1927, 7.
33
“Kowloon Bowling Green Club”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 16 April 1927, 10.
34
“The Lawn Bowls Association”, The Hong Kong Telegraph, 22 March 1928, 9.
35
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 20.
36
‘Kowloon Bowling Green Club’, China Mail, 5 October 1901, 4.
37
McDevitt, May the Best Man Win: Sport, Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain and the
Empire, 1880–1935. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
38
Hall, Kowloon Cricket Club: A History. (Hong Kong: Kowloon Cricket Club: A History, 1980), 63.
39
“Reservation by Hon. Mr. J. P. Braga and Mr. M. K. Lo”, in the Report of the Playing Fields
Committee. C.S.O. 2 in 567/29, No. 2/1930, Hong Kong Government Reports Online.
40
“Reservation by Hon. Mr. J. P. Braga and Mr. M. K. Lo”, in the Report of the Playing Fields
Committee. C.S.O. 2 in 567/29, No. 2/1930, Hong Kong Government Reports Online.
41
See page 15.
42
John M. Carroll, Edge of empires: Chinese elites and British colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 102-7.
43
John M. Carroll, Edge of empires: Chinese elites and British colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 104.
44
“Reservation by Hon. Mr. J. P. Braga and Mr. M. K. Lo”, in the Report of the Playing Fields
Committee. C.S.O. 2 in 567/29, No. 2/1930, Hong Kong Government Reports Online.
45
“Kowloon Golf Club”, SCMP, 30 April 1924
46
“Lawn Bowls”, SCMP, 3 November 1919, 1.
47
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 5 June 1936.
190

48

The Annual Reports in the SCMP Ltd Minute Books, 1930s.
“HK Lawn Bowls Association”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 24 March 1932, 8.
50
“KCC Lawn Bowls Closing Day on Oct 17”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 6 October 1936, 8.
51
“Jack”, “The Relegation Problem”, SCMP, 12 June 1925, 6.
52
“Enthusiast”, “Lawn Bowls Notes”, SCMP, 12 June 1925, 6.
53
Sport, “To the Editor, S.C.M. Post”, SCMP, 10 October 1925, 12.
54
JR, “To the Editor, SCM Post”, SCMP, 3 September 1932, 8.
55
“Lawn Bowls Suggestion”, SCMP, 21 October 1938, 6.
56
“Bowl Tournament”, SCMP, 2 August 1934, 6.
57
“Empire Bowls”, SCMP, 7 August 1934, 6.
58
“Empire Bowls”, SCMP, 11 August 1934, 6.
59
“Notes on Lawn Bowls”, SCMP, 10 August 1934, 6.
60
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 18.
61
Tony Slessler, Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet, 22.
62
“Governor’s Welcome”, SCMP, 24 October 1938, 8.
63
“Governor’s Welcome”, SCMP, 24 October 1938, 8.
64
“Governor at Bowls”, SCMP, 3 December 1938, 6.
65
“Yesterday’s Association Committee Meeting”, Hong Kong Telegraph, 27 September 1929, 10.
66
Ibid.
67
“Fareast Lawn Bowls Association”, China Mail, Sept 11, 1935, 5; “Lawn Bowls Meeting”, Hong
Kong Daily Press, 7 October 1938, 8.
68
“Bomber Fund Bowls”, Hong Kong Daily Press, 10 January 1941, 2.
69
Robert MacWhirter, Lawn Bowls in Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post Ltd,
1931); Quote from Robin Hutcheon in SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983),
65–6.
70
SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 71.
71
SCMP Limited Minute Book, Volume K, 5 June 1936.
49

4. Making “an Empire Shop Window”: The British Empire Exhibition Reporting
1

John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005).
2
Elizabeth Sinn, Power and charity: Chinese merchant elite in colonial Hong Kong. (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2003).
3
“South China Morning Post”, SCMP, 24 October 1911, 3.
4
Simon James Potter, Newspapers and empire in Ireland and Britain: reporting the British Empire,
1857-1921. (Dublin: Four Courts, 2004).
5
“Wembley,” SCMP, 29 October 1924, 8.
6
. Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949. (Manchester;
New York: Manchester University Press, 1999).
7
John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005), 78-79.
8
“Afternoon Reception: A Representative Gathering”, SCMP, 4 November 1924, 3.
9
“Haven’t Made Much Money: Hong Kong’s Attitude”, SCMP, 21 November 1924, 8.
10
Anne Clendinning, “Exhibiting a Nation: Canada at the British Empire Exhibition, 1924-25”, Social
History 39, no. 77 (2006), 79-107.
11
“Hon. Mr. E. R. Hallifax, C.B.E., to be Commissioner and Hon. Mr. Chow Shou-son and Sir R. Ho
Tung, LL.D., to be Honorary Associate Commissioners of the Hongkong Section of the British
Empire Exhibition, 1924”, Jan. 4, 1924, 2, Hong Kong Government Gazette 1924 No.3, HKGRO.
12
“Final accounts of the Hong Kong Section of the British Empire Exhibition, Wembley, 1924 and
1925”, Aug. 16, 1927, 4, Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1928, HKGRO.
13
“Report of the Meeting on 31-May-1923”, 31 May 1923, 38-39, Hong Kong Hansard 1923,
HKGRO
14
South China Morning Post (SCMP), 24 April 1924.
15
The SCMP later pointed out there were 80000, not 150,000 audiences.
16
“Empire Exhibition”, SCMP, 23 April 1924.
17
“Empire’s Heritage”, SCMP, 24 April 1924.
191

18

“The Exhibition”, SCMP, 24 April 1924.
“Hong Kong at Wembley”, SCMP, 25 April 1924, 8
20
Chan Lau Kit-ching, Business and Radicalism: Hong Kong Chinese Merchants and the Chinese
Communist Movement, 1921-1934 in Lee Pui-tak (ed.) Colonial Hong Kong and modern China :
interaction and reintegration.(Hong Kong : Hong Kong University Press,2005),87.
21
“A Fitting Display”, SCMP, 25 April 1924.
22
Irene Cheng, Clara Ho Tung: a Hong Kong lady : her family and her times. (Hong Kong: Chinese
Univ. Press, 1980).
23
“An Interview with Sir Robert Ho Tung”, SCMP, 22 September 1924, 9.
24
“How the Hongkong Section Has fared”, SCMP, 1 July 1924, 8.
25
“An Interview with Sir Robert Ho Tung”, SCMP, 22 September 1924, 9.
26
“An Interview with Sir Robert Ho Tung”, SCMP, 22 September 1924, 9.
27
“An Interview with Sir Robert Ho Tung”, SCMP, 22 September 1924, 9.
28
“Hong Kong’s Display”, SCMP, 25 April 1924.
29
“Empire Exhibition”, SCMP, 23 April 1924, 9.
30
“Hong Kong Section Very Popular”, SCMP, 28 April 1924.
31
“Hong Kong at Wembley”, SCMP, 25 June 1924.
32
“Wembley Wonders”, SCMP, 5 July 1924.
33
“Come to Wembley”, SCMP, 29 April 1924.
34
“Wembley”, SCMP, 29 October 1924, 8.
35
“Wembley”, SCMP, 29 October 1924, 8.
36
“Wembley”, SCMP, 29 October 1924, 8.
37
“Wembley”, SCMP, 29 October 1924, 8.
38
“Prince of Wales Suggests another Year”, SCMP, 16 July 1924, 9.
39
“Prince of Wales Suggests another Year”, SCMP, 16 July 1924, 9.
40
“Wembley’s Results”, SCMP, 16 July 1924, 6.
41
“How the Hong Kong Section has Fared” SCMP, 1 July 1924, 8.
42
“Final accounts of the Hong Kong Section of the British Empire Exhibition, Wembley, 1924 and
1925”, Aug.16, 1927, 3, Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1928, Hong Kong Government Reports Online
(HKGRO)
43
“Wembley Next Year”, SCMP, 29 August 1924, 8.
44
“How Hong Kong Benefitted: Reform of Exporters’ Section needed”, SCMP, 27 November 1924, 9.
45
“Haven’t Made Much Money: Hong Kong’s Attitude”, SCMP, 21 November 1924, 8.
46
“Haven’t Made Much Money: Hong Kong’s Attitude”, SCMP, 21 November 1924, 8.
47
“Haven’t Made Much Money: Hong Kong’s Attitude”, SCMP, 21 November 1924, 8.
48
“Haven’t Made Much Money: Hong Kong’s Attitude”, SCMP, 21 November 1924, 8.
49
“Sir Robert’s Views: Hong Kong should not stand out”, SCMP, 24 November,1924, 8.
50
“Sir Robert’s Views: Hong Kong should not stand out”, SCMP, 24 November, 1924, 8.
51
“Sir Robert’s Views: Hong Kong should not stand out”, SCMP, 24 November, 1924, 8.
52
“Sir Robert’s Views: Hong Kong should not stand out”, SCMP, 24 November, 1924, 8.
53
“How Hong Kong Benefitted: Reform of Exporters’ Section needed”, SCMP, 27 November 1924, 9.
54
“How Hong Kong Benefitted: Reform of Exporters’ Section needed”, SCMP, 27 November 1924, 9.
55
“Will Government Help?” SCMP, 2 December 1924, 9.
56
“Will Government Help?” SCMP, 2 December 1924, 9.
57
“Will Government Help?” SCMP, 2 December 1924, 9.
58
“Will Government Help?” SCMP, 2 December 1924, 9.
59
“Will Government Help?” SCMP, 2 December 1924, 9.
60
“Hong Kong and Wembley”, SCMP, 3 December 1924, 8.
61
“Hong Kong and Wembley”, SCMP, 3 December 1924, 8.
62
“Final accounts of the Hong Kong Section of the British Empire Exhibition, Wembley, 1924 and
1925”, 16 August 1927, 3, Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1928, Hong Kong Government Reports
Online (HKGRO)
19

5. The Anti-Japanese War Reporting.
1

“H Guard to GM of the SCMP”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 10 July 1939.
“H Guard to GM of the SCMP”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 10 July 1939.
3
“H Guard to GM of the SCMP”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 10 July 1939.
2

192

4

Israel Epstein, Jianzheng Zhongguo Aipositan Huiyilu 見證中國：愛潑斯坦回憶錄 (My China Eye:
Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist). (Beijing: Xinshijie Chubanshe, 2004), 124.
5
Zhang Li 张丽, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Xianggang de Neidi Nanmin Wenti 抗日战争时期香港的
内地难民问题” (The Refugee Issue in the Anti-Japanese War period Hong Kong), Kangri Zhanzheng
Yanjiu 抗日战争研究 (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War against Japan) 4 (1994):132141.
6
Zhang Li 张丽, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Xianggang de Neidi Nanmin Wenti 抗日战争时期香港的
内地难民问题” (The Refugee Issue in the Anti-Japanese War period Hong Kong), Kangri Zhanzheng
Yanjiu 抗日战争研究 (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance War against Japan) 4 (1994):132141.
7
SCMP Minute Book, Volume K, 15 December 1938, 173,
8
“List of Refugees”, SCMP, 20 August 1937, 14.
9
SCMP Minute Book, Volume K, 15 December 1938, 173.
10
“Franklin to the board”, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume K, 12 October 1939.
11
Li Gucheng, A Comment on the Press of Hong Kong.( Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Ltd, 2000).
12
Huo Qichang, 霍起昌,9.18 Shibian yu Zhongri Guanxi: 9.18 Shibian 70 Zhounian Guoji Xueshu
Taolunhui Lunwenji 九一八事變與近代中日關係 : 九一八事變 70 周年國際學術討論會論文集
(9.18 Incident and Sino-Japanese Relations: The International Academic Conference Collection for
the 70th Anniversary of 9.18 Incident ). (Beijing: Beijing Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2004), 497-515.
13
Zou Taofen, Jingli 經歷 (Experience), (Shenghuo, Dushu, Xinzhi Sanlian Shudian, 1978), 144.
14
Wang Xiaolan 王小嵐, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guomindang de Guoji Xuanchuan Celue 抗日戰
爭時期國民黨的國際宣傳策略” (The International Propaganda Strategy of KMT in Anti-Japanese
War Period), Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu 抗日戰爭研究 (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance
War against Japan) 3（1998）:112-126.
15
Zhang Wei,張煒, “Taiwushibao dui Zhongri Zhanzheng Taidu de Zhuanbian- 9.18 shibian he 7.7
shibian xiangguan baodao zhi bijiao《泰晤士報》對中日戰爭態度的轉變——九一八事變與七七
事變相關報道之比較” (The Transition of The Times’ Attitude to Sino-Japanese War), Lanzhou
Xuekan 蘭州學刊 (Lanzhou Academic Journal) 8 (2007):174-76.
16
Chen Shuping, “Li Zhuping, Songhu Huizhan Qianhou de Taiwushibao (淞滬會戰前後的《泰晤
士報》” (The Times Reporting on Songhu Battle), Beijing Dang’an 北京檔案 (Beijing Archives) 6
(2012): 58-59.
17
Wang Xiaolan 王小嵐, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guomindang de Guoji Xuanchuan Celue 抗日戰
爭時期國民黨的國際宣傳策略” (The International Propaganda Strategy of KMT in Anti-Japanese
War Period), Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu 抗日戰爭研究 (The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance
War against Japan) 3（1998）:119.
18
Hong Kong Hansard, 7 December 1939.
19
Hong Kong Sessional Paper, 7 August 1941.
20
Sa Kongliao 萨空了, Xianggang Luxian Riji, 香港沦陷日记 (The Diary for the Fall of Hong Kong).
(Beijing: San Lian Shu Dian, 1985), 84.
21
Henry Ching Jr. Personal Communication, March 04 2013;
22
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 77.
23
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 77.
24
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
25
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 358.
26
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 77.
27
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
28
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
29
“Action by Chinese Newspapers: Japanese Advertisements to be refused”, SCMP, 26 September
1931, 13; H Guard to General Manager of the SCMP, July 10 1939, SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume
K.
30
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983),
78-84.
31
____, Yanjing Da Xue Ren Wu Zhi Dierji, 燕 京 大 學 人 物 志 第 二 輯 (Yanjing University
Biographies Volume II). (Beijing: Beijing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 2001), 87.
193

32
33

Robin Hutcheon. SCMP, the First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
“War Fund, SCMP LTD, Statement of Record of Receipts and Payments”, SCMP Ltd. Minute Book

L.
34

“South China Morning Post Donated Money to British Government to Buy Bomber”, Chinese Mail,
2 July 1940, 8.
35
“South China Morning Post Staff Donated for Patriot Bond”, Chinese Mail, 17 March 1938, 8.
36
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 86.
37
Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist. (San Francisco: Long River,
2005), 145.
38
Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist. (San Francisco: Long River,
2005), 160.
39
Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist. (San Francisco: Long River,
2005), 144.
40
SCMP Ltd Minute Books, 1920s-1930s.
41
Yang Bafan, Yangquyun Jiazhuan, 楊衢雲家傳 (The Family Memoir of Yeung Ku Wan), (MS.
Yang Xingan's Home, 1955), 58.
42
Yang Bafan, Yangquyun Jiazhuan, 楊衢雲家傳 (The Family Memoir of Yeung Ku Wan), (MS.
Yang Xingan's Home, 1955), 58.
43
Yang Bafan, Yangquyun Jiazhuan, 杨衢云家传 (The Family Memoir of Yeung Ku Wan), (MS.
Yang Xingan’s Home, 1955), 58; Wang Peizhi 王培智, “Chen Qiyou Yanjiu 陳其尤研究” (Chen
Qiyou Study), Minguo Dang’an 民國檔案 (Journal of Republican China Archive) 2 (2003): 118-25.
44
The SCMP Ltd Minute Book, December 20, 1924, December 19, 1925, Volume G.
45
Report of General Manager Ben Wylie to the board of directors, 19 December 1939. SCMP Ltd
Minute Book, Volume L.
46
____, Japanese Trample on Foreign Rights in China. (Hankow, China: China Information
Committee, 1938); ____, Sino-Japanese Hostilities in North China; a Survey of the First Five Months
of Armed Conflict North of the Yellow River. (Hankow: China Information Committee, 1938).
47
Wang Xiaolan 王小嵐, “Kangri Zhanzheng Shiqi Guomindang de Guoji Xuanchuan Celue 抗日戰
爭時期國民黨的國際宣傳策略” (The International Propaganda Strategy of KMT in Anti-Japanese
War Period), Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu 抗日戰爭研究 (The Journal of Studies of China's Resistance
War against Japan) 3（1998）:112-126.
48
Wu Yanjun, “The Department of International Propaganda of KMT in the Second Anti-Japanese
War Period.” Journal of Historical Archive 2 (1990): 125+.
49
“Chinese Industrial Co-op Move is Supported by British”, Mason City Globe Gazette, 21 July 1939,
6.
50
Gan Xianfeng, Zhongguo Dui Wai Xin Wen Chuan Bo Shi. (Fuzhou: Fujian Ren Min Chu Ban She,
2004), 98-101.
51
Frank H. H. King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King. The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 278.
52
HSBC Holdings Plc, The HSBC Group: A Brief History. London: HSBC Holdings Plc, 2009.
HSBC's History. (London: The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, 2009). Web.
27 Dec. 2012.
53
Frank H. H King, David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 358.
54
Yao Songling, Zhong Hang Fu Wu Ji. (Taibei: Zhuan Ji Wen Hsueh Chu Ban She, 1968), 31.
55
Elizabeth Sinn, Yu Xianggang Bing Jian Mai Jin: Dong Ya Yin Hang, 1919-1994. (Hong Kong:
Dong Ya Yin Hang, 1994), 49-50.
56
Huazi Ribao (Chinese Mail), 3 December 1939; Zhongguo Yinhang Zonghang, Zhongguo Di’er
Lishi Dang’an’guan, 中國銀行總行, 中國第二歷史檔案館合編, Zhongguo Yinhang Hangshi Ziliao
Huibian 1912-1949 中國銀行行史資料匯編 1912-1949 (Records of the Central Office of the Bank of
China 1912-1949). (Beijing: Beijing Dang’an Chubanshe, 1991. 北京: 檔案出版社, 1991), 1586-7.
57
“Action by Chinese Newspapers: Japanese Advertisements to be refused”, SCMP, 26 September
1931, 13.
58
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 29.
59
SCMP Shipping Advertisements in 1930s.
60
South China Morning Post Advertisement, SCMP, 1 July 1941, 15.
194

61

Violet Sweet Haven, Gentlemen of Japan, a Study in Rapist Diplomacy. (Chicago, NY: Ziff-Davis
Pub., 1944), 154.
62
SCMP Ltd Minute Book, Volume L, 19 December 1939.
63
“Further Rioting, Boycott Leaflets”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 13; “Wanchai Riot: Chinese
Attack on Japanese Shops; Hong Kong Feeling: Flags Half-Masted on Chinese Buildings”, SCMP, 24
September 1931, 13.
64
“Hong Kong Feeling: Flags Half-Masted on Chinese Buildings”, SCMP, 24 September 1931, 13.
65
“Further Rioting, Boycott Leaflets”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 13.
66
Englishman, “Colony’s Shame”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 9.
67
“Recrimination”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 10.
68
“Recrimination”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 10.
69
Englishman, “Colony’s Shame”, SCMP, 29 September 1931, 9.
70
“Chinese Protest”, SCMP, 30 September 1931, 9.
71
“Chinese Protest”, SCMP, 30 September 1931, 9.
72
A Chinese, “Chinese Protest”, SCMP, 30 September 1931, 9.
73
“Chinese Protest”, SCMP, 30 September 1931, 9.
74
T.A. Robertson, Lieut. Colonel, “The Anti-Japanese Riots”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 10.
75
“Hongkong’s Disgrace”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 10.
76
“Keep off the streets”, SCMP, 28 Sept 1931, 10.
77
“Sound Advice by Chinese members of Council”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 14.
78
“Sound Advice by Chinese members of Council”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 14.
79
“Sound Advice by Chinese members of Council”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 14.
80
“Sound Advice by Chinese members of Council”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 14.
81
“Sound Advice by Chinese members of Council”, SCMP, 28 September 1931, 14.
82
“China and Japan”, SCMP, 24 September 1931, 10.
83
Robin Hutcheon, SCMP: The First Eighty Years. (Hong Kong: SCMP Ltd, 1983), 76.
84
A Chinese Observer, “China At Bay”, SCMP, 18 August 1937, 9.
85
A Chinese Observer, “China At Bay”, SCMP, 18 August 1937, 9.
86
A Chinese Observer, “China At Bay”, SCMP, 18 August 1937, 9.
87
Franklin to the Board, SCMP Limited Minute book Volume K, 12 October 1939.
88
Soong Ching Ling, “____”, SCMP, 9 December 1941.
89
Walter Hanming Chen, “Japan’s Sincerity”, SCMP, 9 December 1941.
90
Chen Jun Bao 陳君葆, and Rong Gun. Xie 謝榮滾. Chen Jun Bao Ri Ji 陳君葆日記 (The Diary of
Chen Junbao). Vol. 1. (Xiang Gang: Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan (Xiang Gang) Gong Si, 1999), 375.
91
Chen Jun Bao 陳君葆, and Rong Gun. Xie 謝榮滾. Chen Jun Bao Ri Ji 陳君葆日記 (The Diary of
Chen Junbao). Vol. 1. (Xiang Gang: Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan (Xiang Gang) Gong Si, 1999), 341.
92
Violet Sweet Haven, Gentlemen of Japan, a Study in Rapist Diplomacy. (Chicago, NY: Ziff-Davis
Pub., 1944), 151.
93
“Editorial: Comment on Reading the South China Morning Post”, Ta Kung Pao, 19 August 1938.
94
Henry Ching, “Nanhua Zaobao Youmo Xiaoping”, Ta Kung Pao, 26 January 1940, 3.
95
“Heping zhi Daijia, Nanhua Zaobao Shenxu Woguo Kangzhan Jingshen”（The Cost of Peace, The
SCMP Greatly Praised Chinese Anti-Japanese Spirit）, HuaziRibao（Chinese Mail）, 14 Jan 1937.
96
Liao Chengzhi 廖承志, Liao Chengzhi Wen Ji 廖承志文集（The Collection of Liao Chengzhi）
(Hong Kong: San Lian Shu Dian (Xianggang) You Xian Gong Si, 1990), 61.
97
“Japan Blockades China Coast”, The Industrial & Commercial Daily, 28 August 1937, 9.
98
“Japan Blockades China Coast”, The Industrial & Commercial Daily, 28 August 1937, 9.
99
“Japanese Bomber Seriously Hurt British Ambassador Outside of War Zone”, The Industrial &
Commercial Daily, 29 August 1937, 9.
100
“South China Morning Post Criticized the Western Powers’ Hesitation and Delaying”, Chinese
Mail, 25 November 1937, 8.
101
“Comment on the Treaty between Wang Jingwei and Japan”, Ta Kung Pao, 2 December 1940, 17.
102
“English Newspaper Criticized Wang Jingwei”, Chinese Mail, 24 January 1940, 8.
103
“South China Morning Post Denounced the Conditions of Peace of Japanese”, Chinese Mail, 14
November 1937, 8.
104
“SCMP Said China Must Win”, Ta Kung Pao, 3 September 1938, 4.
105
Wu Yanjun, "Kangzhan Shiqi Guomindang Zhengfu de Guoji Xuanchuanchu 抗戰時期國民黨政
府的國際宣傳處" (The Department of International Propaganda of KMT in the Second Anti-Japanese
War Period), Lishi Dangan 歷史檔案 (Journal of Historical Archive) 2 (1990): 125+.
195

106

The Clearfield Progress, 5 October 1937, 4.
Ferdinand Kuhn Jr., “Britain Reasserts Protest at Tokyo”, New York Times, 28 September 1937, 12;
“American Hospital in China Destroyed by Japanese Bombs”, New York Times, 28 September 1937,
12.
108
“Isolation Not Protection Says President”, Chronicle Telegram, 5 October 1937, 1.
109
“Chinese Rush Troops into Danger Zone”, The Zanesville Signal, 13 October 1938, 1.
110
Israel Epstein, My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist. (San Francisco: Long River,
2005), 118.
107

Conclusion

196

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources:
Company Archive:
The South China Morning Post Company Minute Books. Hong Kong: South China Morning
Post Limited.
Government Documents:
Great Britain Colonial Office. Original Correspondence: Hong Kong (1903-1941), C.O. 129.
(Microfilm, stored in the University of Hong Kong Library)
Hong Kong Sessional Papers (1903-1940), from Hong Kong Government Reports Online
(HKGRO)
Hong Kong Administrative Reports (1903-1941), from Hong Kong Government Reports Online
(HKGRO)
Hong Kong Hansard (1903-1941), from Hong Kong Government Reports Online (HKGRO)
Hong Kong Government Gazette (1903-1941), from Hong Kong Government Reports Online
(HKGRO)
Joseph Whittelsey Noble Documents at Hong Kong Public Records Office.
Personal Documents:
Yang Bafan, Family History of Yeung Ku Wan, (not published).
Tse Tsan Tai Collection, stored in Clarence River Historical Society, Australia.
Tse Tsan Tai Collection, from Dr. Elizabeth Sinn, the University of Hong Kong.
The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison and Tse Tsan Tai, from G. E. Morrison Papers, stored in
the State Library of the New South Wales, Australia.
Shi Jianru Written Confession, 1900.
Dr. Noble Collection, collected for ZOU Yizheng from Cumberland County Historical Society
Library Document, Pennsylvania, USA.
Dr. Noble Collection, collected for ZOU Yizheng from the Dental Library of the University of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, USA.
Tse Tsan Tai, The Chinese Republic Secret History of the Revolution. Hong Kong: South China
Morning Post, 1924.
Tse Tsan Tai, The Creation; the Real Situation of Eden, and the Origin of the Chinese. Hongkong:
Kelly & Walsh, 1914.
Tse Tsan Tai, Ri E Zhanwu Riji. Beijing: Xue Yuan Chu Ban She, 2006.
Tse Tsan Tai to C.C. Greenway, in the Greenway Family Papers (1817-1903), CY Reel 271, p.271,
the State Library of New south Wales, Macquarie Street, Sydney NSW 2000, Australia.
________, Wusiyundong Qinliji. Beijing: Zhongguo Wen Shi Chu Ban She, 1999.

Interviews:
Interview with Andrew Tse Kwok-cheong, grandson of Tse Tsan Tai (co-founder of the South
China Morning Post), November 26, 2010;
Interview with Henry Ching Jr., son of Henry Ching (former editor of the South China Morning
Post), January 18, 2011;
Interview with Helen Franklin, daughter of F.P. Franklin (former acting general manager of the
South China Morning Post and the manager of the Hong Kong Telegraph), February 14, 2011.
Interview with Robin Hutcheon, former editor of the South China Morning Post, December 19,
2009, March 23, 2011, August 6, 2012, August 9, 2012.
Newspapers:
China Mail, 1895-1941.
Chronicle Telegram, 1937
Gongshang Ribao, 工商日報, 1930-1941.
Hong Kong Daily Press, 1895-1941.
Hong Kong Telegraph, 1895-1941.
Hong Kong Weekly Press, 1903.
Huaqiao Ribao, 華僑日報, 1930-1941.
197

Ta Kung Pao, 大公報, 1930-1941.
Huazi Ribao, 華字日報, 1900-1941.
Mason City Globe Gazette, 1939
North China Herald, 1926.
Racine Journal Times, 1939.
South China Morning Post, 1903-1941.
The Chinese Recorder, 1903-1941.
The Clearfield Progress, 1937.
The Zanesville Signal, 1938.
Waterloo Daily Courier, 1950.
Zuguo Wenmingbao, 祖國文明報, 1907.
Guomin Riribao, 國民日日報, 1900-1910.
Secondary Sources:
Books Written in English:
_______, American University Men in China. Shanghai: Comacrib, 1936.
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1991.
Bernstein, Alina, and Neil Blain. Sport, Media, Culture: Global and Local Dimensions. London: F.
Cass, 2003.
Bickers, Robert A. Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism 1900-1949.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
Cameron, Nigel. Power: The Story of China Light. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1982.
Carroll, John M. Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Chalaby, Jean K. The Invention of Journalism. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan,
1998.
Chan, Joseph Man., and Jinquan Li. Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press
in China's Orbit. New York: Guilford, 1991.
Cunningham, Alfred. To-day in Egypt; Its Administration, People and Politics, London: Hurst &
Blackett, 1912.
Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. Power without Responsibility: Press, Broadcasting and the
Internet in Britain. London: Rutledge, 2010.
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-system, 1830-1970.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Dayan, Daniel, and Elihu Katz. Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1992.
Dykhuizen, George. The Life and Mind of John Dewey. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1973.
Epstein, Israel. My China Eye: Memoirs of a Jew and a Journalist. San Francisco: Long River,
2005.
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London:
Pluto, 1993.
Hall, Peter Arthur. Kowloon Cricket Club: A History. Hong Kong: Kowloon Cricket Club, 1980.
Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Haven, Violet Sweet. Gentlemen of Japan, a Study in Rapist Diplomacy. Chicago, NY: Ziff-Davis
Pub., 1944.
Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
HSBC Holdings Plc. The HSBC Group: A Brief History. London: HSBC Holdings Plc, 2009.
HSBC’s History. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited, 2009. Web. 27
Dec. 2012.
Hsu, Berry Fong-Chung. The Common Law: In Chinese Context. Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 1992.

198

Hundley, Heather L., and Andrew C. Billings. Examining Identity in Sports Media. Los Angeles:
Sage Publications, 2010.
Hutcheon, Robin. SCMP: The First Eighty Years. Quarry Bay, Hong Kong: South China Morning
Post, Publications Division, 1983.
_______, Japanese Trample on Foreign Rights in China. Hankow, China: China Information
Committee, 1938.
Jeanrenaud, Claude, and Stefan Kesenne. The Economics of Sport and the Media. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 2006.
Kaul, Chandrika. Reporting the Raj: The British Press and India, C. 1880-1922. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003.
King, Frank H. H., and Prescott Clarke. A Research Guide to China-coast Newspapers, 1822-1911.
Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965.
King, Frank H. H., David J. S. King, and Catherine E. King. The Hongkong Bank in the Period of
Imperialism and War, 1895-1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth. Vol. II. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Lai, Carol P. Media in Hong Kong: Press Freedom and Political Change, 1967-2005. London:
Routledge, 2007.
Mauss, Marcel. The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. London:
Routledge, 2002.
McDevitt, Patrick F. May the Best Man Win: Sport, Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain
and the Empire, 1880-1935. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
O’Connor, Peter. The English-language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-1945. Folkestone:
Global Oriental, 2010.
Pomerantz-Zhang, Linda. Wu Tingfang (1842-1922): Reform and Modernization in Modern
Chinese History. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992.
Porter, Bernard. The Absent-minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004.
Potter, Simon James. Newspapers and Empire in Ireland and Britain: Reporting the British
Empire, C.1857-1921. Dublin: Four Courts, 2004.
__________, Report on the British Press: A Survey of Its Current Operations and Problems with
Special Reference to National Newspapers and Their Part in Public Affairs. London: PEP,
1938.
Schiller, Herbert I. Mass Communications and American Empire. Boulder: Westview, 1992.
Sino-Japanese Hostilities in North China; a Survey of the First Five Months of Armed Conflict
North of the Yellow River. Hankow: China Information Committee, 1938.
Slessler, Tony. Kowloon Bowling Green Club 110th Anniversary Booklet. Hong Kong: Kowloon
Bowling Green Club, 2010.
Snow, Philip. The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China, and the Japanese Occupation. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003.
Story, Douglas. To-morrow in the East. London: Chapman & Hall, 1907.
Testart, Alain. Critique Du Don: études Sur La Circulation Non Marchande. Paris: Syllepse, 2007.
Turnbull, C. M. Dateline Singapore: 150 Years of the Straits times. Singapore: Singapore
Holdings, 1995.
Wesley-Smith, Peter. The Sources of Hong Kong Law. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,
1994.
Williams, Walter. The Press Congress of the World in Hawaii. Columbia, MO: E.W. Stephens
Pub., 1922.
Wright, Arnold, and H. A. Cartwright. Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong: History,
People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1990.

Journal Articles and Book Chapters Written in English:
Clendinning, Anne. “Exhibiting a Nation: Canada at the British Empire Exhibition.” Social
History 39.77 (2006): 79-107.
Schudson, Michael. “Toward a Troubleshooting Manual for Journalism History.” J&MC
Quarterly 3rd ser. 74 (1997): 463-76.
Sin, Elizabeth, Emerging Media: Hong Kong and the Early Evolution of the Chinese Press."
Modern Asian Studies 36.2 (2002): 421-65.
199

Volz, Yong Z., and Chin-Chuan Lee. “Semi-Colonialism and Journalistic Sphere of Influence:
British-American Press Competition in Early Twentieth-Century China.” Journalism Studies
12.5 (2011): 559-74.
Walker, R. T. “Joseph Whittlesey Noble, 1862-1949: An Oriental Entrepreneur.” Bulletin of the
History of Dentistry 133 (1985): 7-12.
Walker, R. T. “Joseph Whittlesey Noble: An American in Hong Kong.” Journal of American
Dental Association 109 (1984): 757.
Walker, R. T. “The Noble Story. (Joseph Whittlesey Noble).” British Dental Journal 157 (1984):
291-94.
Zou, Yizheng. “English Newspaper and Sport: The South China Morning Post’s Lawn Bowls
Reporting in British Colonial Hong Kong”, The International Journal of the History of Sport,
30:3(2013), 285-296.
Zou, Yizheng. “The British Empire Exhibition at Wembley and British Imperial Identity in the
South China Morning Post.” Islands and Britishness: A Global Perspective. By Jodie
Matthews and Daniel Travers. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012. 218-27.

Theses Written in English:
Lam, Man-sum. Hong Kong and China's Reform and Revolutionary Movements an Analytical
Study of the Reports of Four Hong Kong English Newspapers, 1895-1912. Hong Kong: Hong
Kong University, 1984.

Books and Articles Written in Chinese:
Chen, Jun Bao 陳君葆, and Rong Gun. Xie 謝榮滾. Chen Jun Bao Ri Ji 陳君葆日記 (The Diary
of Chen Junbao). Vol. 1. Xiang Gang: Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan (Xiang Gang) Gong Si, 1999.
Chen, Ming 陳鳴. Xianggang Bao Ye Shi Gao 香港報業史稿1841-1911 (A history of the press in
Hong Kong 1841-1911). Xianggang: Hua Guang Bao Ye You Xian Gong Si, 2005.
Fang, Hanqi 方漢奇, Yeshao Chen 陳業劭, and Zhihua Zhang 張之華. Zhongguo Xin Wen Shi Ye
Jian Shi 中國新聞事業簡史. Beijing: Zhongguo Ren Min Da Xue Chu Ban She, 1983.
Fang, Hanqi 方漢奇. Zhongguo Xin Wen Chuan Bo Shi 中國新聞傳播史(Chinese Journalism and
Communication History). Beijing: Zhongguo Ren Min Da Xue Chu Ban She, 2002.
Feng Ziyou, 馮自由. Zhonghua Minguo Kaiguoqian Gemingshi. 中華民國開國前革命史 (The
Revolutionary History of Pre-Republic of China). Taibei: Tai Wan Shang Wu, 1969.
Gan, Xianfeng 甘險峰. Zhongguo Dui Wai Xin Wen Chuan Bo Shi 中國對外新聞傳播史 (The
history of China's foreign news dissemination). Fuzhou Shi: Fujian Ren Min Chu Ban She,
2004.
Gao, Hua. Hong Tai Yang Shi Zen Yang Sheng Qi De Yan'an Zheng Feng Yun Dong De Lai Long
Qu Mai 紅太陽是怎樣升起的 : 延安整風運動的來龍去脈 (How the Red Sun rises: the ins
and outs of the Yan'an Rectification Movement). Xianggang: Zhong Wen Da Xue Chu Ban
She, 2012.
Ge, Gongzhen 戈公振. Zhongguo Bao Xue Shi中國報學史 (China Newspaper History). Beijing:
Sheng Huo, Du Shu, Xin Zhi San Lian Shu Dian, 1955.
Hu, Daojing胡道靜. Shanghai Xin Wen Shi Ye Zhi Shi De Fa Zhan 上海新聞事業之史的發展
(The Development of the Shanghai Journalism History). Beijing: Beijing Zhong Xian Tuo
Fang Ke Ji Fa Zhan You Xian Gong Si, 2007.
Hu, Sheng 胡繩. Zhongguo Gong Chan Dang De Qi Shi Nian 中國共產黨的七十年 (The Seventy
years of the Communist Party of China). Beijing: Zhong Gong Dang Shi Chu Ban She, 1991.
Hu, Shengwu 胡繩武, and Chongji Jin 金沖及. Cong Xin Hai Ge Ming Dao Wu Si Yun Dong 從辛
亥革命到五四運動 (From the 1911 Revolution to the May Fourth Movement). Changsha:
Hunan Ren Min Chu Ban She, 1983.
Huang, Qiuyun. Feng Yu Nian Hua 風雨年華 (The Years of Winds and Rains). Beijing: Ren Min
Wen Xue Chu Ban She, 1983.
Jia, Xiaohui賈曉慧. “Da Gong Bao” Xin Lun: 20 Shi Ji 30 Nian Dai “Da Gong Bao” Yu
Zhongguo Xian Dai Hua 《大公報》新論: 20世紀 30年代《大公報》與中國現代化 (The
new theory of “Ta Kung Pao”: “Ta Kung Pao” and China’s modernization in the 1930s).

200

Tianjin: Tianjin Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2002. Li, Guoqi 李國祁. Min Guo Shi Lun Ji 民國史
論集 (The Study of the Republican Chinese History). Taibei Shi: Nan Tian Shu Ju, 1990.
Li, Jinwei 黎晉偉. Xianggang Bai Nian Shi 香港百年史 (The 100 Years History of Hong Kong).
Hong Kong: Nan Zhong Bian Yi Chu Ban She, 1948.
Li, Kwok Sing 李穀城. Xianggang Bao Ye Bai Nian Cang Sang 香港報業百年滄桑 (A Comment
on the Press of HK). Xianggang: Ming Bao Chu Ban She You Xian Gong Si, 2000.
Li, Kwok Sing 李穀城. Xianggang Zhong Wen Bao Ye Fa Zhan Shi 香港中文報業發展史(The
Development History of Hong Kong Chinese Newspaper). Shanghai: Shanghai Gu Ji Chu Ban
She, 2005.
Li, Zhengxian. Malaixiya "Guang Hua Ri Bao" De Zhongguo Ren Shi: Zai Hua Qiao Yu Hua Ren
Liang Zhong Shen Fen Zhi Jian馬來西亞《光華日報》的中國認識 : 在華僑與華人兩種身
份之間 (Malaysia Kwong Wah Yit Poh Chinese understanding between the overseas Chinese
and Chinese identity). Taibei Shi: Guo Li Taiwan Da Xue Zheng Zhi Xue Xi Zhongguo Da Lu
Ji Liang an Guan Xi Jiao Xue Yu Yan Jiu Zhong Xin, 2009.
Li, Zhigang 李志剛. Ji Du Jiao Yu Jin Dai Zhong Guo Wen Hua Lun Wen Ji 基督教與近代中國
文化論文集 （The Collection of Christian and Modern Chinese Culture）. Taibei: Yu Zhou
Guang, 1993.
Liang, Shangyuan 梁上苑. Zhong Gong Zai Xianggang 中共在香港 （The Party of Communist
China in Hong Kong）. Xianggang: Guang Jiao Jing Chu Ban She, 1989.
Liao, Chengzhi 廖承志. Liao Chengzhi Wen Ji 廖承志文集 （The Collection of Liao Chengzhi
Articles） Xianggang: San Lian Shu Dian (Xianggang) You Xian Gong Si, 1990.
Luo, Chuanxu 羅傳勖. Chongqing Kang Zhan Da Shi Ji 重慶抗戰大事記 (Chongqing AntiJapanese War Record). Chongqing: Chongqing Chu Ban She, 1995.
Qiao Guanhua 喬冠華. Qiao Guanhua Wenji 喬冠華文集 (The Collection of Qiao Guanhua
Articles). Changchun: Jilin Ren Min Chu Ban She, 2000.
Sa, Kongliao 薩空了. Xianggang Lun Xian Ri Ji 香港淪陷日記. Beijing: Sheng Huo, Du Shu, Xin
Zhi San Lian Shu Dian, 1985.
Sinn, Elizabeth 冼玉儀. Yu Xianggang Bing Jian Mai Jin: Dong Ya Yin Hang, 1919-1994 與香港
並肩邁進 : 東亞銀行, 1919-1994 (Growing with Hong Kong : the Bank of East Asia : 19191994). Xianggang: Dong Ya Yin Hang, 1994.
Sun, Yat-sen 孫中山 . Sun Zhongshan Quan Ji 孫中山全集. Beijing: Zhonghua Shu Ju, 1981.
Wang, Gungwu 王賡武. Xianggang Shi Xin Bian香港史新編 （Hong Kong History: New
Perspectives）. Xianggang: San Lian Shu Dian (Xianggang) You Xian Gong Si, 1997.
Wong, J. Y 黃宇和. San Shi Sui Qian De Sun Zhongshan: Cuiheng, Tandao, Xianggang, 18661895 三十歲前的孫中山 : 翠亨, 檀島, 香港, 1866-1895 （Before Sun Yatsen’s thirty-three
year-old: Cuiheng, Honolulu, Hong Kong, 1866-1895 ） . Xianggang: Zhonghua Shu Ju
(Xianggang) You Xian Gong Si, 2011.
Yang, Bafan 楊拔凡. Yang Bafan Jiazhuan 楊拔凡家傳 （The Family Memoir of Yeung Ku
Wan）. 1955. MS 58. Yang Xingan's Home, no page.
Yang, Kuisong 楊奎松. Zhong Jian Di Dai Di Ge Ming: Zhongguo Ge Ming de Ce Lue Zai Guo
Ji Bei Jing Xia Di Yan Bian 中間地帶的革命 : 中國革命的策略在國際背景下的演變
（Evolution of the middle ground of the revolution: the strategy of the Chinese revolution in
the international context）. Beijing: Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Dang Xiao Chu Ban She, 1992.
_________, Yanjing Da Xue Ren Wu Zhi 燕京大學人物志 （The Characteristic Record of
Yanjing University）.Vol. 2. Beijing Shi: Beijing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 2001.
Yao, Songling 姚崧齡. Zhong Hang Fu Wu Ji 中行服務記 (The Record of Bank of China Record).
Taibei: Zhuan Ji Wen Hsueh Chu Ban She, 1968.
__________, Zhongguo Yin Hang Hang Shi Zi Liao Hui Bian 中 國 銀 行 史 資 料 彙 編
（Compilation of the history of the Bank of China）.Vol. 1. Beijing: Dang and Chu Ban She,
1991.
Zhou, Jiarong 周佳榮. Jin Dai Ri Ren Zai Hua Bao Ye Huo Dong 近代日人在華報業活動
（Modern Japanese Press Activities in China）. Xianggang: San Lian Shu Dian (Xianggang)
You Xian Gong Si, 2007.

201

Zhu, Jin Fu 朱金甫. Qing Mo Jiao An 清末教案 （Late Qing Christian Cases）. Beijing: Zhong
Hua Shu Ju, 1998.
Zou, Taofen 鄒韜奮. Jing Li 經歷 (Experience). Beijing: Sheng Huo, Du Shu, Xin Zhi San Lian
Shu Dian, 1978.
Journal Articles Written in Chinese:
Chen, Xueran 陳學然. “Wusi Zai Xianggang” Huayu De Xingcheng Yu Chongtang. 五四在香港
話語的形成與重探 (The Formation and Revisit of the Discourse of May Fourth Movement in
Hong Kong) .Twenty-first Century 131.6 (2012): 74-86.
Lin, Quan 林泉. Jingcheng Zuizao De Taibao Qiye 京城最早的臺胞企業 （The First Taiwan
Compatriots’ Enterprise in Beijing）. Beijing Guancha=Journal of Beijing Observation 10
(2002): 54-56.
Liu, Guo-qiang 劉國強, and Hui Chen 陳慧. Lianzhou Jiaoan Shulun 連州教案述論(A Review
Of Lianzhou Christian Incident). Journal Of Guangzhou University (Social Science Edition) 12
(2002): 8-11.
Qian, Niansun 錢念孫. Zhu Guangqian yu Wusi Yundong 朱光潛與五四運動 (Zhuguangqian and
the May Fourth Movement). Xinwenxue Shiliao 4 (2003): 93-99.
Wang, Peizhi 王培智. Chen Qiyou Yanjiu 陳其尤研究 （Chen Qiyou Study）. Journal of
Republican China Archive 2 (2003): 118-25. Web.
Wu, Yanjun 武燕軍. Kangzhan Shiqi Guomindang Zhengfu de Guojixuanchuanchu 抗戰時期國
民黨政府的國際宣傳處 (The Department of International Propaganda of KMT in the Second
Anti-Japanese War Period ). Journal of Historical Archive 2 (1990): 125+.
Xu, Yuebiao 徐曰彪. Jindai Xianggang Renkou Shixi 1841-1941 近代香港人口試析1841-1941
年 (Modern Hong Kong Population Analysis (1841-1941). Modern Chinese History Studies 3
(1993): 1-28.
Zhang, Li 張麗. Ershi shiji Shangbanqi Xianggang Renkou Yanjiu (1901-1941) 20世紀上半期香
港人口研究（1901-1941年）（The First Half of the 20th Century Hong Kong Population
Study (1901 ~ 1941) ）. Chinese Academy Of Social Sciences Academic, Youth History Forum,
2003 Volume (2003): no page. 29 Oct. 2005. Web. 27 Dec. 2012.
Zou, Yizheng 鄒 一 崢 . Geming Xuanchuan Xianqu Xie Zantai 革 命 宣 傳 先 驅 謝 纘 泰 (The
Revolutionary Propaganda Pioneer Tse Tsan Tai). Zhuanji Wenxue =the Journal of
Biographical Literature 4 (2010): 70-82.
Zou, Yizheng 鄒一崢. Xiezantai Sixiang Fazhan he Aodaliya de Lianxi 謝贊泰思想發展和澳大
利亞的聯繫 （The Evolution of Tse Tsan Tai’s Thought and His Connection with Australia）.
Zhuanji Wenxue =the Journal of Biographical Literature 10 (2013):51-65.

202

